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Initially praised as independent voices in a region known for authoritarian 
control, the pan-Arab satellite news networks have been criticized for airing content 
that is overtly violent, and sensational. Guided by framing theory and media 
categorization based in press theory and political economy models, a quantitative 
content analysis was conducted on news programming from five networks—Al 
Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Al Arabiya, Alhurra, and BBC Arabic—to determine if 
differences exist between the networks, and between 2 dimensions of a network 
taxonomy—western and liberal commercial—in how news selection, content, and 
sensational structural features are framed. The data from 6,595 shots and 438 
stories reveal both similarities and differences in how the networks visually framed 
their daily newscasts and Arab Spring coverage. Differences were found in the 
nominal agenda diversity of stories aired between western networks emphasizing 
more sports, and liberal commercial networks emphasizing more teases. Alhurra 
presented more Amerocentric visuals than the other networks. The liberal 
commercial networks utilized more conflict visuals than western networks. In 
addition, the conflict visuals on liberal networks were more likely to depict explicit 
violence. The study also predicted differing applications of sensational production 
techniques among the networks. Use of sensational presentation features was found 
to be more likely on liberal networks. Al Arabiya utilized more sensational 
presentation features than the other networks. Visuals from Arab Spring coverage 





while the liberal networks presented a more explicitly violent view of the uprisings. 
Al Jazeera English aired the most visuals containing conflict. Al Jazeera’s coverage 
was the most explicitly violent. No difference was found in the application of the 
human interest frame between western and liberal networks. However, Alhurra 
invoked the political frame more than Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic. Finally, use of 
sensational production techniques in Arab Spring coverage mirrored routine news 
coverage. The liberal networks relied on more sensational presentation features. Al 
Arabiya’s presentation style was the most sensational.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
After the shipwreck of communism came years of relative quiet, years of repose, 
years of sabbatical. 
 President George W. Bush, 2005 Inaugural Address 
 President Bush’s comments aptly described the decade of the 1990s for many 
with an American point of view. The fall of the Berlin Wall, demise of the Soviet 
Union, and quick liberation of Kuwait under Operation Desert Storm had left the 
United States the world’s lone “superpower.” Convinced by the pre-eminence of 
U.S. “hard power”—the ability to do things and control others through force—
America’s attention and interest focused inward. It was widely perceived that the 
United States no longer faced many legitimate rivals, or serious threats (Laqeuer, 
1994). 
This optimism was simultaneously driven by socio-political changes, and 
dependence on new communication and information technologies (ICTs). These new 
electronic communications technologies powered by the convergence of satellite, 
fiber optic, computer, and telephone technologies, facilitate less expensive, near real-
time, synchronous and asynchronous transmission, storage and retrieval of 
information, through increasingly ubiquitous transnational systems. Many 
proponents hailed the transforming nature of these new communication technologies 
to free communication from government and corporate gatekeepers and increase 
democratization around the globe. Kalathil (2002) described this optimism as a 
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“technologically enhanced Pax Americana, in which borders disintegrate and 
democratic values spread rapidly throughout a networked world” (p. 347). 
This forecast Pax Americana was somewhat short lived. Instead the new 
millennium ushered in unprecedented terrorist attacks against western targets, U.S. 
involvement in two wars, a pre-occupation with Western/Arab relations, and a 
feeling that global public opinion of the U.S. had suddenly soured. At the same time, 
the dominance U.S. media outlets once enjoyed as the world’s preeminent source for 
information also diminished, most notably in the Arab world. Many Americans 
perceived these events were correlated to the rise of pan-Arab satellite television. 
The rise of pan-Arab media began rather inauspiciously in the late 1990s, but 
has become a driving force in the region. Recognizing Arabs can’t compete militarily 
with the west, Arab visionaries harnessed the power of information technology to 
compete in a so-called battle for “hearts and minds.” Abderrahim Foukara, 
Washington bureau chief for Al Jazeera, once said that Arab satellite television 
“captured a deep-seated common existential pain called Arab sensibility and turned it 
into a picture narrative that speaks to something very deep in the Arab psyche” (as 
cited in Pintak, 2011b, p. 1). 
The current study seeks to explore the visuals of five transnational satellite 
TV news channels that broadcast to/from the Arab world for differences in the 
application of visual news frames in routine news coverage, and coverage of the 
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Arab Spring. Sensational framing, as will be discussed more fully in chapter 2, is 
manifest in news selection, content, and production elements. 
Media Revolution 
Winner argues that the introduction of new technology often “provides an 
occasion for flights of utopian fancy” (Winner, 1989, p. 106). Postman (1992) coined 
the term “Technophiles” to describe people who embrace the euphoria of new 
technology. He explained that these are people “who see only what new technologies 
can do and are incapable of imagining what they will undo” (p. 5). He further 
elaborated that it leads to a state of mind and culture that he referred to as 
“Technopoly.” 
It consists in the deification of technology, finds its satisfactions in 
technology, and takes its orders from technology. This requires the 
development of a new kind of social order, and of necessity leads to the rapid 
dissolution of much that is associated with traditional beliefs (Postman, p. 
71).  
 
Communication and technology theorists (Innis, 1950, 1951; Mumford, 1963; 
McLuhan 1964; Postman, 1992) recognized that each communication technology is 
embedded with ideological, organizational, usage, and knowledge biases that impact 
society. According to Winner (1977), this examination of the link between 
technology and society has origins in Aristotle’s discussion of inanimate instruments. 
Postman defined these technological biases as “a predisposition… to amplify one 
sense… more loudly than another” (p. 13).  
 The economic historian Harold Innis began examining the influence of the 
media after World War II. The founder of the Toronto School of thinking on media 
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and social change, Innis rewrote the history of civilization as the history of 
communication media. He theorized that every communication medium has a “bias” 
(time-biased, or space-biased) and that the bias of the culture’s dominant medium 
affects the societal form (Meyrowitz, 1985). Innis recognized that throughout history 
new communication technologies have changed society by undermining old bases of 
social power (McQuail, 2000). He argued that those in control of a technology 
accumulate power through “knowledge monopolies” (Postman, 1992). Carey 
explained that in the final years of his life, Innis became increasingly pessimistic of 
space-biased electronic media, particularly television. “He recognized that the speed 
and distance of electronic communication enlarged the possible scale of social 
organization and greatly enhanced the possibilities of centralization and imperialism 
in matters of culture and politics” (Carey, 2009, p. 105). 
 Referred to as the “Oracle of the Electronic Age,” McLuhan extended the 
work of his colleague Harold Innis. He is best known for his sound-byte style 
pronouncements “the medium is the message” (1964) and “the global village” 
(1962). The phrase, the medium is the message, illustrated his view that media 
themselves should be the central concern and that media content is only a peripheral 
issue. His writings focused on how new forms of communication technology extend 
the senses, disrupt tradition, and alter the social world (McLuhan, 1964).  
Pondering the implications of transoceanic satellite news coverage of the 
Kennedy assassination, and subsequent funeral, McLuhan prophesied a world that is 
electronically connected, eliminating time and space, and giving the appearance of a 
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global village (Gladney, 2004). McLuhan’s global village theory bestowed the 
electronic media with the power to “unify and retribalize the human race” (Ebersole, 
1995, p. 1) McLuhan said “electric speed at bringing all social and political functions 
together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to 
an intense degree” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 5). While McLuhan generally expressed hope 
and optimism, “he warned that the coming changes caused by the new conditions of 
the global village would cause turmoil and chaos. He explained that as everyone 
becomes involved in the affairs of all others (integral inclusiveness) or part of a 
simultaneous field of human affairs, the self-image of individuals and whole cultures 
and societies becomes threatened, inviting a mandate for war” (Gladney, p. 17).  
Elaborating on McLuhan, Meyrowitz (1985) argued “electronic media affect 
us, then, not primarily through their content, but by changing the ‘situational 
geography’ of social life” (p. 6). According to Mills (1956), the media provides 
people with new identities and new aspirations and provide models of conduct. 
Meyrowitz (1994) argues that television in particular has “lifted many old veils of 
secrecy” giving rise to increased citizen involvement in “local, national and 
international affairs” (p. 68).  
Rheingold (2002) contends that the new communication technologies are 
powerful because they allow humans to organize in new ways. According to Bollier, 
these technologies form the “exoskeleton of a new sort of global politics and 
culture… a slow motion geopolitical tsunami” (2004, p. 1). In 1997, Mathews 
warned that ICTs were enabling a “power shift” from the traditional Westphalian 
 
 6  
 
system of states to non-state actors (i.e., non-governmental organizations, terrorists, 
organized criminals, media outlets, social movements), which Moore (2003) referred 
to as the “second superpower” (p. 3). “We are outgrowing the nation-state a new 
form of world is emerging, a global village, a universal brotherhood of world 
government on a shrunken planet” (Carey, 1992, p. 170). 
While the idea of an impending utopia may be premature, there is growing 
evidence of the intertwined nature of communication capability and the impact on 
socio-political institutions (Price, 1995). This discussion illustrates that the 
introduction of new communication systems often produce unforeseen consequences 
(Purcell & Kodras, 2001). As Rheingold (2002) states, the new technologies are 
often appropriated by end-users for purposes unimagined by both their creators and 
unsuspecting governments.  
The so-called “CNN effect” provides one example. The CNN effect is an 
often-cited concept of satellite media’s profound real-time effect on foreign policy 
decisions. The term was coined in the late Cold War period to describe the impact of 
CNN’s coverage of international events on foreign policy decision-making (Powers 
& Gilboa, 2007). Livingston (1997) described three distinct influences of the CNN 
effect on foreign policy: (1) as policy agenda-setting agent, (2) as impediment to 
obtaining desired policy goals, and (3) as accelerant to decision making. Compelling 
images of humanitarian crises (e.g., a lone man blocking a Chinese tank in 
Tiananmen square, starving children in Somalia, genocide in Yugoslavia) are often 
referenced as examples of the CNN effect in action. Newspaper columnist Marianne 
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Means wrote “We went into Somalia because of horrible television images; we will 
leave Somalia because of horrible television images” (Kalb, 2002, p. 1). 
Despite the many examples of compelling television images, the systematic 
examination of televised visuals is deficient (Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Most visual 
news analyses utilize print or web images. The deficiency may be partially explained 
by the difficulties associated with analysis of motion visuals, but may also reflect the 
perceived status of TV in the current spectrum of global communication systems. 
Television is often relegated to “traditional” or “old” media status with limited 
influence in today’s social mediated world (Hoffman, 2006). This may help explain 
why some experts argued that the 2011 political crises in Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, 
and Libya were “Twitter revolutions” (Zuckerman, 2011, p. 1). While there is strong 
evidence to support the influence of Internet and cell phone based social networking 
technologies in these recent political uprisings (see Beaumont, 2011). Cottle (2011) 
and Pintak (2011a, 2011b) argue that satellite television was instrumental in the 
uprisings as well.  
References to TV as old media may also explain why international relations 
experts recognize the increased number, and influence, of non-state actors in 
international politics, but rarely list transnational media organizations as non-state 
actors (Powers & Gilboa, 2007). Bruce and O’Hair (2009) suggested that pan-Arab 
satellite television serves as a non-state actor with influence that should not be 
discounted. Kenny (2009) goes further by arguing television is the information and 
communication technology that will have the most profound effect on the planet. He 
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refers to television as the “kudzu of consumer durables,” noting that it is rapidly 
approaching ubiquity (p. 2).  
Nowhere is the interaction of new ICTs and their impact on society currently 
more interesting than in the Arab world. New Arab-controlled and technology-
enhanced transnational television channels are allowing information to transcend 
artificial obstacles of language, culture, geography, and government leading to 
“something much more closely resembling a single market” (Alterman, 1999, p. 2). 
Seib (2008) called this superseding of traditional nationalistic Arab identity by media 
as the “Al Jazeera effect.” According to Norm Pattiz, one of the chief architects of 
the American public diplomacy efforts to the Arab world at the turn of the century, 
“Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya transcend traditional media roles...” and reflect “Arab 
nationalism” (as cited in Hudson, 2006, p. 237). Many American government 
officials have credited the pan-Arab news channels with promoting pan-Arabism and 
a contributing to a rise in anti-Americanism. 
Pan-Arabism 
It is important to classify which nation-states make up the Arab region in 
order to correctly examine this pan-Arab movement, and also to identify which of 
the recent political uprisings should be classified as part of the Arab Spring. 
Correctly identifying the people and/or location referred to by the word Arab can be 
a difficult task. The identifying terms Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim (Islamic) 
are often used interchangeably to reference both specific cultures and geographic 
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locations. However, George Hishmeh (2006), President of the Washington 
Association of Arab Journalists (WAAJ) argued that there are distinct differences in 
these terms. Distinctions can be made based on geographic location, religion, and 
culture.  
For example, Hishmeh (2006) said that the term Middle East should refer to 
the geographic region that includes the Arab states, as well as Turkey, Israel, and 
Iran. Hishmeh (2006) said that Arabs dislike being referred to as Middle Easterners. 
The people and geography of this location are also commonly referenced as the 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region by global agencies, academics and 
businesses. While no standardized list of countries exists to define this region, 
MENA generally refers to Arabic states in the region stretching from Mauritania on 
the Atlantic coast of Africa to Iran in southwest Asia. Like the term Middle East, 
some non-Arab nation states are included in this classification. 
The people of this region are also often identified by religious terms. 
However, using the terms Muslim, or Islamic, for identifying the people of this 
region is also troublesome. Saleh (2007) points out that while most Arabs are 
Muslim, not all Muslims are Arab. Indonesia, in southeast Asia, has the largest 
population of Muslims, but is not an Arab state. Instead, Rugh (2004) argues for the 
use of “language and consciousness” as criteria for defining the Arab world. Saleh 
(2007) states that Arabs “share a common geography, religion, language, broad 
culture and history” (p. 19). The current study will utilize the Arab classification 
adopted by Boyd (1999) and Rugh (2004) which referenced the people from a 
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common list of nation-states: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (the 
West Bank and Gaza), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.  
Throughout most of the last half-century, residents of these independent 
nation-states predominantly identified themselves by nationality. When asked to 
select their most important identity for the 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey 
(Telhami, 2011), respondents narrowly selected nationality (33%) over Muslim 
(31%), and Arab (26%).  Arab (27%) was selected as the respondent’s second most 
important identity ahead of Muslim (26%), and nationality (24%). The survey results 
represent a marked decline since 2009 in the number of respondents that picked 
Muslim as their second most important identity.   
Many experts believe the impact of new media (particularly satellite 
television) has helped facilitate new transnational connections among Arabs, with 
references to a new regional “public sphere” (e.g., Eickelman, 2003; Hahn, 2007; 
Lynch, 2006b, 2007; Sabry, 2007). Habermas (1989) introduced the term bourgeois 
public sphere to explain the development of capitalism in Western Europe and 
described it “as a realm of our social life in which something approaching public 
opinion can be formed” (p. 49)1. The term public sphere has come to refer to public 
opinion formation in people with a newly found shared identity of common interests, 
values, situations, and interdependence (Blitzer, 1978).  
                                                
1 There is considerable debate about the applicability of Habermas’ public sphere to 
other cultures including the Arab world (see Curran, 1991; Hahn, 2007; Sakr, 2007; 
Sparks, 1998). 
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More recently, the term has been used synonymously for new transnational 
media and their role in creating this shared identity through new arenas of public 
discourse, which bypass traditional news gates and the elites of society, help people 
learn about and debate the issues that impact them, and reveal potential responses to 
those issues (Dahlgren, 1991; Feenberg, 2002; Lynch, 2006b; Sakr, 2007). Feenberg 
(2002) described the public sphere as a: 
New transnational realm of civil society… an arena in which individuals 
participate in discussions about matters of common concern in an atmosphere 
free of coercion or dependencies (inequalities) that would incline individuals 
toward acquiescence or silence” (p. 23). 
 
While some scholars (e.g., Lynch, 2006b) suggest that multiple public 
spheres exist in the Arab world, observers often refer to two distinct strata in the 
Arab public sphere, elites and everyone else (the so-called “Arab street”2). However, 
Friedman (2002), Khouri (2002, 2003), and Pollock (1992) make three distinctions 
among the Arab public. Pollock distinguishes between the “upper crust,” the street, 
and the “fringe.” Khouri’s distinctions are between the palace, street; and 
“basement.” The Arab palace represents elite or upper-crust members of society 
including the ruling family, government and military officials, academics, journalists 
and successful merchants. The Arab basement, represents the angry fringe elements 
of society including terrorist cells. The street is everyone else in a given society. The 
street represents the large number of ordinary citizens that Khouri describes as 
“largely poor and getting poorer” (p. 2).  
                                                
2 This is a contested term among Arab media scholars (see Sabry, 2007). 
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Pollock (1992) explained that two major—and rival—camps circulate 
concerning the assessment of the Arab street—an underrated view and an 
exaggerated view. The underrated view sees opinion among the Arab masses as 
irrelevant due to the absence of democratic institutions in those individual countries. 
Subscribers to this view believe national governments, sometimes referred to as 
“Arab autocracy” or the “Mukhabarat3 state” (Pollock, 1992), keep the Arab street 
neutralized. In addition, Friedman sees the street as largely “passive and non-violent” 
(2002, p. 1). Conversely, the exaggerated school sees a seething dichotomy between 
the street and elite that threatens to boil over at any time. People with this view often 
warn, “tomorrow comes the revolution” (Pollock, p. 10). 
 Arab Public Opinion 
Due to a general lack of interest in the Arab public, and a lack of systematic 
opinion polling in the Middle East, not much was known about the opinion of the 
Arab street prior to 2000. A convergence of issues may have contributed to this 
including the lack of sophisticated marketing techniques in the area, the proprietary 
nature of polling data, the controlled nature of Arab media, a focus on Arab elites, 
and the widespread subscription to the “underrated view” of the Arab street by many 
westerners. This latter feeling is reflected in these 1991 anonymous comments by an 
American diplomat in which he referred to the Arab street as “more myth than potent 
                                                
3 According to the Encyclopedia of the Middle East, a “Mukhabarat state” is a 
“police state.” Saleem (2007) expands this definition to cover U.S.-backed heads of 
state, which maintain civilian control through the use of secret police. 
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threat” and Islamic fundamentalism as less potent than the Soviet threat (Ibrahim, 
1991). 
Therefore, Arab public opinion survey data prior to 2001 is largely 
unavailable. One of the few polls available before 2001, a 1999/2000 survey 
conducted by the Office of Research of the U.S. State Department, revealed 
favorable views of the U.S. in 24 of the 75 countries included in the survey (Kohut, 
2005). Of the predominantly Muslim countries included, only respondents in 
Pakistan had an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., while 75% of Indonesian 
respondents and 52% of Turkish respondents had favorable opinions.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sympathy and support for the United States 
surged worldwide immediately following 9/11 (Bernstein, 2003; Conetta, 2006). 
Media reports and official statements from around the world displayed a pro-
American solidarity. The cover of the French daily Le Monde proclaimed “Nous 
sommes tous Américains,” which translates to “We are all Americans” (Colombani 
2001). Arab League chief Amr Mussa said the Arab world “backs the United States 
in its declared war against terrorism ("Arabs support war," 2001). Palestinian 
leadership called the attacks “an act of absolute immorality and evil” ("Palestinian 
leadership," 2001). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations condemned 
terrorism and pledged to cooperate in the war against “the menace” ("Southeast 
Asian leaders," 2001). In a rare joint statement, Russia and NATO agreed to 
“intensify cooperation to fight the scourge of terrorism” (Daley, 2001). For the first 
time in its history the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V 
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of its charter, affirming “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Donovan, 2001, p. 1). 
In the wake of Bush’s question before a joint session of Congress, “why do 
they hate us,” (Bush, 2001), numerous polling firms rushed to measure public 
opinion in the Middle East. By the time the surveys were being conducted, the U.S. -
led invasion of Afghanistan had already begun. The Gallup organization was first to 
release results of a survey of predominantly Muslim nations. The Gallup Poll of the 
Islamic World surveyed 10,000 people in Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in late 2001 and early 2002. The 
survey found that overall, 53% of respondents had an unfavorable view of the U.S. 
and 58% disliked President Bush (Whitaker, 2002). Respondents “overwhelmingly 
labeled the United States with such negative terms as “ruthless, aggressive, 
conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, biased” (Newport, 2002). The Gallup 
organization also discovered some of the difficulties of conducting opinion polling in 
the Islamic world when Moroccan, Saudi Arabian and Jordanian officials ruled the 
question “Do you believe news reports that Arabs carried out the September 11 
attacks?” too sensitive to ask. In the six countries that allowed the question, “sizable 
minorities” were found that doubted the official Western conclusions that Arabs 
were behind the attacks (Newport, 2002). Responding to a question about the Gallop 
poll, President Bush stated, “there is no question that we must do a better job of 
telling the compassionate side of the American story” (Bush, 2002, p. 302). 
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In addition, in 2002, the Pew Research Center released the results of the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, which surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries. The poll 
found that attitudes about the United States in the Middle East (conflict area) are 
“overwhelmingly negative” (Kohut, 2002, December 4, p. 64). Findings revealed 
75% of Jordanians, 69% of Pakistanis and Egyptians, 59% of Lebanese and 55% of 
Turks had an unfavorable view of the United States. In addition, the same poll found 
that the majority of respondents (ranging from 45% in Pakistan to 85% in Jordan) 
opposed the U.S.-led “war on terror.” 
In 2003, Pew conducted a follow-up poll of 16,000 people in 20 countries 
and the Palestinian Authority. The polling, which took place after the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, revealed that opinions of the United States in predominantly 
Muslim countries had “gone beyond mere loathing” (Kohut, 2003, December 10). 
For example, favorable opinions of the U.S. declined from 30% to 15% in Turkey. 
Opposition to the U.S.-led war on terror also increased by double-digit percentages 
with unfavorable ratings ranging from 67% in Lebanon to 97% in Jordan (Kohut, 
2005). In addition, Pew found that clear majorities in seven of the eight Muslim 
countries feared the U.S. might threaten their own country (Kohut, 2003, December 
10). In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kohut (2003, 
February 27) described the poor public opinion of the U.S. in the Muslim world as 
the “most serious problem facing the U.S. abroad” (p. 1). 
The Arab American Institute commissioned Zogby International to conduct a 
survey of six Arab nations (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Lebanon) 
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called “Impressions of America.” Results of this 2002 poll also revealed “strong anti-
American negative currents throughout the region” (Zogby, 2004, p. 2). In a 2004 
follow-up survey, Zogby also found that favorable ratings of the U.S. had gone from 
bad to worse. However, these negative attitudes appeared to be aimed at the U.S. 
government and its policies rather than American ideals. As an illustration of this 
“dual pattern” of attitudes, a majority of respondents from Morocco, Jordan, UAE, 
and Egypt reported mostly favorable views of American “science and technology,” 
“freedom and democracy,” “people,” “movies and TV,” “products,” and 
“education.” 
Results of these post-9/11 polls suggest that anti-Americanism in the Arab 
and Muslim world had reached unprecedented levels (Rubin, 2002). Negative 
opinions of the U.S. have continually resurfaced throughout the decade. In a 2009 six 
country survey of Arabs, Telhami (2009) found 61% of respondents expressed 
somewhat to very unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Experts suggest that the public 
hostility not only increases the risk of attack, but also increases the ability of al-
Qaeda, and like minded groups to recruit, diminishes the willingness of the public to 
help with the “war on terror;” and make it more difficult for the U.S. to attain it’s 
foreign policy objectives in the region (Peterson et al., 2003; Telhami, 2005). 
Nye warned that in the coming decades America would need to be less 
concerned about challenges from rival nation states than the “general diffusion of 
power” (1990, p. 155). This diffusion of power may be partially attributed to 
increased adoption of information and communication technologies and the resulting 
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globalization of media. Experts posited numerous theories, from policy issues to 
superpower envy, for the rise of anti-Americanism among Arabs. Initially, U.S. 
government officials cited Arab media as the culprit. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld said, “More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the 
media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims” 
(2006, p. 2).  
Findings from a 2004 Zogby poll provide a modicum of support for this 
theory. The findings revealed that among Arabs who had no personal interaction 
with Americans and had not traveled to the U.S., the principal source of their 
information about the U.S. was “seeing or hearing Arab commentaries in the Arab 
media” (p. 13). Thus, results from these and other Arab public opinion surveys, 
along with anecdotal examples of sensational news content, fueled Americans’ 
beliefs that pan-Arab newscasts were to blame for anti-American sentiment.  
Pan-Arab Media 
 Arab media developed rather slowly compared to media in other regions of 
the world. The oral nature of the Arab culture, combined with relatively high 
illiteracy, contributed to the slow development of Arab media systems. While 
literacy rates for adults (age 15 years and older) vary greatly among the Arab states, 
the 62.2% literacy rate for the region ranks as one of the lowest literacy rates in the 
world (Hammond, 2005). In addition, the written press tended to focus on the Arab 
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elite, and reinforce barriers between Arabic speakers, which promoted nationalism 
(Alterman, 1999). 
Government press controls also contributed to the slow development of 
media in the region. Historically, Arab media systems have been some of the most 
closed media systems in the world (Hafez, 2001). Television stations tended to be 
state-owned, and controlled by the national information ministry. News coverage on 
these state-owned stations most often reflected public relations functions—or so-
called protocol news—rather than western standards of journalism (Schleifer, 1998). 
Protocol news consists of studio reports of official government business, important 
speeches, and official activities of the ruling elite (Dajani, 2007). Controlling the 
news systems is viewed as a means for stabilizing public opinion and political power 
(El Gody, 2007). Therefore, most Arab media has been categorized as Authoritarian. 
Authoritarian press systems can be simply defined as media systems that are 
continually subject to either implied or direct control by the governing system or 
rulers (Hacten & Scotten, 2002).  
The technical requirements of television have also hampered the development 
of transnational broadcasting in the Arab world. Boyd (1999) stated that 
transnational broadcasting in the region has historically referred to radio 
broadcasting. The BBC’s Arabic-language radio service was historically viewed as 
one of the most listened to sources of news by international broadcasters. Other 
international broadcasters including Voice of America (VOA), Radio France 
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Internationale (RFI), and Radio Monte Carlo Moyen-Orient also provided Arabic-
language radio broadcasts in the region. 
The majority of television stations operating in the region have traditionally 
been terrestrial-based. The technical limitations of broadcast television limited the 
signal availability to line-of-sight from the transmitter, except in the Gulf States 
where summer weather conditions improved signal reach (Boyd, 1999). These 
terrestrial-based channels were predominantly state-controlled.  
Arab transnational broadcasting has new meaning with the development of 
independent satellite broadcasting in the region. Al Jazeera is generally viewed as the 
catalyst of these significant media changes in the Arab world. A recent survey (Al-
Failakawi, 2010) found 371 satellite channels operating on the Arabsat and Nilesat 
satellites. The overwhelming majority of these channels (82%) were privately 
owned. Several channels (e.g,. Al Arabiya, Al Manar, Abu Dhabi) operate as 24-
hour pan-Arab news channels.  
 Satellite television viewership increased in the region over the last few 
decades due to Arabs’ media habits, the availability of relatively inexpensive direct 
broadcast satellite dishes, and the lifting of restrictions on satellite dish ownership 
among many nations in the region. For example, the BBC’s David Lomax 
discovered that more than 7 million satellite dishes were purchased in Iraq in less 
than a year, following the fall of the Baathist regime (2005). An Iraqi sociologist 
said, “I thought Iraqi’s were hungry for food, but they were hungry for television” 
(as cited in Lomax, pg. 2). A field study conducted for the British Council by A.C. 
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Nielsen (see Seib, 2007) revealed the most common media activity in the region is 
TV viewing (listed by 100% of respondents), followed by listening to the radio 
(73%), surfing the Internet (62%) and reading (55%). The survey also found that the 
most watched pan-Arab news channels were Al Jazeera (72%) and Al Arabiya 
(44%).  
 While Internet access in the Arab world is expanding rapidly, surveys reveal 
television still ranks as the most common source for international news. Fifty-eight 
percent of respondents to the 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey (Telhami, 
2011) identified television as their primary source for international news, compared 
to 20% for the Internet. More than a quarter of the respondents said they had only 
gained Internet access in the previous year. 
During the Egyptian uprising in the Spring of 2011, 86% of respondents to an 
Egyptian survey conducted by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) listed 
television as the most used source of information about the protests and political 
developments (Broadcast Board of Governors, 2011). Pintak (2011b) argues that 
Arab satellite television is at the “vanguard of articulating” new political 
developments “that have fueled a sense of common cause among Arabs across the 
region every bit as real as the ‘imagined communities’ that are at the core of the 
concept of nation” (p. 1). 
Despite the proliferation of pan-Arab media outlets and corresponding peak 
of interest by foreign policy experts and media scholars following the rise of Al 
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Jazeera, the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq war, there has 
been a general lack of systematic investigation of the pan-Arab satellite channels 
(Ayish, 2008; Hafez, 2008; Lynch, 2008). The increased attention to the Arab media 
sources has resulted in a number of important books, and journal articles that are, 
while informative, generally descriptive in nature, provide anecdotal evidence, and 
are mostly atheoretical. This reality has led to references to Arab media studies as 
“underresearched” (Hafez, p. 9), and a field of “deficiencies” (Lynch, p. 19). Hafez 
identified a number of reasons for the deficiencies in Arab media studies including: 
the interdisciplinary nature of Arab studies; western communication scholars’ lack of 
interest in non-western media; the language barrier; the restrictive nature of Arab 
regimes; and fear that western communication theories may not apply in the Arab 
context. 
 Hamzawy (2005) states that Arab journalists with pan-Arabist and Islamist 
credos represent their own ideological views as those of the larger Arab culture. One 
generally accepted difference of these ideological views is that the type of coverage 
and standards of acceptability differ significantly from those of Western news 
organizations, particularly in times of extreme violence (Klopfenstein, 2006).  
The current literature review reveals a void in both TV visual, and pan-Arab 
satellite news research. Many of the studies identified in the literature review provide 
cross-cultural, short-term examinations of major event coverage, through pictures in 
newspapers or from online news sources. There are virtually no longitudinal content 
analyses of the visuals contained in pan-Arab satellite newscasts. As Graber (2003) 
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notes, “many broad and definitive judgments about the substantive content of mass 
media are still made without actual content analyses of these media” (p. 140). 
The present study is an attempt to fill the void by providing a theoretical 
examination of typical news visuals, as well as visuals from crisis coverage (e.g. 
Arab Spring), on Arab satellite news channels. This comparative analysis was 
conducted at two levels: (1) the individual network; and (2) through a two-
dimensional taxonomy—western and liberal commercial—of pan-Arab stations. Five 
transnational satellite channels (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic, Alhurra and Al 
Jazeera English), broadcasting to and/or emanating from the Arab world were chosen 
for this analysis. These networks were chosen because they represent some of the 
most widely discussed examples of pan-Arab satellite news networks. In addition, 
these five networks fit into the two-dimensional network taxonomy, with Al Jazeera 
and Al Arabiya representing the liberal commercial dimension, and Alhurra, BBC 
Arabic, and Al Jazeera English representing the western dimension. Rationale for 
both the labels, and organization of these two dimensions is provided in chapter two. 
The following section provides background information on the five channels 
selected for this study. No examination of Arab television news would be complete 
without including Al Jazeera. 
Al Jazeera. Schleifer (1998) notes that the first major impact of satellite 
technology in the Middle East occurred in the eighties when daily newspapers (al-
Sharq al-Awsat, and al-Hayat) were beamed into the region from London. He notes 
that the arrival of these satellite delivered newspapers, and the television networks 
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that followed in the late eighties and early nineties, CNN; MBC (Middle East 
Broadcasting Centre); and ART (Arab Radio and Television), significantly altered 
the Arab media landscape.  
Al-Jazeera was launched in 1996 as the first independent, pan-Arab, all-news 
and public affairs commercial satellite network. The Emir of Qatar created the 
station with $137 million in startup funding. The network’s name, translated in 
English “the Island” or “the peninsula,” is an appropriate representation of both the 
geographic feature of its home nation and of its status as the lone independent Arab 
TV channel in a sea of state-owned and controlled competitors. Al Jazeera gained 
immediate credibility by hiring western-trained journalists from BBC Arabic 
television, which was closed in 1995 (Cherribi, 2006). By the end of 2001, the 
network had an audience of 35 million Arabic-speaking viewers from across the 
region (Ajami, 2001).  
The station’s motto, translated in English “opinion, and the other opinion,” 
accurately describes the station’s philosophy of thoroughly presenting all sides of an 
issue. This editorial position helped consolidate the channel’s reputation as an “equal 
opportunity offender” for negative coverage of governments in the region (except 
Qatar) and for coverage of taboo Arab subjects (Quinn and Walters, 2004, p. 58). 
According to Pintak (2011b), this was the Emir’s mandate to Al Jazeera from the 
beginning, with added benefit being increased political clout for Qatar and the Emir 
in the region. When the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ABSU) expanded by 
extending membership to private Arab radio and television stations, Al Jazeera was 
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excluded from joining (Miles, 2005). During a tour of the station in the spring of 
2000, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated “all this trouble from a matchbox 
like this?” (as cited in Miles, 2005, p. 11). Al Jazeera continues to aggravate regimes 
in the region. Recent examples have resulted in forced closures of the network’s 
Moroccan and Kuwaiti news bureaus in 2010 (Seib, 2011). 
Prior to 9/11, the network was largely unknown to most Americans, but had 
been generally praised by American journalists and U.S. government officials for 
being the only independent voice in the region (Friedman, 2001). A 2000 State 
Department report on human rights in Qatar listed the network as operating “freely” 
(Miles, 2005, p. 382). Thomas Friedman, a columnist for The New York Times, 
described Al Jazeera’s influence as “Glasnost in the Gulf” stating: 
Al-Jazeera owes its success to the fact that, more than any other TV station in 
the Arab world, it airs free and lively debates, offers timely news, even 
interviews Israeli leaders, and allows anyone to criticize Arab regimes. If you 
polled Arab leaders and asked: Which would you get rid of first, Israel or Al-
Jazeera? Al-Jazeera would win hands down (2001, p. 23).  
 
Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, chairman of the board of Al-Jazeera 
said “events themselves make news channels” (Schleifer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 1). 
Coverage of several events in the Middle East helped Al-Jazeera gain credibility as 
the regional leader for Arab news, including the network’s coverage of the 1998 
Desert Fox Campaign in Iraq and of the Al-Aqsa, (Second) Intifada in September, 
2000. Anchorwoman Muntaha Al-Ramahi stated that it was the coverage of these 
two events that established Al-Jazeera as the “number one Arabic channel in the 
world” (Sullivan, 2001).  
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Coverage of two post-9/11 events made Al-Jazeera a household name, and 
gave it global credibility. First, on October 7, 2001, the network ran a taped 
interview from Osama bin Laden in which the al Qaeda leader said Muslims should 
applaud the 9/11 attacks (Ajami, 2001). Second, due to an agreement with the ruling 
Taliban government, Al Jazeera was the only network allowed to operate bureaus in 
Afghanistan. When the American bombardment of Afghanistan began, Al Jazeera 
was the only foreign broadcaster inside Afghanistan. Its live coverage of the aerial 
attacks was picked up by other news organizations, including the American news 
networks, and broadcast worldwide.  
Al Jazeera quickly became recognized as the flagship Arab-language news 
station. “Suddenly, Arabs across the region were seeing an aggressive new style of 
reporting, in Arabic by fellow Arabs, witnessing events long hidden and hearing 
from figures banned from government TV stations” (Pintak, 2011a, p. 1). 
Furthermore, Al Jazeera successfully represented itself as the voice of the Arab street 
to U.S. audiences, and policymakers (Kalathil, 2002). 
Following these events, newspaper articles from around the U.S. appeared 
about the network (e.g., Ajami, 2001; Chafets, 2001; Curiel, 2001; Friedman, 2001; 
Harden, 2001; Kiefer & Tyson, 2001; Waxman, 2001; Zednik, 2002). While many of 
these articles were informative in nature, others were quite critical. A Washington 
Post article referred to Al Jazeera’s news coverage as “sensational,” and asserted that 
“al-Jazeera takes a consistently hostile stance toward the United States” (Waxman, 
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2001). In a New York Daily News editorial, Zev Chafets, suggested that the U.S. 
military should be left to deal with the station.  
American officials, also upset by the tone of Al Jazeera’s coverage, began 
pressuring the Qatari government to “restrain” the news network. On October 2, 
2001, the U.S. embassy in Qatar filed a formal diplomatic complaint. Meetings 
followed between Secretary of State Colin Powell, and later Vice President Dick 
Chaney, with the Emir of Qatar in which they made their displeasure with the 
network known. “Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly denounced the Persian 
Gulf station for giving "an undue amount of time and attention to some of the most 
vitriolic, irresponsible kinds of statements" (Curiel, 2001, p. A2). 
 Public opinion polls also did little to support Al Jazeera’s claims of objective 
reporting. In a 2002 poll of Americans, 78% of respondents expressed their belief 
that the unfavorable views Muslims had for the U.S. were based mostly on 
misinformation provided by their media and governments (Saad, 2002, March 7). A 
Gallup poll of Arabs in Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, also 
conducted in 2002, revealed that Al Jazeera viewers tended to have a higher 
percentage of anti-American opinions than viewers of other stations (Saad, 2002, 
April 23). Complaints about Al Jazeera’s coverage have centered around the 
station’s perceived anti-Western and anti-Israeli bias, promotion of pan-Arabism, 
lack of domestic reporting, reputation as the Osama bin Laden channel (Darwish, 
2001; Taylor, 2001), and use of slanted language (Ajami, 2001; Campagna, 2001).  
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 The official U.S. stance on Al Jazeera has softened under the Obama 
administration (Doherty, 2011). A 2009 diplomatic cable from the U.S. embassy, 
released by WikiLeaks, revealed the perceived market dominance and political 
influence of the station. 
Al Jazeera, the most watched satellite television station in the Middle East, is 
heavily subsidized by the Qatari government and has proved itself a useful 
tool for the station's political masters. The station's coverage of events in the 
Middle East is relatively free and open, though it refrains from criticizing 
Qatar and its government. Al Jazeera's ability to influence public opinion 
throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which 
it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip 
to improve relations (as cited in Doherty, p. 1). 
 
Telhami’s (2008, 2009, 2010) annual surveys of Arab public opinion also 
consistently reinforce the dominance of Al Jazeera in the region. The latest survey 
results (Telhami, 2011) indicated 43% of respondents preferred Al Jazeera for 
international news, compared to 14% for Al Arabiya. Al Jazeera’s success led to the 
proliferation of Arabic-language satellite news channels. Al Arabiya was the first 
serious rival to Al Jazeera (Dajani, 2007). 
Al Arabiya. Al Arabiya (Arabic for the “The Arabic One” or “The Arab 
One) began broadcasting as a 24-hour Arabic-language commercial satellite news 
channel in February 2003 with the explicit task of challenging the domination of Al 
Jazeera (Sakr, 2006). Saudi owned Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) operates 
the network from Dubai Media City, United Arab Emirates. 
 The story of Al Arabiya is reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s initial foray into 
transnational media in the 1960s. Kraidy (2012) notes that Saudi Arabia embraced 
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transnational media then to counter the influence of Egyptian radio on the Arabian 
Peninsula. Sheik Walid al-Ibrahim, the brother-in-law of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, 
started the network as a moderate, objective voice in the Arab world (“Al Arabiya: A 
Balanced Alternative,” 2003). In a Washington Times interview, he said he wanted 
his network “to make a difference in the world” and “get rid of the Taliban 
mentality” (“Al Arabiya Seeks Media Niche,” 2003 (p. 1). In a later interview, al-
Ibrahim stated, “after the events of Sept. 11, Afghanistan and Iraq, people want the 
truth… they don't want their news from the Pentagon or from Al Jazeera” (as cited in 
Shapiro, 2005, p. 1). Schleifer described Al Arabiya’s approach as more cautious, 
professional, and mannered (Shapiro). According to Al Arabiya managers, this 
means presenting the truth, “but no sensationalism” (Feuilherade, 2003, p. 1). 
General manager Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, who joined the network in 2004, 
described Al Arabiya as “one of the most important TV stations in a very troubled 
region” (Interview with Abdul Rahman al-Rahsed, 2007, para. 1). Dajani stated that 
Al Arabiya initially resembled Al Jazeera, but with “flashier graphics.” The network 
quickly established a reputation for breaking news coverage, as well as, for 
innovative use of technology in the delivery of television news (Al-Saggaf, 2006). Al 
Arabiya won four awards at the Fourth Arab Media Festival including “Best Website 
of an Arab News Channel” (Golden, 2006, p. 1). 
 Although created to counter the more sensational aspects of Al Jazeera’s 
coverage, Al Arabiya was also heavily criticized by U.S. officials for its coverage of 
the war in Iraq. Criticism centered around the network’s airing of taped messages 
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from Sadam Hussein in hiding, and for giving air time to masked men who 
threatened members of the U.S.-backed Iraqi Governing Coalition (Sakr, 2006). At a 
news conference in November, 2006, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
called Al Arabiya “violently anti-coalition” and later said: 
There are so many things that are untrue that are being reported by 
irresponsible journalists and irresponsible television stations, particularly like 
Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, that are leaving the Iraqi people with a totally 
imbalanced picture of what is happening in their country (as cited in Ibish, 
2006, p. 227).  
 
Despite early U.S. criticism, Al Arabiya has developed a reputation among 
Arab media critics for being pro-American, and has been referred to as Al Hebraia 
(Arabic for The Hebrew) (Worth, 2008). Al-Rashed is an outspoken critic of Islamic 
fundamentalism. One of the network’s regular programs “Sina’at al Mowt” (Arabic 
for The Death Industry) focuses on terrorism (Worth, 2008). Network policy has 
banned the use of loaded terms (e.g., calling the coalition forces in Iraq “invaders”) 
in its coverage of politically sensitive issues (Sakr, 2006). In addition, Al Arabiya 
has been the chosen media outlet when U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama addressed the Arab world. 
  Early evidence suggests Al Arabiya quickly found an audience in the region. 
The network was particularly popular in Iraq. A 2003 U.S. State Department poll 
conducted in seven Iraqi cities, found 37% of satellite news viewers ranked Al 
Arabiya as their top choice for news, followed by Al Jazeera (26%). A field study 
conducted for the British Council by A.C. Nielsen (Seib, 2007) found the most 
watched pan-Arab news channels were Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Lynch (2008) 
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referred to Al Arabiya as a challenger to Al Jazeera in the region. Telhami’s (2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011) annual survey of six Arab countries also consistently found Al 
Arabiya ranked as one of the most watched pan-Arab news channels. The 2011 
survey revealed a marked increase, from 2010 (3%) to 2011(14%), in the number of 
respondents who chose Al Arabiya as the station they watch most often for 
international news coverage (Telhami, 2011). Research by the BBG (2011) also 
found Al Arabiya was ranked the most watched and most reliable Arab network by 
Egyptians during the 2011 political uprising. Of the eight channels listed in the 
survey, Al Arabiya ranked the highest with 65% of respondents stating that they used 
the network for information during the crisis.  
International Broadcasting 
 In addition to the numerous pan-Arab satellite networks, a number of 
international broadcasters are also beaming Arabic-language news into the region. 
The term international broadcasting generally refers to government sponsored 
broadcasting aimed at audiences in another nation-state or region. Germany’s 
Deutsche Welle, France 24, Russia TV Today, and China Central TV (CCTV) have 
all joined the evolving and congested Arab media environment.  
 Two of the most talked about Arabic-language foreign channels are Alhurra 
and BBC Arabic. However, this section also includes a discussion of Al Jazeera 
English, which originates English-language newscasts from the Middle East which 
are broadcast around the world.  
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 Alhurra. Spurred by policies of protectionism and peace dividends, 
American soft power (which was an effective element of the U.S. cold war 
strategy)—“when one country gets other countries to want what it wants” (Nye, 
1990)— began to atrophy. In terms of national security, this mentality resulted in 
reduced interest and spending on foreign affairs, public diplomacy and military 
intelligence operations. The roughly ten years of relative peace and prosperity, 
between the fall of the Soviet Union and 9/11, brought multiple reorganizations 
within the public diplomacy apparatus and continual declines, as much as 40%, in 
the resources available to public diplomacy (Slavin, 2002). Richard Holbrooke’s 
comment about Osama bin Laden’s communication skills may have best summed up 
America’s communication problem at the turn of the century: “How can a man in a 
cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?” (Holbrooke, 
2001, p. B07).  
Writing in 1994, Walter Laqueur warned that a major crisis could have a 
“salutary effect… putting an end to lethargy and indifference” (p. 24). The terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, growing anti-Americanism, and numerous private and government 
reports (e.g., Armitage & Nye, 2007; Blinken, 2003; Bollier, 2004; Djerejian, 2003; 
Johnson & Dale, 2003; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2002) woke many 
government officials from their sabbaticals of reason. They quickly realized that the 
American public diplomacy “machinery” had begun, in the words of The 
Washington Post, “to cough, sputter, misfire” (Moeller, 2005, p. B5).  
While America’s failure to utilize its soft power resources was a universal 
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problem, it was most pronounced in the Arab and Muslim world. The slice of public 
diplomacy resources dedicated to the Arab world was focused on elites. (Ross & 
Slavin, 2002). This strategy meant, for one thing, that less than 2% of the Arab 
population was able to hear Voice of America broadcasts (Blinken, 2003). By early 
2002, communicating with the Arab world had become a priority for American 
diplomacy. President Bush charged the office of the under-secretary of state for public 
diplomacy and public affairs with the task of improving the U.S. image overseas. Public 
diplomacy is defined as the “promotion of the national interest by informing, 
engaging, and influencing people around the world” (Djerejian, 2003, p. 13). “There 
is no question that we must do a better job of telling the compassionate side of the 
American story. We’ve got work to do” (Newport, 2002, p. 1) 
The President appointed a series of high-profile communication experts 
(Charlotte Beers, Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes) to the public diplomacy post. 
The result was a number of initiatives designed to sell “brand America” to the 
Muslim world including—the Shared Values public service announcement (PSA) 
campaign, Hi magazine, and Radio Sawa.  
The backbone of the Bush administration’s “battle for hearts and minds,” 
however, was a new 24-hour satellite network called Alhurra4. “The Bush 
administration viewed satellite television as a so-called soft-power tool for building 
good will toward the United States” (Morgan, 2005, p. 1). On the outskirts of the 
                                                
4 There are various spellings/capitalizations for the name of the network. The author 
has chosen to follow the conventions dictated by the BBG. 
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Capitol beltway, in Springfield, Virginia, the government-funded Alhurra Television 
Network began beaming Arabic language programming to the Middle East on 
February 14, 2004. The network, which received $100 million in startup funding 
from the U.S. government, was launched to counter the pan-Arab satellite networks 
and promote freedom. The establishment of Alhurra marked a significant turning 
point in the way the U.S. government would communicate policy to the Arab world. 
Alhurra (and Radio Sawa) is operated by the Middle East Television Network 
(MTN). MTN is a “grantee organization” which receives federal funding through the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The BBG mission is “to promote freedom 
and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and 
information about the United States and the world to audiences overseas” 
(Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2005, p. 2). The network provided evidence of 
the Bush administration’s renewed commitment to communication technology in the 
global war on terror. 
Alhurra targets a young (under 30 years-of-age) general audience in the 
Middle East. In addition to news, programming includes fitness, fashion, 
entertainment news, science and technology, and sports. In April 2004, Alhurra Iraq 
was launched to provide programming specifically designed for an Iraqi audience.  
Even before Alhurra debuted, there was widespread speculation about the 
effectiveness of this public diplomacy effort, both from home and abroad. The first 
hurdle for the network would be to find an audience in an already congested Arab 
media landscape. An additional challenge was “to persuade a world cynical about 
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spin that the U.S. is not just pushing good news stories but is being straightforward; 
and explaining policies many will not like” (Deluca, 2005, p. 17). In contrast, the 
Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 
Djerejian (2003) wrote that if Alhurra “succeeds in attracting and influencing a 
significant audience, it will become a critical U.S. Government-sponsored voice in 
the Arab world. That would be an important accomplishment” (p. 31). 
After a few years of operation, there is widespread disagreement over 
Alhurra’s effectiveness in reaching the “hearts and minds” of the Arab world. 
Sources of disagreement involve the size of the station’s audience, effectiveness of 
programming and news coverage, competitiveness among pan-Arab broadcasters, 
and limitations of the network’s organizational structure. An evaluation of the 
network, conducted at the bequest of the BBG, revealed Alhurra’s news product was 
considered uninteresting, weak journalism, biased, propaganda, which lacked 
connection to the Arab street (USC, 2008).  
 BBC Arabic. Much like Alhurra, the new BBC Arabic was revived by the 
British government to compete with Al Jazeera in the pan-Arab satellite news 
market. In the mid-1990s, the BBC maintained an Arabic-language satellite news 
presence in the region when it operated BBC Arabic Television on the Orbit 
network. Orbit is a commercial pay TV satellite network controlled by Saudi Arabian 
interests. The Saudis cancelled BBC Arabic Television in 1996 after the network 
aired programming deemed critical of the Saudi kingdom (Boone, 2004). Al Jazeera 
was born from the ruins of the BBC/Orbit joint venture. Many of the BBC-trained 
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journalists working at BBC Arabic Television went on to work for Al Jazeera and Al 
Arabiya after its demise. 
The new BBC Arabic began broadcasting in March 2008. Like Alhurra, it is a 
government-funded entity, receiving funds from the British Foreign Office. Some 
Arab critics dismissed BBC Arabic as a propaganda tool before it ever began 
broadcasting (Jarrah, 2008). However, BBC World Service director Nigel Chapman 
dismissed the notion that the new channel would be a political mouthpiece for the 
British government stating it would report “without fear or favour” (as cited in BBC 
launches Arabic TV channel, 2008).  
Due to their Arabic-language radio service, and experience with Orbit TV, 
the BBC is a respected name in the Arab world, and BBC Arabic hoped to capitalize 
on this reputation. The head of the BBC’s Arabic Service, Hosam El Sokkari said, 
that the network will “adhere to BBC values that our audience in the Middle East has 
known since 1938” (as cited in Pintak, 2007, p. 6). Chapman stated: 
BBC Arabic is renowned for broadcasting impartial and accurate news and 
information, which is strong on analysis and expertise. [An] enhanced 
multimedia service meets the needs of an audience with a very strong 
appetite for news and debate (as cited in BBC launches Arabic TV channel, 
2008, p. 1). 
 
 Research conducted in several Middle Eastern capitals by the BBC before the 
launch of the new channel suggested that a clear majority of the people sampled 
would watch the channel often (Pintak, 2007). British officials hoped the new 
channel would attract an audience of 20 million viewers per week by 2010. 
However, during the political uprising in Egypt, the channel ranked at the bottom of 
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the eight channels listed in the BBG survey of channel use. Only 13% of respondents 
listed the channel as one they were currently using.  
 Al Jazeera English. While all of the satellite news channels mentioned to 
this point have been concerned with broadcasting into the Arab world, Al Jazeera 
English (AJE) was created to broadcast from the Middle East to the rest of the world. 
AJE was launched in November 2006, as the first international English-language 
network based in the Middle East. Just as he was with its sister network, Al Jazeera, 
the Emir of Qatar was the principal source of the more than $1 billion initial budget 
for AJE (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2008). AJE rotates its broadcasts from four news 
centers (Doha, Kuala Lumpur, London, and Washington DC) and operates twenty-
one news bureaus.  
AJE was originally conceived as a provider of “international perspectives” on 
the news, but was re-focused early on to emphasize “Arab perspectives” with “non-
Western” voices delivering the news (Pintak, 2006, p. 1). Although AJE was created 
to compete with CNN International and BBC World, its mission is to provide 
different points of view and new perspectives (Potter, 2007; Rao, 2007; Turner, 
2006). A task made easier since, according to former managing director Nigel 
Parsons, AJE is a non-commercial entity (Kolesnikov-Jessop, 2007). This affords 
AJE the opportunity to cover stories ignored by other networks, and to devote more 
time to those stories (Potter, 2007).  
The AJE website states that the channel “aims to balance the information 
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flow between the South and the North.” El-Nawawy and Powers (2008) point to 
AJE’s attempt to balance the global flow of information as an example of Sakr’s 
“contra-flow” (2007). Sakr describes contra-flow as “reversed or alternative media 
flows… that are also counter-hegemonic” (p. 117). Khamis (2007) states that AJE 
provides a “counterflow” of information from the Arab world back to the Western 
world. Al Jazeera English managing director, Al Anstey referred to AJE having “the 
same DNA” as its parent network with a commitment to being “comprehensive in 
our coverage of the Middle East” (as cited in Seib, 2011, p. 22). 
Khamis (2007) identified several challenges facing AJE including its sister 
station’s “image problem” and an “unwillingness to listen” from the American 
audience (pp. 47-48). In fact, AJE is hard to find in the U.S. due to reluctance among 
major U.S. cable TV and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers to carry it. A poll 
commissioned by the conservative media watchdog group Accuracy In Media 
(Accuracy in Media, 2006) found that 53% of surveyed Americans did not believe 
the network should be made available in the U.S. Like its sister station, AJE has also 
offended governments. In May 2012, AJE was forced to close its news operations in 
China and recall its correspondent (Wines, 2012). 
Despite the challenges, AJE’s reach is estimated at 220 million households in 
more than 100 countries. Seib (2011) identified the 2008-2009 Gaza war and the 
2011 uprisings in Egypt as coverage that meliorated the AJE brand. During the most 
intense protests in Egypt, traffic on the network’s website increased dramatically, 
with much of the traffic coming from the U.S. (Burman, 2011). Powers (2011b) 
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described AJE’s coverage of the Egypt uprising as “world-class” (p. 26). He is one 
of many media experts that tout AJE as a pre-eminent example of “networked 
journalism” 5 (Powers, 2011a). 
Summary 
 Rugh (2004) identified the population explosion, rapid urbanization, and high 
illiteracy rates in the region as reasons for studying Arab television. Despite more 
than a decade of scrutiny, little comparative systematic analysis has been conducted 
on  these channels. The purpose of this paper is to explore, through framing, the 
visuals on five pan-Arab and international satellite news channels during a typical 
news cycle. Before discussing how the study will be conducted, a review of the 
literature on visual content analysis, Arab media studies, and framing will be 
provided. 
                                                
5 The term networked journalism was coined by Jeff Jarvis in 2006 to describe the 
collaboration of journalism professionals and amateurs in the coverage of news 
stories (McGann, 2010).  
 
 39  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Most of us do not have first hand experience with countries from the Middle East, 
mass media are responsible for providing “reality” of those countries and television 
news is especially powerful. 
 Chris A. Paterson, Framing Public Life 
Arab Media Studies 
 
Historically, the Arab media has been one of the most closed media systems 
in the world (Hafez, 2001), and by extension, has suffered from a lack of research by 
media scholars. Through a non-exhaustive meta-analysis, Ayish (2008) examined 
100 content research studies conducted on Arab media by Arab scholars over the last 
forty years. He found the body of research centered on nine themes: national 
development, cultural globalization, politics, terrorism, women, children, military 
conflict, gatekeeping practices, and new media.  
In general, the majority of research on Arab electronic media prior to the “Al 
Jazeera age” largely consisted of a few broad categories: surveys of MENA media 
systems (al-Halwani, 1984; Amin, 1997/98; Boyd, 1982, 1993a, 1993b, 1999; Foote 
& Amin, 1993; Head, 1976, 1985; Kamalipour & Mowlana, 1994); media use and 
influence during the first gulf war (Al-Makaty, Boyd, & Tubergen, 1994; Boyd, 
1994; Weisenborn, 1992); the diffusion and influence of technology including 
videocassettes (Amin & Boyd, 1993; Boyd, 1987; Boyd & Straubhaar, 1985; Boyd, 
Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989); direct broadcast satellite usage in the region (Amin & 
Boyd, 1994; Ayish & Qassim, 1995; Marghalani, Palmgreen & Boyd, 1998); 
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transnational broadcasting (Boyd, 1976, 1983, 1986, 1993a, 1993b, 2001; Boyd & 
Asi, 1991); and Arab press theories (Ayish, 2002; Hachten & Scotten, 2002, 2007; 
Rugh, 1979, 2004). Historical background on the evolution of press theories6 is 
provided here because they serve as a foundation for the network taxonomy utilized 
in the present study.   
While not limited to the Arab world, press theories emerged from media 
scholars’ attempts to discover why the media operate differently, and serve different 
purposes in different countries. These theories use categories, or taxonomies, to 
represent differing functions of media based on such factors as the political system, 
economic model, and historical development of the societies in which they operate 
(Hachten & Scotton, 2002). In their classic work, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 
(1956) identified four theories of the press: (1) authoritarian, (2) libertarian, (3) 
social responsibility and (4) Soviet Communist (sometimes referred to as 
totalitarian). They acknowledged that Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist 
theories were simply modifications of the two most basic theories of the press—
libertarian and authoritarian—that have applied to media since the development of 
the printing press. 
Through the years, several variations, extensions, and re-conceptualizations 
of these concepts have been advanced. For example, Hachten and Scotten (2002, 
2007) extended the work of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm to five “ideologies” of 
                                                
6 Although the word press is most often used in the titles of these theories, and 
implies the printed media, they are frequently universally applied to all mass 
communication media.  
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the press: (1) authoritarian, (2) western, (3) communist, (4) revolutionary, and (5) 
developmental. Rugh (1979) identified four press systems: (1) authoritarian, (2) 
libertarian, (3) social responsibility, and (4) totalitarian. He used four press 
characteristics and three political characteristics as determining factors for his 
typologies. While scholars (Amin, 2001; Ayish, 2002; Boyd, 1999, Rugh, 1979) 
have historically placed Arab media under the authoritarian press system, Rugh 
(1979) argued that the authoritarian description is too broad to represent the full 
range of media dynamics present in the Arab world. Thus, he applied three subtypes 
to the authoritarian press system: (1) mobilization, (2) loyalist, and (3) diverse. Later, 
Rugh (2004) added a fourth Arab media subtype: transitional.  
More recent attempts to compare media systems have also utilized the 
political economy of the news media. In their book, Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Media, Herman & Chomsky (1988) presented a model for 
evaluating the news media’s—as primarily economic institutions—impact on 
culture. Their propaganda model is composed of five characteristics that they 
contend serve as filters on the news that reaches audiences: (1) size, ownership and 
profit orientation; (2) advertising license; (3) sourcing news; (4) flak and enforcers; 
and (5) anti-communism (terrorism after 9/11).  
  Despite these numerous extensions, Hallin and Mancini (2004) questioned 
the usefulness of these comparative models, stating they were hampered by the 
dominant Cold War ideology of U.S.-Soviet systems. “Four Theories of the Press 
has stalked the landscape of media studies like a horror-movie zombie for decades 
 
 42  
 
beyond its natural lifetime” (Hallin & Mancini, p. 10). According to Hallin and 
Mancini, this ideological framework hinders the establishment of sophisticated and 
comparative models that account for the rich diversity present in the world’s current 
media systems. Hallin (1994) also suggested many comparative models did not do 
enough to account for the media as cultural institutions and emphasized the work of 
Habermas as a means of developing a systematic approach for comparative media 
analysis. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) presented a framework for comparing North 
American and Western European media systems based on four major dimensions: (1) 
the development of media markets; (2) level of media-political parallelism; (3) 
degree or journalistic professionalism; and (4) role of the state in the media. Their 
historical analysis using these four dimensions resulted in three models called the 
Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist, the North/Central European or Democratic 
Corporatist, and the North Atlantic or Liberal models. Their findings indicated five 
forces of homogenization—(1) Americanization of media; (2) technological 
dependence; (3) modernization; (4) secularization; and (5) commercialization—
resulted in a “historic shift” that propelled some European media systems toward the 
Liberal model. They define liberal media as “commercialized, politically unaligned, 
and ‘catch-all’ media” (Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 7). 
Unlike former press theories, Hallin and Mancini (2004) stated they did not 
intend their models to serve as general categories for analysis of other media systems 
from around the globe. However, their edited book Comparing Media Systems 
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Beyond the Western World (2012) presents cases in which these models are applied 
in other media contexts. In one chapter, Kraidy (2012) conducts comparative 
analysis of national and supranational forces in Lebanese and Saudi Arabian media 
systems. Kraidy argues that the Arab media operate in a mix of national political 
systems and media systems that are increasingly influenced by regional forces. He 
placed the pan-Arab media system as a mix of the Polarized Pluralist and the Liberal 
models. He joins other scholars (see Hallin, 2009; and Livingstone, 2003) in 
advocating a transnational approach for comparative media analysis.  
These conceptualizations have often been based on the empirical analysis of 
historical and structural elements of media systems with the nation state serving as 
the unit of analysis (Hallin & Mancini, 2012). However, the present study will focus 
on media content as the unit of analysis. Still, the conceptualizations presented by 
Hallin and Mancini served as a guide for identifying the two-dimensional network 
taxonomy, and for making predictions about the visual content and structure of 
transnational Arab television.  
Previous research utilizing television content as the unit of analysis should 
also inform predictions for the current study. In one of the few systematic studies of 
the news content of national and transnational Arab television channels, Ayish 
(2002) examined news content from three networks—Syrian Satellite Channel, Abu 
Dhabi Satellite Channel and Al Jazeera—representing three different political 
patterns of communication. He referred to the differing media systems as political 
patterns of television and labeled the channels traditional government-controlled 
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television, reformist government-controlled television, and liberal commercial 
television respectively. The latter he described as a new transnational pattern 
characterized by professional standards, presented in western-styled “critical and 
pluralistic views of society” (p. 142), and highly volatile commercial competition. 
He assigned the liberal commercial label to Al Jazeera. 
Ayish used framing to examine news selection, newscast formats, areas of 
coverage, and attitudes toward political players among the three stations. He found 
that news on the Arab satellite channels shared many of the features of western 
broadcast journalism. The study was an extension of a previous content analysis. In 
that study (Ayish, 2001a), he examined news formats, news topics, and areas of 
coverage during a five day sample of nightly newscasts from five Arab TV channels: 
MBC, Al-Jazeera, LBC, Abu Dhabi and Syrian satellite channel. The findings 
revealed: political topics were the most covered news items; stations presented pro-
Palestinian attitudes; and coverage of the United States was mostly negative.  
Jasperson and El-Kikhia (2003) conducted one of the first cross-cultural 
content studies that included Al Jazeera programming. Their qualitative framing 
analysis compared the use of three news frames—governance, military, and 
humanitarian—on CNN and Al Jazeera. Their findings revealed that CNN coverage 
emphasized governance and military frames, while Al Jazeera’s coverage 
emphasized humanitarian frames. In addition, they found that Al Jazeera video 
footage emphasized collateral damage including visuals of dead and wounded 
civilians.  
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Aday, Livingston, and Hebert (2005) also conducted a cross-cultural analysis 
of television news coverage. They compared news coverage of the 2003 Iraq war 
from Al Jazeera, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox News. The researchers examined more 
than 1,800 stories that aired during the spring of 2003, for objectivity and tone of the 
coverage. While their findings did reveal differences in coverage between U.S. 
networks and Al Jazeera, the authors concluded that Al Jazeera’s coverage was 
objective and generally neutral in tone, except when dealing with civilian casualties. 
The authors concluded that Al Jazeera’s casualty coverage was generally negative 
and carried an anti-American tone. The Aday et al. study also examined differences 
in the use of visuals by embedded and unilateral journalists. They found unilateral 
reporters used more visuals of civilian and Iraqi casualties. They concluded that the 
American networks provided a “sanitized” view of the war (p. 18). 
Lynch (2007) examined the content of more than one thousand episodes of 
political talk shows from a five year period on Al Jazeera. He found four broad 
topics—Palestine, Iraq, reform, and America—monopolized Al Jazeera’s agenda. 
Lynch (2006a) concluded that “negative images of the United States clearly 
predominated over positive images” (p. 218). 
While content analysis of Arab satellite news broadcasts are somewhat rare, 
and difficult to conduct, a few research studies have examined differences of 
coverage on the websites of Arab satellite news channels instead. Douai (2007) used 
framing to examine coverage of the Danish cartoon controversy on the websites of 
the Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya satellite networks. He identified “transgression” as the 
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dominant frame used in the coverage. Loomis (2009) conducted a content analysis 
on the webpages of BBC, CBS, CNN and AJE. He found AJE’s coverage was 
similar to that of the other networks. Barkho (2006) compared online content from 
the BBC, CNN and Arabic Al-Jazeera. He found that Al-Jazeera prioritized news 
stories and used language that was uniquely meaningful to its Arab audience. In 
another content analysis of English language news websites, Barkho (2008) found 
differences in the discourse structures and layers employed by AJE when compared 
to BBC, and CNN news coverage.  
In 2008, Ayish stated that content analysis research has failed to “adequately” 
examine the new Arab communication systems, including Al-Jazeera and similar 
satellite news channels (p. 118). Content analysis research has also largely failed to 
adequately investigate the role of the image in television news broadcasts.  
Television News Images 
 The Project for Excellence in Journalism (2005) reported that we are in the 
midst of an “epochal transformation” of news media. Over the last two decades, the 
rapid “convergence” of satellite, fiber-optic, video, computer, and phone 
technologies has allowed the synchronous transmission and rebroadcast, as well as 
asynchronous sorting and retrieval of, audio, video, communication, and data on a 
global scale. This convergence of technology has also brought about the 
decentralization of news production, allowing virtually anyone with access to make 
and distribute mediated communication, thus empowering citizen journalists (Project 
for Excellence in Journalism, 2005). 
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 Communication and technology theorists (Innis, 1950, 1951; Mumford, 1963; 
McLuhan 1964; Postman, 1992) recognized that each communication technology is 
embedded with ideological, organizational, use, and knowledge biases that impact 
society. According to Winner (1977), this examination of the link between 
technology and society has origins in Aristotle’s discussion of “inanimate 
instruments.” Postman defined these technological biases as “a predisposition… to 
amplify one sense… more loudly than another” (p. 13). Innis stated that throughout 
the course of history, new communication technologies have undermined old bases 
of social power (McQuail, 2000). These technological biases are what McLuhan’s, 
often misunderstood, statement “the medium is the message” referred to (1964, p. 7). 
McLuhan argued that the content of a message could be subjugated by the inherent 
characteristics of the message’s transmission technology.  
 Lippmann (1922) also discussed the progression of influence—from the 
spoken word, to the written word, to the photograph—which has taken place over the 
last few centuries of Western technological advancement. He described images as a 
key ingredient to public opinion formation because they appear “utterly real” and 
provide “effortless food for the mind” (p. 92). Grabe and Bucy (2009) state that there 
is credible evidence of the effect of images on public opinion formation. 
The French philosopher and semiotician, Roland Barthes, referred to the 
unavoidable nature of pictures to instantaneously impose meaning (as cited in Hall 
1973 p. 176). Zelizer (2001) stated “Western epistemology has always been ocular-
centric or vision-based. With ‘the seen’ taken as a primary ground of knowledge in 
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Western thought, ‘seeing’ has become in many cases a metaphor for perspective” 
(Zelizer, 2001, pp. 1-2). Rosen (2005) states that due to this inherent power of 
visuals to influence, those in power have historically tried to control the distribution 
of images.  
Scholars (Adams, 1978b; Arlen, 1969; Brosius, Donsbach, & Birk, 1996; 
Epstein, 1973; Kepplinger, 1991; Klijn, 2003; Lang & Lang, 1970; Stoel, 1996; 
Tuchman, 1978; Wax, 1970; Wolfsfeld, 2004) have told us that good visuals are 
essential for television news. As Perlmutter (1999) notes, the news that really counts 
“is visually prominent” (p. 178). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that news 
directors seek to fill their newscasts with compelling visuals. TV news critics coined 
the term “if it bleeds, it leads” as one example. News correspondent Jim Lederman 
(1992) referred to television as “enslaved to images” (p. 132). Walter Cronkite once 
said, “If we can illustrate all stories there is no further need of a news broadcaster to 
read half the items to the public” (as cited in Klijn, 2003, p. 124).  
Throughout the history of television news, the news organizations have made 
huge expenditures on state-of-the-art technology enabling electronic newsgathering, 
satellite newsgathering, and Internet protocol based news delivery practices. These 
expenditures testify to the desire for live reporting and images of important stories. 
The result has been the prioritization and promulgation of visuals in international 
news (Clausen, 2003). 
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Visual News Research 
The scholarly disciplines of the neurosciences and cognitive psychology have 
devoted a significant amount of attention to the role of image processing in 
individuals. (Gibson, 2003; Rosen, 2005). This research (Anderson & Paulson, 1978; 
Barry, 1997; Gehring, Toglias, & Kimble, 1976; Graber, 1987; Nickerson, 1968; 
Paivio, 1971, 1986; Zhou, 2005) has revealed that the brain processes visual and 
audiovisual stimuli differently, and more quickly, than text or verbal stimuli (Gibson, 
2003; Pfau et al., 2008; Rosen, 2005). Arpan et al. (2006) state visuals alone can 
affect how people process news content and their perception of issues.  
Gibson (2003) notes that visual research has also examined the effect of news 
images on information acquisition and recall. In arguing that visuals are more 
memorable than verbal components of TV newscasts, Graber (1990) stated, “seeing 
is remembering.” Numerous studies have found the use of visuals on television news 
aided viewers’ recall (Berry & Brosius, 1991; Brosius, 1993; Brosius, Donsbach, & 
Birk, 1996; Cowan, 1984; Edwardson, Grooms, & Pringle, 1981; Graber, 1990; 
Grimes, 1990; Gunter, 1979; Kipper, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Renckstorf, 1977; 
Son, Reese, & Davie, 1987). Drew and Grimes (1987) found that visual redundancy 
improves auditory recall. In addition, visuals have been found to improve 
understanding (Stoel, 1996); improve credibility and authenticity (Brosius et al.); 
capture and sustain attention (Detenber, Simons, & Bennett, 1998; Lang, Dhillon, & 
Dong, 1995; Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980); and draw 
attention when there is a conflict in the audio and video messages (Drew & Grimes). 
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Recent studies of visual news elements have tended to examine photographic 
depictions of conflict and crisis event content (Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). These 
events have included natural disasters (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007), 2009 Gaza conflict 
(Dobernig, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2010); terrorist attacks (Cho et al., 2003; Fahmy, 
2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2010; Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, & Taber, 2003; Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Yung-Soo & Smith, 2003), the war in 
Afghanistan (Fahmy, 2004, 2010; Fahmy, 2005a, 2005b; Griffin, 2004; Zelizer, 
2005), the 1991 Gulf War (Griffin, 2004; King & Lester, 2005; Moriarty & Shaw, 
1995), the Sri Lankan Civil War (Neumann & Fahmy, 2010), patriotism (Pyka, 
Fosdick, & Tillinghast, 2010), and the War in Iraq (Aday, 2004; Fahmy & Kim, 
2008; Griffin, 2004; Keith, Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2009, 2010; King & Lester, 2005; 
Pfau et al., 2008; Schwalbe, 2006; Schwalbe, Silcock, & Keith, 2008; Silcock, 
Schwalbe, & Keith, 2008). Of these studies, only a few (Cho et al.; Huddy et al.; 
Lerner et al.; Pfau et al.; Keith et al., 2009, 2010; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Silcock et 
al., 2008) included video or television images in their analysis. 
Lester (2005) identified four qualities of images—color, form, depth and 
movement—which stimulate the visual cortex. In terms of media, television utilizes 
three of these four qualities: movement, color, and form. Zettl (1990) stated that 
motion is “one of the strongest forces operating within the screen” (p. 119). Research 
on motion visuals has revealed that they increase arousal (Detenber, Simons, & 
Bennett, 1998; Detenber and Reeves, 1996; Reeves et al., 1985) and produce 
stronger affective responses than still pictures (Detenber et al.).  
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A number of scholars have examined the influence of visuals on viewer’s 
emotional responses. Culbertson (1974) found pictures had greater emotional impact 
than words. Moeller states that news photographs are extremely influential during 
times of war (1989), and without pictures there often is not a story (2009). Zelizer 
(2004) refers to war photographs as “among the most powerful visuals known to 
humankind (p. 115). Experimental research (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 
2003), and survey research (Huddy et al., 2003) conducted on 9/11 coverage 
revealed that TV content influenced emotional reactions of fear and anxiety, 
perceptions of risk, and public policy preferences. 
Researchers have found that TV news in general (Cho et al., 2003), and TV 
news visuals (Graber, 1987, 2001; Nabi, 2003; Newhagen & Reeves, 1992; Strivers, 
1994) communicate more emotion, and influence audience reactions more than news 
narratives. In an experimental study, Crigler, Just, and Neuman (1994) found 
participants were most emotionally impacted by the combination of audio/visual 
stimuli, which is the essence of television.  
A series of studies have examined the impact of televised emotion-laden 
negative news images on audience memory (Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996; 
Newhagen, 1998; Newhagen & Lewenstein, 1992; Reeves et al., 1985). Newhagen 
and Reeves (1992) found that placement of the negative image and story have 
varying effects on memory. In a later experimental study, Newhagen (1998) 
separated negative news images into anger, fear, and disgust categories. His findings 
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suggest that images eliciting feelings of anger and fear are more memorable, while 
images that elicit disgust are more commonly avoided. 
These studies lend support to Gitlin’s statement that “both positive and 
negative associations are television’s distinct forte: emotionally charged images in 
which an entire narrative is instantly present” (1991, p. 127). Even media critics have 
recognized the emotional influence of the television image.  
The camera cannot unravel complex intellectual issues, it cannot distinguish 
important from trivial detail, it cannot follow an argument to a reasoned 
conclusion… in these respects, one word is worth a thousand pictures. What 
television can do, however—and do with extraordinary power—is to 
mobilize the audience’s emotions around a vivid, simplified, essentially 
melodramatic vision of the political world, in which praise and blame are the 
magnetic poles. What television can do, in other words, is what demagogic 
rhetoric used to do less efficaciously (Kristol, 1972, p. 51). 
 
Despite the scientific and anecdotal evidence of their importance, visuals 
have not received the same level of systematic research attention that has been 
devoted to the verbal, or textual, news elements (Domke, Perlmutter, & Spratt, 2002; 
Graber, 1989, 1990; Matthes, 2009). Graber (1989) argues that ignoring visual news 
elements is detrimental to a complete understanding of the audiovisual message 
because the analysis not only loses the meaning contained in the visuals, but also 
misses the verbal meanings that are modified by the interaction of the visual content. 
Thus, as Grabe and Bucy (2009) explain, much of the meaning of television news is 
disregarded. 
Graber (1990) stated that several “theoretical and methodological reasons” 
hamper research on visuals in TV news (p. 134). She notes that some scholars 
presume visuals convey purely secondary or peculiar meanings, which are 
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scientifically inconsequential. While samples of U.S. network news broadcasts are 
available from the Vanderbilt News Archive, local and international news samples 
can be difficult to obtain and manage. Even when samples are readily available, 
visual coding is by nature a tedious process (Graber, 1990). Visual analysis of news 
content may be further hindered by the high degree of overlap between the domains 
of mass communication, public opinion, political science, political communication, 
cognitive psychology, sociology, and visual communication. Finally, there is 
inconsistency over examining the visual content, the visual structure, or both. 
For many years, researchers have discussed the two-fold nature—content and 
structure—of television’s audio/visual messages (Adams, 1978a; Lang, 2000; 
Tuchman, 1978). The message content carries the manifest story information. In 
terms of visuals, content refers to what images are shown. This has traditionally been 
the basis of most television news research (Barnett & Grabe, 2000; Lang, 2000). The 
following quote by then Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew reflects the thrust of most 
criticism of television content: 
No medium has a more profound influence over public opinion… a narrow 
and distorted picture of America… the abridged view… which tends to 
emphasize scenes depicting the more dramatic moments of violence, 
lawlessness and embittered dissent (as cited in Epstein, 1973, p. 6). 
 
Tuchman’s statement, “news is perpetually defining and redefining, 
constituting and reconstituting social phenomena” (1978, p. 184), echoes Agnew’s 
concern about the influence of TV news on public opinion. However, Tuchman is 
also referring to the structural features of TV news, not just the content. Tuchman 
described how the manipulation of various structural features of news, primarily 
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space and time, could lend elements of distortion or credibility (which she called 
“facticity”) to the news product (p. 112). Her analysis of news production led to a 
description of a “framing” process, which she described as operating through a series 
of codes, and equated with bias. McQuail (2000) states that news structure has 
historically been described as a form of structural bias.  
In recent years the term bias has given way to the related concepts of 
sensationalism and vividness. These terms can reference both the content and formal 
features of TV news. Nisbett and Ross (1980) defined vividness as information that 
is “(1) emotionally interesting, (2) concrete and image-provoking, and (3) proximate 
in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way” (p. 45). Graber (2001) stated that vividness 
lends itself to audiovisual material, is a common feature of television news, is a form 
of dramatic framing, and can be applied to content and/or presentation style. 
Grabe, Zhou, & Barnett (2001) state that sensationalism “amuses, titillates, 
and entertains” (p. 637). In terms of content, sensationalism often refers to stories 
about crime, sex, disasters, accidents, public fear, fires, and violence (Adams, 1978c; 
Ehrlich, 1996; Grabe, et al.; Hofstetter & Dozier, 1986; Vettehen, Nuijten, & 
Beentjes, 2005). However, several systematic investigations (Grabe, Zhou, Lang & 
Bolls, 2000; Grabe, et al., 2001; Klijn, 2003; Vettehen, et al.; Zhou, 2005) have 
focused on the explication of the structural features of sensationalism. Sensational 
journalism is designed to appeal to emotion, attract attention, and is driven by market 
pressures (Grabe et al., 2001; Graber, 2001; Vettehen et al.).  
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Scholars examining the structural features of images have struggled to find a 
theoretical home for their analysis. This is illustrated by the variety of theories that 
have been applied to the examination of image content and structural features. For 
example, Kaid and Davidson (1986) outlined a measure of political candidates’ 
“videostyle,” which they said comprises the analysis of verbal content, nonverbal 
content and production techniques used in political candidates’ campaign ads (see 
also Kaid, 1999; Kaid & Johnston, 2001; Kaid & Tedesco, 1999; Kaid, Tedesco, & 
McKinnon, 1996; Kaid, Tedesco, Chanslor, & Roper, 1993). Newhagen and 
Lowenstein (1992) applied cultivation theory to image-laden news coverage of the 
1989 Loma Pietra earthquake. The limited capacity model of television viewing has 
been used to examine the effects of negative video images (Lang, Newhagen, & 
Reeves, 1996); audio video redundancy (Lang, 1995); production pacing and 
arousing content (Lang, Bolls, Potter, & Kawahara, 1999); and sensational content 
and form (Grabe, Lang, & Zhao, 2003) in TV news.  
The common thread that has emerged from this discussion of Arab media 
studies, TV news research, and visual content and structure has been news frames. 
Macro-level framing should serve as an appropriate theoretical framework for 
examining the content and structure of visuals in Arab satellite newscasts.  
Framing 
The origins of mass communication research are largely a development of the 
1920s and 1930s from scholars who were concerned with the influence of mass 
media (radio and newspapers) and wartime propaganda on the attitudes and 
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behaviors of the audience (Miller, 2002). Two scholars in particular, Walter 
Lippman and Harold Lasswell, were instrumental in the development of mass 
communication research. In his 1922 book, Public Opinion, Lippman used the 
analogy of “pictures in our head and the world outside” to explain that the media 
shape people’s perceptions and opinions (p. 25). He stated that twentieth-century 
individuals do not act on certain knowledge (first-hand knowledge), or knowledge 
gained from relational bonds, but rather on knowledge given to him by the media. In 
Propaganda Techniques in the World War (1927), Lasswell also espoused the 
influence of the media to mold mass reaction. He theorized that the content of 
propaganda messages could “meld thousands and even millions of human beings into 
one amalgamated mass” (p. 221).  
What emerged from the early work in mass communication was a theory of 
strong, direct and universal cause and effect between the stimulus (message) and 
social behavior, referred to as the “magic bullet” or “hypodermic needle” effect 
(Meyrowitz, 1985; Miller, 2001). As a result, the focus of communication research 
became a study of what the media injects (the content) into the audience.  
When little evidence was found to support this strong effects model, mass 
communication scholars switched to a limited effects model, in which the content’s 
interaction with variables could change or eliminate its influence. Thus, much of 
mass communication research remains focused on the media content. Some of the 
most heavily used mass communication theories of the last forty years are 
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predominantly focused on message content rather than the potential effects of a 
specific medium. 
In a journal article addressing “the state of the art in mass communication 
theory and research,” Bryant and Miron (2004, p. 602) identified uses and 
gratifications, agenda setting and cultivation theory as the “triumvirate” mass 
communication theories in terms of usage over the past half-century (p. 673). 
However, their findings, as well as those from Riffe, (2004) and Weaver (2007), 
reveal that framing has become one of the most frequently applied, and discussed, 
mass communication theories in recent years.  
While uses and gratifications, agenda setting, and cultivation originated from 
research traditions in mass communication, the origins of framing are more diverse 
(Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007). Van Gorp 
traces the origins of framing to Bartlett’s (1932) work in cognitive psychology, 
Bateson’s (1955) work in anthropology and Goffman’s (1974) work in sociology.  
Many mass communication scholars recognize Goffman’s concept of frame 
analysis (1974) as the cornerstone upon which modern framing theory is built. 
Although he is recognized as one of the “seminal figures” in the development of this 
mass communication theory (Edy & Meirick, 2007, p. 122), his original work was 
primarily concerned with sense making in interpersonal interactions. For frame 
analysis, Goffman drew heavily on the work of Bateson and on his own earlier work 
on the management of impressions during these social interactions (Goffman, 1959, 
1967). Goffman argued that individuals constantly struggle to make sense of the 
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world around them and thus rely on the “schemata of information,” which he labeled 
“frames,” "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" (1974, p. 21). 
Currently, framing is typically associated with the fields of mass 
communication and political communication (e.g., Entman, 1991; Gitlin, 1980; 
Iyengar, 1991). However, scholars (Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 1993; Scheufele 
& Tewksbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007) recognize that framing literature is ubiquitous 
throughout disciplines within the social sciences including: economics (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); linguistics (e.g., Lakoff, 2004; Tannen, 1979); 
psychology (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984); social-movements research (e.g., 
Snow & Benford, 1988); public relations (e.g., Hallahan, 1999); health 
communication (e.g., Rothman & Salovey, 1997); media hegemony (e.g., Entman, 
1991), media effects (e.g., Iyengar, 1987); and news making (e.g., Tuchman, 1978).  
Communication scholars argue that the theory’s wide-ranging background 
has resulted in “conceptual diversity and imprecision” (Kinder, 2007, p. 158); 
“scattered conceptualization” (Entman, 1993, p. 52); “plethora of meanings” 
(McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p. 79); “passé-partout” (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 60); and a 
“polysemic nature of the word framing” (Maher, 2001, p. 89). Matthes (2009) argues 
that this diversity of definitions is the result, at least in part, to the type of 
definition—general or operational—used to describe frames. According to Maher 
(2001), these imprecise conceptualizations are also perpetuated when scholars fail to 
distinguish between the locations of the frames they are examining.  
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Researchers have identified multiple frame sources in the communication 
process. The number of frame locations varies from two—message producer and 
message receiver (Entman, 1991; Friedland & Zhong, 1996; Gamson, Croteau, 
Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Scheufele, 1999; 
Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007); three—the media, the audience, and cultural actors 
(Scheufele, 2006); and four—the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture 
(Entman, 1993). By contextualizing the definitions of framing within one of these 
frame locations, the framing concept becomes clearer.  
The most common distinctions are made between message producer and 
message receiver frames. The term framing refers to organizing structures used by 
both media professionals and audiences to simplify complex issues (Gitlin, 1980; 
Gamson et al., 1992; Reese, 2001). When specifically applied to the news, frames 
have been considered “schemes” for both presenting and comprehending the news.  
As noted above, Scheufele (1999) and Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) 
described framing as a dual-level construct. They used the terms micro-level and 
macro-level to distinguish between individual applied frames and media applied 
frames. Scheufele (1999) equates micro-level framing with frames located at the 
individual level. Definitions commonly applied to individual framing include 
“schemata of information” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21); “internal structures of the mind” 
(Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74); “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide 
individuals’ processing of information” (Entman,1993, p. 53); “lenses through which 
social reality is viewed” (Dillard, Soloman, Samp, 1996, p. 706). Micro-level frames, 
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then, represent the ways individuals use, make sense of, and gain meaning from the 
communication they receive.  
However, the term framing is more commonly used to describe media-
located, or macro-level, frames. At the macro-level, frame building is concerned with 
message producers’ organizing structures, which are used to present complex events 
and issues, and, in the process give their stories meaning (Kosicki, 2003; Scheufele 
& Tewksbury, 2007). Many of the most widely referenced metaphors for framing 
apply to this context, including: “primary frameworks” (Goffman, 1974, p. 24); 
“narratives” (Manoff, 1987, p. 228); “scenario” (Bennett, 1975); central organizing 
ideas (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, & 
Ghanem, 1991); interpretive “schemata” (Reese, 2001, p. 14); “organizes everyday 
reality” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193); package (Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Gitlin, 1980); 
and promotion of “particular definitions and interpretations of political issues” 
(Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002, p. 343). 
“To frame,” Entman said, “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, p. 52). The choices 
journalists make in presenting the news not only affect the salience of issues, but also 
how the issues are interpreted by the audience (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).  
 
 61  
 
Frames have the potential to alter what audiences perceive the issue to be, 
how important the issue is, and what should be done about it (Entman, 1993; 
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Jasperson, Shah, Watts, Faber, & Fan, 
1998). Chong and Druckman (2007) refer to this ability of media handlers to produce 
significant opinion changes through subtle presentation changes as “framing effects” 
(p.104). Scholars (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; 
Jasperson, et al., 1998) have recognized the effect of word choice on opinion 
changes. For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) examined how two 
different news frames (word phrasings) affected audience attitudes of the same 
event. They examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for a Ku Klux Klan 
rally. Research participants were shown news stories on the Klan rally framed either 
as a free speech issue or as a disruption of public order. Their findings revealed more 
tolerance for the Klan by participants that saw the rally framed as a free speech issue. 
According to Tankard (2001), the power of news producers is enhanced by their 
ability to “to define the terms of the debate without the audience realizing it is taking 
place” (p. 97). 
Iyengar (1991) and Iyengar and Simon (1993) described two broad 
organizing structures of media framing, episodic and thematic. Episodic framing is 
an organizing structure that provides specific examples of the issue or event being 
covered, including live, on-the-spot coverage. Thematic framing, also called 
“backgrounder,” is broader coverage and provides more background information and 
talking-head analysis of a historical, cultural, or other context (p. 370). Fahmy 
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(2004) suggested visual choices journalists make can also indicate whether coverage 
is episodic or thematic. She states that a thematic style can be visually achieved by 
providing more archive images along with current images. While news stories may 
contain elements of both episodic and thematic framing, Iyengar and Simon (1993) 
state that most stories utilize a dominant frame. Furthermore, they argue that the 
dominant organizing structure in most television news stories is episodic framing. 
They state the commercial nature of television news anticipates the networks’ use of 
more episodic coverage.  
Iyengar and Simon (1993) also identified two levels of attributions of 
responsibility in media framing. The first level, causal, identifies who or what caused 
or is responsible for the event or issues being covered. The second level, treatment, 
identifies who can resolve the issue, or who is preventing the resolution of the issue. 
Their discussion of previous research revealed relationships between the application 
of episodic or thematic frames in news coverage, and attributions of responsibility. 
Specifically, under thematic framing viewers attributed responsibility to general 
societal factors while under episodic framing viewers attributed responsibility to 
specific agents. The styles of frames and attributions of responsibility reveal methods 
members of the media use to reduce complex issues into easily understood reports, 
which is a macro-level function.  
 Framing and Second-Level Agenda-Setting. The most intense debate 
surrounding framing is the relationship to agenda-setting theory. More specifically, 
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debate involves whether framing is a separate phenomena, or simply an extension—
or so-called second-level—of the agenda-setting effect.  
Rogers and Dearing (Dearing & Rogers, 1992; Rogers & Dearing, 1987) 
described three traditions of agenda-setting research: (1) media agenda setting which 
examines what news is and how issues become prominent in the media; (2) policy 
agenda setting which examines the influences of the media and the public on public-
policy changes; and (3) public agenda setting which examines the relationship 
between issues of media importance and issues of public importance. The latter was 
the focus of the pioneering work on agenda-setting by McCombs and Shaw (1972) 
and is typically identified by a research design combining mass media content 
analysis with public opinion surveys (Rogers, Dearing, Bregman, 1993). 
The original McCombs and Shaw study, referred to as the “Chapel Hill 
study” examined the relationship between media coverage and voter attitudes during 
the 1968 presidential election. Their research was influenced by several ideas for the 
relationship between media coverage and audience attitudes advanced by leading 
communication scholars including “The World Outside and Pictures in Our Heads” 
(Lippman, 1922); “attention frames” (Lasswell, 1948); and “the mass media force 
attention to certain issues” (Lang & Lang, 1966, p. 468). Cohen (1963) expressed the 
statement that best sums up the idea behind agenda setting when he said, “the press 
is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p. 13).  
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Findings from the Chapel Hill study revealed that the issues given attention 
in the media (media agenda) were highly correlated to the issues the audience was 
thinking about (public agenda). McCombs and Shaw attributed these correlations to 
the direct transfer of issue salience (the importance or prominence of an issue) from 
media to public. In discussing their findings, McCombs and Shaw gave name to their 
theory when they called for future research to examine communication and political 
“agenda-setting” (1972, p. 187).  
In their second study, McCombs and Shaw (1977) attempted to replicate the 
findings of their first study and elaborated on their theory by introducing contingent 
conditions, which can either heighten or attenuate agenda setting. McCombs and 
Shaw referred to these early years of agenda setting research as attempts to answer 
the question “who sets the public agenda—and under what conditions?” (1993, p. 
60). Early agenda-setting studies of a similar vein were later referred to as first-level 
agenda setting.  
They also suggested that messages contain an agenda of both objects (issues, 
candidates, personalities, events) and attributes (properties associated with the 
objects), which can both be transferred from media to public (Maher, 2001). 
McCombs (2005) identified several early studies (Becker & McCombs, 1978; 
Benton & Frazier, 1976; McCombs & Shaw, 1977; Weaver, Graber, McCombs, & 
Eyal, 1981) that found evidence for attribute agenda setting. The study by Weaver et 
al. is credited as the trailblazing study of attribute-agenda setting (McCombs & 
Evatt, 1995; Takeshita, 1997). McCombs and Evatt referred to agenda attributes as a 
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“second dimension” of agenda setting (p. 12). Later, Ghanem (1997) described 
attribute-agenda setting as a “second level of effects” (p. 3). Ghanem defined 
attributes of an object as “perspectives or frames that journalists and the public 
employ to think about each object” (p. 5), thus tying second-level agenda setting to 
framing. 
Many studies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Entman, 1993; Ghanem, 1997; 
Japserson et al., 1998; McCombs, 2005; McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 
1997; McCombs & Estrada, 1997; McCombs & Evatt, 1995; McCombs & Ghanem, 
2001; McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1977; Wanta, Williams, & Hu, 1991; Weaver et al., 
1981; Zaller, 1992) have equated framing with a second-level agenda-setting effect. 
McCombs and Shaw (1993) stated the significance of subsuming framing within the 
agenda-setting framework when they said: 
Bernard Cohen’s classic summation of agenda setting—the media may not 
tell us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to 
think about—has been turned inside out. New research… suggests that the 
media not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and, 
consequently, what to think (p. 65). 
 
 The mechanism that causes the agenda-setting phenomena to function in 
individuals is related to information processing. (Downs, 1957) referred to people as 
“cognitive misers.” He suggested that individuals look for shortcuts for processing 
information. Iyengar (1990) stated that both agenda-setting and priming were 
functions of an “accessibility bias.” Iyengar’s argument is that the amount and 
recency of coverage an issue receives in the media will influence the salience of an 
issue. He went on to add that the more salient an issue, the more accessible that 
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information is to an individual. Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2004) state 
that the accessibility bias is based on three assumptions: 1) some information is 
cognitively more accessible; 2) opinion is formed from more easily accessible 
information; 3) recency and level of coverage affect accessibility.  
 However, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) and Kosicki (1993) argue that 
framing should not be subsumed by agenda-setting. They state that micro-level 
framing is a result of an applicability effect, which has to do with connections of 
information. What is being described is how information is organized. Edy and 
Meirick (2007) state that the second level of agenda-setting is concerned with “what” 
people think about, while framing describes “how” people make sense of issues. 
Thus, framing is an organizing function, rather than a cognitive-processing 
(accessibility) function.  
Van Gorp (2007) and Gamson (1992) argue that framing is based in large 
part on culture. Van Gorp says that to link framing to agenda-setting (cognitive-
processing) is to deny Goffman’s cultural-based approach to the phenomena. He 
insists that instead of being causal and focused on issues (like agenda-setting), 
framing is concerned with mutually “constructed” frames. Van Gorp suggests that 
framing is sense-making based on the interaction of four levels: (1) textual (media 
applied frames); (2) cognitive (schemata in the audience); (3) extramedial (discourse 
of frame sponsors); and (4) the store of frames available in the culture.  
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Framing, then, is a necessary organizing function for both the media and the 
audience. According to Norris, Kern, and Just (2003) “the essence of framing is 
selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby, 
either consciously or unconsciously, promoting one particular interpretation of 
events” (p. 11). Macro-level framing describes journalists’ attempts to condense 
complex issues into reports that a lay audience can make sense of. It is often the 
result of the interplay of journalistic routines, organizational structures, cultural 
proclivities and what Shah, Domke, and Wackman (2001) refer to as “extramedia” 
influences. Gurevitch and Levy (1985) described the media as a battleground in 
which various interested parties struggle to promote competing views (frames) of the 
same media covered reality. According to Herman and Chomsky (1988) this media 
frame plays a significant part in establishing how an event is understood. Gamson, et 
al. (1992) refer to this mediated process as the “production of images” because it 
emphasizes the importance of visuals and vivid language (p. 374). 
The frame manifests itself in media content through various framing devices. 
Norris et al. (2003) refer to these news frames as “interpretive structures” (p. 10). 
Gamson & Lasch (1980) identified five framing devices: metaphors, exemplars, 
catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images. Others have reinforced (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2007) or extended framing 
devices by adding rhetorical flourishes, and justifications (Kinder, 2007); certain 
keywords, stock phrases, and sources of information (Entman,1993). Tankard (2001) 
identified 11 framing mechanisms: headlines, subheads, photographs, photo 
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captions, leads, selection of sources, selections of quotes, pull quotes, logos, statistics 
and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs. The visual image is a 
recurring theme in these lists of framing devices. 
 Visual Framing. Scholars (Fahmy, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Messaris, 
1992; Messaris, 1994; Messaris & Abraham, 2001 have recognized that visuals 
operate differently form verbal narratives in the way meaning is transferred from 
media to the audience. Messaris has written extensively about the role of images in 
communication, and the differences from verbal language in the framing process. 
Messaris and Abraham identified three properties of visual images—analogical 
quality, indexicality, and lack of an explicit propositional syntax—that make visual 
framing distinct from verbal framing.  
Messaris and Abraham (2001) argue that the analogical quality of images is 
what most clearly differentiates them from words. They recognize that this is a 
seriously contested notion among visual communication scholars (see Eco, 1975; 
Gombrich, 1960; Goodman, 1976; Messaris, 1994; Worth, 1982). The essence of this 
analogical quality is the idea that images are similar to, or analogous to, the things 
they represent. Therefore, unlike words, visuals can be interpreted without prior 
familiarity or culturally based conventions. The consequences to viewers is that 
“images appear more natural, more closely linked to reality than words” and can 
cause them to ignore the fact that “all images are human-made, artificial 
constructions” (p. 217). This results in what Kepplinger (1991) describes as people 
taking images at face value. 
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Indexicality refers to similar qualities of images that are specifically 
associated with photographic media (including film, television, and video). Messaris 
and Abraham (2001) acknowledged the writings of philosopher C. S. Peirce who 
referred to photographs as “signs” or “indices” of the world they represent. They 
argue that the indexicality of photographs presents a “true-to-life” quality that 
appears free from “human agency” and results in visuals being perceived as more 
believable than other communication sources (p. 217). They note that the use of 
images in the framing process could “diminish the likelihood that viewers would 
question what they see” (p. 217). 
The danger of indexicality in news images is manifested when viewers are 
misled by outright deceptive practices or through the subtle, often unintentional, 
process of image selection and editing. Messaris and Abraham (2001) recognize the 
Chicago MacArthur Day study (Lang & Lang, 1968) as one of the earliest studies on 
the systematic evaluation of the effects of the photographic selection process. The 
study examined how television editors shaped viewers’ perceptions of the 
MacArthur Day event. They found shot selection in the television coverage of the 
event made the crowds seem larger and much more enthusiastic than they actually 
were. Lang and Lang determined that the discrepancy between the mediated event 
and the actual event was a result of selective editing. Messaris and Abraham cite the 
Langs’ findings as a “paradigmatic illustration of the relationship between visual 
indexicality and framing” (p. 218). 
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While the first two properties reference the individual image, the third 
distinct property—lack of an explicit propositional syntax—refers to relationships 
between multiple images, or “visual syntax” (Messaris & Abraham, 2001, p. 218). 
They note that within the communication process, verbal languages rely on specific 
syntactic devices for making propositions about causality, comparison, 
generalization, or other connections. Visual communication does not rely on an 
explicit syntax for making these propositions. Therefore, the various visual 
presentation techniques (i.e., editing, transitions, juxtaposition) can convey multiple 
meanings to viewers. For example, associational juxtaposition is an editing device 
that allows the characteristics of the subject in one image to be transferred to the 
subject in the next image (Reynolds & Barnett, 2002). Tuchman (1978) referred to 
juxtaposition as a framing technique used in news film to create relationships among 
various story elements. This shifts the impetus for appropriate interpretation of visual 
messages from the messenger to the viewer.  
These three properties of the visual image create a sense of “this event really 
happened and this photo is the proof of it” (Hall, 1973, p. 188). This effect has been 
referred to as “having-been-there” (Barthes, 1978, p. 44); “aspects of nature” or 
“actuality” (Hall, 1973); and “photographic verisimilitude (Zelizer, 2005, p. 5). Even 
Barnhurst’s definition of photojournalism—“the depiction of real events and the 
promulgation of the result to a wide audience” (Barnhurst, 1994, p. 38)—focuses on 
the reality, or actuality of captured events. Thus, scholars suggest that images 
presented through the media often appear to be free of ideological biases by 
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appearing to capture reality (Hall, 1973; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Woollacott, 
1982). This may explain why visual depictions are considered to be objective 
(Sontag, 1977; Tirohl, 2000), more believable (Graber, 1987; McLuhan & Fiore, 
1967; Pfau et al., 2008). Thus, scholars (Dobernig, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2010; 
Huxford, 2001; Tirohl, 2000) suggest  journalists use news images to support the 
credibility and accuracy of their reports. Dobernig, Lobinger, and Wetzstein state the 
image becomes “a piece of evidence” (p. 90). As a result, images have been found to 
have greater influence over opinion change than verbal or textual depictions 
(Kepplinger, 1991). Fahmy and Wanta (2007) go further suggesting the way the 
media reports visuals becomes an important part of the event per se” (p. 20). 
Reviews of the framing literature reveal a number of methodological 
approaches for conducting framing studies, which are generally categorized as 
inductive or deductive content analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000). In addition to these distinctions, Matthes and Kohring further 
identified four inductive approaches: hermeneutic approach, linguistic approach, 
manual holistic approach, and computer-assisted approach. The inductive approach 
is described as an exploratory method used to identify the wide variety of frames that 
may be present in the sample (Semetko & Valkenburg). They note that it is an 
effective approach for small samples. Entman’s (1991) discovery of contrasting 
frames—technical, and moral-outrage—in the coverage of the KAL and Iran Air 
incidents serves as a good example of the inductive approach.  
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The deductive approach is used to search for the occurrence of certain pre-
defined frames among the variables under analysis. The benefits of the deductive 
approach are the ability to cope with large samples, easy replication, and usefulness 
in cross-media analysis. Scholars (De Vreese, 2005; Matthes, 2009; Matthes & 
Kohring, 2008; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) have also recognized sub-
categories—generic, or issue-specific—of deductive frames7. In a systematic 
analysis of 131 framing studies in the leading communication journals, Matthes 
(2009) identified 29 different generic frames and 561 different issue-specific frames. 
The conflict and human interest frames were two of the most commonly used generic 
frames. Regardless of the frame type, Matthes and Kohring state that valid and 
reliable deductive measurement relies on identification of the elements that comprise 
the frame a priori. 
 Researchers have differed widely on conceptualizations for visual frames, 
discourse units, and methods for reliably identifying the variety of visual news 
frames (Matthes, 2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Scholars (Entman, 1993; 
Fahmy, 2004; Fahmy, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Ghanem, 1996; Vujakovic, 1998) 
suggest that the frequency and prominence of visual depictions are key elements of 
examination in studies of visual framing. Entman states that “by providing, 
repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas 
but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less 
so-and others entirely invisible” (p. 7). Thus, he refers to frequency as the most 
                                                
7 See De Vreese (2005) for a thorough discussion of generic and issue-specific 
frames.  
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powerful framing mechanism because it promotes a particular issue’s importance to 
the audience. Matthes and Kohring (2008) note frequency is one method for 
examining frames. Referencing Entman, they interpret frames as single aspects of 
mediated communication grouped together in systematic patterns over multiple 
messages. Gitlin (1980) referred to this process as “persistent selection, emphasis, 
and exclusion” (p. 7).  
 Prominence, on the other hand, refers to how the news visual is presented. 
Because the majority of visual framing studies are based on print or Internet sources, 
prominence generally refers to the size of the photograph and placement on the page. 
Fahmy (2010) notes that the prominence of news photos has been found to indicate 
the perceived importance of an event. The author of the present study suggests that in 
television news, sensational visual structures (operationalized as acquisition and 
presentation production techniques) are a form of visual prominence. Therefore, 
sensationalism is not a frame per se, but can enhance—“juice”— the frames that are 
present (J. Edy, personal communication, November 29, 2012). 
Even though images are regularly referenced as a framing device, they are 
often ignored in studies of television news (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Messaris & 
Abraham, 2001), and framing (Bell, 2001; Gandy, 2001). Matthes’ (2009) analysis 
confirmed this notion. He found that textual elements were generally treated as the 
main units of analysis. Only 5% of the studies had directly coded visuals, and only 
3% used visuals as the main unit of analysis. Eighty-three percent of the studies 
ignored visuals completely. He found that the dominance of textual-based analysis 
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even held true for studies dedicated to the examination of television content. 
Seventy-two percent of television content studies completely ignored the visual 
elements. 
Messaris and Abraham (2001) identified a number of studies (Boskin, 1980; 
Campbell, 1995; Entman, 1994a; Entman, 1994b; Ettema & Peer, 1996; Gray, 1989; 
Martindale, 1996; Van Dijk, 1988) that examined how “implicit visual imagery” was 
used to frame race in stereotypical and prejudicial manners without overt verbal 
references (p. 221). Grabe and Bucy (2009) conducted a longitudinal visual framing 
analysis of network TV news coverage of presidential elections from 1992-2004. 
They identified three visual frames that were present in the general election news 
coverage—the ideal candidate, the populist campaigner, and the sure loser. Their 
findings suggest, among other things, that Republicans received more favorable 
visual coverage than Democrats. They concluded that the visual dimension of 
television news is still under researched. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The literature review revealed that visual news content and structural 
elements are important and under-researched framing elements. Politically and 
culturally bound audience interests and expectations are important considerations in 
the news selection and framing process (Burgoon et al., 1982; Entman, 1993; Kratzer 
& Kratzer, 2003; Tai & Chang, 2002; Wanta & Roarke, 1993; Wolfsfeld, 2004). 
Wolfsfeld notes that news stories are framed to be “culturally resonant and 
professionally worthy” (p. 38). He concludes that the political environment of a 
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media outlet helps establish cultural resonance, while professional worthiness is 
established via the media environment. The current study is an attempt to add to the 
systematic analysis of Arab media through deductive content analysis of media 
frames.  
Network Taxonomy 
 A number of factors were used to determine the network taxonomy 
designation (western or liberal commercial) of each of the five networks. The 
primary factor was each network’s intended audience. audience. I borrowed the term 
liberal commercial8 from Ayish (2002) to describe these networks. The liberal 
commercial label was used to identify the networks that broadcast to an audience that 
was culturally similar to the origin and location of the network. This describes both 
Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which broadcast from Arab nations, in Arabic, to a pre-
dominantly Arab  
 The commercial status of each network was also considered when grouping 
the networks. While it is true that all five networks have benefactors that ultimately 
guarantee their continued operation, both Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were originally 
intended to be commercial networks. Even though it is unclear how much of each 
network’s budget actually comes from advertising revenue, both networks carry 
some degree of commercial messages. The commercial undertones, and resulting 
                                                
8 While these networks may not reflect the classical application of the term liberal 
media (e.g. journalistic freedom), Ayish (2002) notes that Al Jazeera represents an 
example of an Arab-based transnational network operating relatively free of editorial 
control. 
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competitiveness of these networks tends to contribute directly to other characteristics 
found in the liberal model. For example, Hallin (1994) states that the intensely 
competitive forces associated with television result in media populism. Both, Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiya overtly cater programming to the ordinary citizen in an effort 
to increase viewership, which is a hallmark of populist media.  
Alhurra, BBC Arabic, and Al Jazeera English were grouped together to 
represent the western style because they are all non-commercial international 
broadcast networks. The term western was appropriated from the press theory 
literature and originally chosen to classify the western-based Alhurra and BBC 
Arabic networks. Considering the network’s stated mission, it may be argued that 
AJE more appropriately fits into some other dimension. However, these three 
networks are similar in that they each broadcast from a culture that is different from 
the culture of their intended audience. Alhurra and BBC Arabic broadcast from the 
west to an Arab audience, while Al Jazeera English broadcasts from the Arab region 
to an international audience. Therefore, AJE is considered western for the current 
study due to the network’s intense effort to reach an international audience, including 
the United States, and its attempts to distance itself in subtle ways from its Arabic-
language sister station.  
Story Type  
The German-based media research organization, Media Tenor, has carried 
out long-term cross-cultural content analysis of television news on American 
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networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX), European networks (BBC, ARD, ZDF, RTL, 
SAT.1, ProSieben, DW Journal), South African networks (SABC, E-TV), and Arab 
networks (Al Ikhbariya, Al Alam, Al Manar, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya). An analysis of 
programming aired between April 2004 and June 2005 revealed that more than 80% 
of the content of Arab newscasts is focused on political issues, while political issues 
on American, German and South African news made up less than sixty percent of the 
content (Media Tenor, 2006). Other research supports these findings. Ayish (2001a, 
2002) found that news selection on Arab satellite networks was predominantly 
framed from a political perspective. Nötzold (2008) also found that political and 
religious programming dominated on Lebanese television. On the other hand, 
American TV newscasts have become increasingly entertainment oriented (Hacten, 
1998) with 25% to 30% of stories comprising sensational topics (Grabe, et al., 2001).  
The literature review outlined above provides evidence that political framing 
dominates the patterns of news content presented on Arab television networks. Allen 
and Izcaray (1988) used the term “nominal agenda diversity” to describe the number, 
or diversity, of issues found in news coverage. The first research question is designed 
to explore whether this propensity to focus on news coverage from a political 
perspective also carries over to the western-styled networks that are operating in the 
region.  
RQ1: Is there a difference in the nominal agenda diversity of visuals between 
western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks? 
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Amerocentric Coverage 
 Groshek (2008) used the term Amerocentric to identify media accounts 
framed in the interest of Americans. As noted in Chapter 1, Alhurra was launched by 
the Bush administration as a “soft-power tool” (Morgan, 2005) to counter the 
perceived anti-American influence of the pan-Arab networks and to promote 
American ideals of freedom in the Middle East. According to Brian Conniff, former 
Executive Director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the role of the BBG 
(Alhurra’s parent organization) has been to explain U.S. policy—“not to promote or 
defend it”—and improve America’s image abroad (2006).  
 Alhurra’s skeptics often refer to the network’s content as biased to the 
American perspective, or worse, propaganda. Jon Alterman, Middle East director of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said, “This is a region 
where people are generally skeptical of the news and Alhurra smells to many people 
as government spin from a government they don’t particularly trust to begin with” 
(as cited in Wise, 2005, Doubly Damned?, para. 1). The analysis of Alhurra, 
commissioned by the BBG and conducted by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy 
at the Annenberg School (2008), confirmed that Alhurra has suffered from this kind 
of identity crisis. The researchers suggested that Alhurra’s credibility problem could 
be reduced by emphasizing objectivity through (1) broadening the pool of sources in 
news stories and interviews to include those who may counter U.S. positions on the 
issues, and (2) expanding coverage to include events and issues of interest to a 
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Middle Eastern audience regardless of the issues’ significance in terms of U.S. 
foreign policy (USC, 2008).   
 Since the report, Conniff has stated that Alhurra has carved out a niche in the 
region by “providing objective and accurate news, covering topics rarely seen on 
other local channels” (2010, para. 1). However, the implication from critics is that 
Alhurra’s coverage is framed from an American perspective and reflects American 
interests. Despite a lack of formal intervention from the state, the traditional 
American news media have operated with a high degree of veneration for the U.S. 
government (Hallin, 1994). Therefore, considering Alhurra’s unique position as the 
American public diplomacy mouthpiece to the Arab world, it is expected that: 
H1: The level of Amerocentric visual framing will be higher on Alhurra 
than on AJE, BBC-Arabic, Al Jazeera, and Al Arabiya.  
Conflict and Explicit Violence Content 
 Like framing studies in general, many of the visual framing studies have 
focused on images of natural disasters, conflict, war, or terrorism. Conflict and 
violence are often listed as frames in deductive framing studies. Neuman, Just and 
Crigler (1992) found that conflict frames were the most common frames in U.S. 
news. Wolfsfeld (2004) identified several possible reasons for researchers’ interests 
in examining conflict coverage: (1) researchers find conflict coverage more 
interesting, (2) short-term event coverage is easier to examine, (3) conflict and 
disruption comprise normal TV news fare.  
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 The previous chapter outlined some of the news topics that are often 
considered to be sensational. Several of these topics—sex, celebrity, crime—are still 
considered taboo subjects on pan-Arab media and receive limited coverage. 
However, it is assumed that images of conflict and violence regularly appear on pan-
Arab newscasts. Furthermore, images of conflict and violence are of particular 
interest in the current study because they represent the sensational content elements 
that have received the most criticism from Westerners. Several recent cross-cultural 
examinations of the visual content of conflict/disaster news coverage provide support 
for these conclusions.  
Borah (2009) examined visuals from newspaper coverage of Hurricane 
Katrina and the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Results revealed different visual framing 
treatments between the two natural disasters. King and Lester (2005) compared 
visual coverage from the start of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War in three 
American newspapers. They concluded that the U.S. military received the kind of 
visual coverage it wanted through the use of embedded journalists during the initial 
stages of the Iraq War.  
Media Tenor (2003) conducted a cross-cultural framing analysis of coverage 
of the 2003 Iraq War on European, South African and American TV news, which 
included an analysis of visuals of American and Iraqi casualties. Their findings 
suggest American news reports avoided images of American casualties while 
presenting images of Iraqi casualties.  
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Fahmy has conducted numerous research studies on visuals in the news 
media, including visual framing studies of the sources of news visuals (Fahmy, 
2005a), and the visual themes (Fahmy, 2004) used in coverage of the 9/11 attacks 
and the war in Afghanistan in the English-language International Herald Tribune 
and Arabic-language Al-Hayat newspapers. She found differences in how each 
newspaper visually framed both events, and concluded these differences were 
politically and culturally bound.  
To further explore political and cultural implications of visual conflict 
coverage, Fahmy and Johnson (2007) surveyed Al Jazeera viewers about the 
network’s perceived use of graphic visuals in its coverage of the Iraq War and 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The Arabic-language, web-based survey, revealed that 
70% of respondents reported seeing graphic images of these conflicts on Al Jazeera, 
while 69.2% supported the network’s decision to show these images. One respondent 
said: 
Al Jazeera should show those video/images, because that’s what 
realities/consequences of war and occupation or any civil unrest are. Self-
censorship is only a dis-service to the millions of viewers who depend on it 
for honest, un-sanitized and un-beautified news (Fahmy & Johnson, p. 258). 
The results of this study would seem to re-enforce Robertson’s (2004) claim 
that Al Jazeera editors knew their audience expected to see graphic images. 
According to Wolfsfeld (2004), journalists react to the events they are covering and 
construct stories that are “politically acceptable to their readers” (p. 29). Kenney 
(1988) stated that audience expectation is a key consideration when a network is 
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trying to build the largest audience possible. This knowledge is likely not lost on Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which are locked in a battle for a share of the pan-Arab TV 
news audience.  
Western-styled news organizations, particularly American networks, are also 
mindful of audience preferences. Those preferences tend to include less tolerance for 
violent images. For example, Zelizer (2005) states that American audiences were 
exposed to fewer violent images of conflict in the last decade. A Pew Research 
Center survey (Kohut, 2004) found that 70% of Americans favored U.S. media 
coverage of military action in Fallujah, Iraq that avoided showing gruesome images. 
Silcock, Schwalbe, and Keith (2008) note that western-based news decision-makers 
must wrestle with “showing the raw truth of harsh visuals while remaining 
compassionate and inoffensive to the audience” (p. 38). 
 Scholars (Aday et al., 2005; Griffin, 2004; King and Lester, 2005; Silcock et 
al., 2008; Youssef, 2009; Zelizer, 2005) found that media outlets show few images of 
injury and death when covering war. Decision-makers at Alhurra, and to a lesser 
extent BBC-Arabic, must not only consider the preferences of their Arab audience, 
but may also be influenced by the western preferences of visual decency, differences 
in standards of professionalism, and by additional pressures inherent in public 
diplomacy entities. As an international broadcaster seeking a large non-Arab 
audience, AJE may also be influenced by audience preferences that include use of 
less violent images. Therefore, Alhurra, BBC-Arabic, and AJE news coverage may 
rely on fewer visuals of conflict and violence.  
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 Since they operate in different political and media environments, it is 
expected that the networks included in the present study will differ in their visual 
framing of conflict and violent content. Images of conflict and violence are of 
particular interest in the current study because they represent the sensational content 
elements that have received the most criticism from westerners. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that:  
H2: The Arab networks represented by the liberal commercial pattern of 
broadcasting will display more visuals of conflict than the networks 
representing the western-style. 
H3: Violent imagery in the content of conflict coverage will be more explicit 
on the liberal commercial networks than on the western-style networks. 
Visual Structure and Sensationalism 
 The literature review revealed that accusations of sensationalism in the media 
could be levied based on the message content—as the previous hypotheses are 
designed to examine—as well as, the structural features of the message. Tuchman 
(1978) referred to the organizing structures of TV news as a form of bias and 
referenced Goffman, while referring to the process as framing. 
More recent examinations of structural news features have abandoned the 
traditional “bias” label for more descriptive labels of presentation elements, and their 
influence on audiences. For example tabloid, or sensational, news packaging, which 
has traditionally been considered a form of bias resulting from content selections, 
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have instead been operationalized as structural features in several recent studies (e.g., 
Grabe et al., 2000; Grabe, Zhou, & Barnett, 2001, Grabe, et al., 2003; Lang, 1995; 
Lang et al., 1996; Lang, et al., 1999; Vettehen et al., 2005; Zhou, 2005).  
Structural features of TV messages include music, sound effects, cuts, edits, 
luminance levels, movement, time manipulation (fast or slow motion), animation, 
zooms, pans, motion graphics, and field of view selections (Grabe et al., 2000; Lang, 
Geiger, Strickwerda, & Sumner, 1993; McQuail, 2000; Tuchman, 1978). Research 
on structural features of film and TV images has included investigations of editing 
techniques (Hobbs, Frost, Davis, & Stauffer, 1988; Hobbs & Frost, 1989; Messaris, 
Eckman, & Gumpert, 1979); space/time transitions (Barnett & Grabe, 2000); 
paraproxemics and subjective camera (Galan, 1986; Meyrowitz, 1986); and angle of 
view (Messaris, 1992; Zettl, 1990).  
Vettehen et al. (2005) applied the concept of vividness to a content analysis 
of sensational production techniques in Dutch television newscasts. Results revealed 
a general trend of increased sensational production techniques on Dutch TV 
networks between 1995-2001.  
Silcock (2007) used field observations, interviews, and questionnaires to 
investigate cross-cultural differences in editing routines. His findings also suggest 
that news editors operate using cultural routines that result in stories that are visually 
framed from a structural standpoint for their specific cultural audience. 
In addition to cultural pressures, increased competition may also affect the 
use of sensational production techniques in TV newscasts. Epstein (1973) stated that 
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the primary purpose of TV news was not to inform, but to keep the audience 
interested enough to stay tuned in.  Even though the majority of these networks are 
government funded, their continued operation is dependent upon the ability to attract 
and hold an audience. In some cases, news managers resort to sensationalism, which 
can be accomplished through the application of sensational production techniques. 
Therefore, it is expected that: 
H4: News visuals on the liberal commercial networks will contain higher 
levels of sensational framing than on western-style networks. 
 Vettehen et al. (2005) note that increased competition may put pressure on 
broadcasters to increase the attractiveness of their newscasts. They state that in 
addition to competition, sensationalism may also be driven by technological 
innovation and journalistic routines. From its beginning, Al Arabiya has embraced 
technological innovation for the purpose of covering breaking news and creating 
newscasts which utilize cutting-edge production techniques. In addition, Al Arabiya 
is a for-profit network and relies on advertising revenue. Due to the network’s 
reliance on advertising and embrace of technological innovation, it is expected that:  
H5: News visuals on Al Arabiya will contain higher levels of sensational 
framing than shots on the other networks.  
Visuals in Arab Spring Coverage 
 The original intent of this project was to examine the visuals of  “normal” or 
“routine” news coverage in transnational, pan-Arab television. While it was expected 
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that there would be several major international news stories during the sample 
frame—the World Cup, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the end of 
U.S. combat operations in Iraq—it was impossible to predict in advance that a single 
issue—the Arab Spring—would have such an important impact on the news agenda 
for more than half of the sampling period.  
The term Arab Spring9 refers to the series of popular uprisings against 
repressive governments that spread across the MENA region in late 2010 and early 
2011. The first civil demonstrations were organized in Tunisia on December 18th 
after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire to protest his harassment at the hands 
of police. The wire services quickly picked up on the Tunisian demonstrations that 
followed. The first report describing the demonstration from the Reuters news 
agency appeared on December 19, 2010 (“Witnesses Report,” 2010). As the 
demonstrations spread across Tunisia, the Arab media covered the events extensively 
(Pintak, 2011b). 
Over the next few months, the civil unrest spread across the region resulting 
in demonstrations, strikes, clashes with government officials, violence, and the 
overthrow of several regimes. Sources disagree on the total number (possibly as high 
as twenty) of nation states impacted by civil unrest resulting from the Arab Spring. 
                                                
9Arab Spring is also referred to as the “Arab Awakening,” “Arab Rebellions,” “Arab 
Revolutions,” and “Arab Uprisings.” The term Arab Spring was originally used in 
2005 by western journalists to describe the potential for a democratic movement 
spreading across the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq (see Devine, 2005; 
Jacoby, 2005; Krauthammer, 2005a, 2005b; Walker, 2005). 
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For example, Blight, Pulham and Torpey (2012) included seventeen countries in 
their interactive timeline of Middle East protests.  
 The uprisings that began in 2010 have continued into 2012. The most notable 
demonstrations have occurred in Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. 
Because the coverage of the Arab Spring was so prevalent during the second half of 
the sample period, it seems prudent to include some comparison of visuals from the 
Arab Spring coverage to the current study.  
 The recent political unrest in the Middle East provides an opportunity to 
examine potential differences in how visuals have been presented to their audiences. 
According to Fahmy (2010) these differences should be more apparent as 
international crises magnify differences in visual news coverage.  
Conflict Frames 
The intensity at which the political uprisings of the Arab Spring played out 
varied from relatively peaceful demonstrations to civil war (Libya and Syria). Yet, 
they all involved some level of conflict. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) recognized 
conflict as one of the most explored, and identified news frames. News images of 
intense conflict are of interest to media scholars because (1) they tend to draw 
intense public attention, (2) they highlight the application of professional norms and 
practices to the presentation of highly charged content; (3) they reflect cultural 
perspectives and reproduce traditions of cultural representation (Griffin, 2010).  
 While the literature review on conflict coverage outlined above suggests that 
media outlets frame conflict differently based on the political and cultural 
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environments in which they operate, predicting the framing of Arab Spring conflict 
by these networks is complicated by several factors. First, in recent years Alhurra 
reversed its policy and began covering breaking news. CNN, Time, and the leading 
pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat each recognized the quality of Alhurra’s Arab Spring 
coverage. Second, media coverage during the height of the protests was often 
hampered by official and unofficial disruptions. Journalists reported difficulty 
communicating with the outside world, were harassed, and had tapes confiscated. In 
Egypt for example, the Mubarak regime knocked Al Jazeera off the government 
controlled Nilesat satellite, in an effort to thwart the channel’s coverage. Also, pro-
Mubarak supporters passed out fliers (referring to Alhurra) stating “we are going to 
kick you out of Egypt” (Wimbush, 2011, p. 2). Third, Fahmy (2010) postulates that 
differences in visual coverage will be magnified during significant international 
events.  
These research questions are intended to explore how the networks visually 
framed conflict in their Arab Spring coverage:  
RQ2: Are there differences in the level of conflict/violence in visuals of the 
Arab Spring between the liberal commercial and western-styled 
networks?  
RQ3: Are there differences in the level of conflict/violence in visuals of the 
Arab Spring between Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Al Arabiya, BBC 
Arabic and Alhurra? 
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Human Interest Versus Political Framing 
Findings from several scholars suggest that different media outlets follow 
different visual strategies in the coverage of conflict events (Dobernig, Lobinger, and 
Wetzstein, 2010; Fahmy, 2010; Konstantindou, 2008). A review of the literature 
reveals the diversity generic and issues-specific frames identified in news content 
studies, including: conflict, violence, graphic, human interest/human impact, 
economic consequences, morality, moral-outrage, responsibility, casualty, political 
strategy, public engagement, public opinion, terrorism, victory, defeat, 
race/religion/culture, technical, anti-war, pro-war, and self-referential.   
Next to the conflict frame, the human impact (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 
1992) or human interest frame is a common frame found in news coverage (Matthes, 
2009; Neuman, et al., 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The human interest 
frame “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, 
issue, or problem” (Semetko & Valkenburg, p. 95). The human interest frame has 
also been identified as a of tabloid television news (Ehrlich, 1996).  
Numerous studies have examined the specific breakdown of visual frames in 
conflict coverage from various national and international contexts. Griffin and Lee 
(1995) found photographs of the first Gulf War overwhelming focused on military 
technology and virtually ignored the human impact of the war. King and Lester 
(2005) found pictures in three U.S. newspapers from the first and second gulf wars 
were pro-military. Fahmy and Kim (2008) explored differences in the coverage of 
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the second Gulf War from The New York Times and The Guardian. They found 
numerous differences in the visual coverage of the war. For example, The New York 
times focused on images of the U.S. military and government officials while The 
Guardian ran more photos of material destruction in Iraq. Konstantindou (2008) 
found that visuals in Greek coverage of the second Gulf War focused on spectacular 
images of victims. Fahmy (2005a) found that even though many of the images of 
9/11 and the War in Afghanistan carried in the Arab-language Al Hayat and English-
language The International Herald Tribune (IHT) transnational newspapers came 
from western news agencies they were framed differently by these organizations. 
More specific analysis of Afghan War coverage revealed Al Hayat depicted the 
human suffering and tragedy of the war (human interest frame), while IHT presented 
a more sanitized view (Fahmy, 2010). Fahmy (2010) concluded that the military 
(Griffin & Lee, 1995; King & Lester, 2005), or technical frame (Fahmy, 2005a, 
2010) is more commonly used to portray conflict on western media outlets, and is 
distinct from the human interest frame.  
Grabe, et al., (2001) state that dichotomies, including human interest versus 
public affairs, are often used to emphasize the differences between standard and 
sensational news topics. Although their study was not limited to visuals, Hamdy and 
Gomaa (2012) found social media posts during the Egyptian uprisings emphasized 
the human interest frame. Analysis by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) of European 
political coverage, found the human interest frame was more common in TV news 
than in print news media, and also more common on sensationalist news outlets than 
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on traditional news outlets. Brantner, Lobinger, and Wetzstein (2011) explored the 
differences in visual effects elicited between the dichotomous human interest and 
political news frames. 
Dobernig, et al. (2010) explored differences in the coverage of the 2009 Gaza 
crisis in four print news sources and found the Palestinian side was visually 
represented by individual civilians which provoked a sense of empathy, while the 
Israeli side was represented by visuals of political or governmental officials 
portraying statesmanship. These results suggest differing visual framing strategies 
based on the actors that are presented in the news coverage. 
Since the human interest frame has been found more prevalent in coverage on 
sensational news outlets, and in Arab media portrayals of conflict, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H6: Visuals on the liberal commercial networks will be more likely to 
emphasize the human-interest frame in coverage of the Arab Spring than 
western-styled networks. 
 In contrast to the human interest frame, the public affairs frame, or political 
strategy frame (Nisbet and Huge, 2007) emphasizes the actions of presidents, 
government agencies, political officials and authorities. Haigh (2010) found that the 
political strategy frame was one of the most common frames used in news coverage 
of the alternative energy debate. Brantner et al. (2011) found images of Israelis from 
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the 2009 Gaza conflict represented the political frame and emphasized “institutional 
power and statesmanship” (p. 528). 
Hallin (1994) emphasized that modern American journalism explicitly 
recognizes political authority, particularly in times of celebration or upheaval. 
Benson & Hallin (2004) state that in such times newsgathering turns to political 
authority to define the primary viewpoints on the issues. Their comparative analysis 
of American and French news media revealed a greater level of “indexing” to the 
viewpoints of the political elite in American coverage than in French coverage (p. 
19). They also found that reliance on political authority in both American and French 
coverage had increased between the 1960s and 1990s.   
Alhurra as a western-based public diplomacy entity of the U.S. 
government—which had close ties to some of the regimes targeted in the Arab 
Spring uprisings (e.g. Egypt)—should be more likely to emphasize statesmanship 
and political perspectives in Arab Spring coverage. Therefore it is predicted: 
H7: Visuals on Alhurra will be more likely to emphasize the political frame 
in coverage of the Arab Spring than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC 
Arabic and Al Arabiya. 
Sensational Production Features 
Coverage of political crises has often provided news organizations with 
opportunities to distinguish their programming from competitors (e.g. CNN’s 
coverage of the 1991 invasion of Iraq on CNN; Al Jazeera’s coverage of the 1998 
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Desert Fox Campaign, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; 
and Al Jazeera English’s coverage of the 2008-2009 Gaza war). In a highly 
competitive media environment, efforts to attract and maintain an audience often 
include being the first to report breaking developments, providing visuals that give 
the audience “a sense of presence” (Cho, et al., 2003, p. 312), and creating 
sophisticated packaging techniques to identify the story. As events drag on for weeks 
and sometimes months, sophisticated packaging techniques (identifying graphics, 
animation, music, and other productions enhancements) are often employed to define 
the coverage.  
Based on the status of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya as commercial stations in a 
highly competitive media environment, it is expected that:  
H8: News visuals from the coverage of the Arab Spring on the liberal 
commercial networks will be more likely to contain elements of 
sensational structural features than in coverage on western-style 
networks. 
From its inception Al Jazeera has shown a preference for emphasizing 
viewership over political and religious programming considerations. While similar 
trends are occasionally evident on transnational Saudi media, these outlets are 
simultaneously constrained by a strong state influence (Kraidy, 2009; 2012). Due to 
the hyper-competitive forces of Arab Spring coverage, and contravening political 
sensitivities of most of the networks, it is predicted: 
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H9: News visuals in Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Arab Spring will be more 
likely to contain elements of sensational structural features than 
coverage on Al Arabiya, Alhurra, Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic. 
Summary 
In light of the explosion of Arab satellite media and the absence of systematic 
studies of visuals contained in Arab newscasts, a visual analysis of transnational 
Arab newscasts is appropriate. Some researchers (e.g., DeVitt, 2002), suggest that 
framing provides an appropriate mechanism for exploring differences in both the 
content and structure of news coverage. The current study proposes to use framing to 
examine the visual images that navigate within the changed communication climate 
of the Arab world. The most appropriate method for the proposed research is the 
content analysis. 
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Chapter 3: Method 
Comparative research, it must be said, is easy to do badly and difficult to do well. 
 Jay G. Blumler, The Media and Neo-Populism 
Adams (1978) identified three distinct areas of inquiries for television news 
research: (1) production research, (2) content research, and (3) effects research. 
According to Adams, content research examines the composition of newscasts in 
order to determine the agenda and nature (depiction) of newscasts (Adams, 1978a). 
By the late 1980s, content analysis had developed into one of the most commonly 
used research methodologies for examining mass media and political messages (Kaid 
& Wadsworth, 1989).  
Berelson (1952) provides one of the most commonly cited definitions for 
content analysis. He defined content analysis as a “research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (p. 18). Other scholars (Holsti, 1969; Kaid & Wadsworth; Paisely, 
1969) have also defined content analysis. Each of their definitions tends to 
emphasize the elements of quantification, objectivity, systematic methods, and 
generalizability. According to Holsti the goal of content analysis is generalization 
with the benefit of being unobtrusive.  
While not explicitly stated in Berelson’s definition, basing content analysis 
on theoretical notions is also implied. Historically, broadcast news content research 
has been criticized for lacking theoretical underpinnings (Paletz and Pearson, 1978; 
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Patterson, 1978). As discussed in the literature review, this practice is still all too 
common.  
The most common objections to Berelson’s definition relate to his inclusion 
of the terms quantification and manifest content in his definition (see Krippendorff, 
1980). Holsti (1980) argues that quantification is an important element of content 
analysis because frequency counts of phenomena are powerful. The quantitative 
methods prevent the novelty of observed phenomena from being substituted for 
importance (Kaid & Wadsworth, 1989). Similarly, manifest content refers to what 
lies on the surface, is simple, or easily observable in the content. Use of latent 
content requires a “deeper” (Holsti) examination of the “inferences” being drawn 
from communication content by the audience, or “motives and intent of the source” 
(Kaid & Wadsworth, p. 198). 
Kaid and Wadsworth (1989) have detailed a seven-step research procedure 
for content analysis. The seven steps are: (1) developing research questions and 
hypotheses, (2) selecting the sample, (3) defining categories, (4) developing a coding 
system and training coders, (5) implementing coding, (6) assessing reliability and 
validity, and (7) analyzing the results. 
The current study is grounded in Berelson’s definition of content analysis and 
Kaid and Wadsworth’s seven-step process. A quantitative content analysis, guided 
by deductive framing, was conducted on the news programming of Al Jazeera, Al 
Arabiya, Alhurra, Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic.  
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Sample 
The sample frame consists of more than ten months of news programming 
from August 1, 2010, to June 15, 2011. A one-hour late evening newscast was 
recorded live via satellite from Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, AJE, and BBC Arabic on 
each weekday, and many weekends, for the duration of the sample period. Due to 
differences in each networks’ schedule, and the different time zones from which the 
newscasts originated, all newscasts could not be recorded during the exact same time 
each day. However, all the newscasts aired within a few hours of each other. 
Alhurra’s broadcasts are not available via satellite in the United States. The Alhurra 
broadcasts were recorded from daily archives available on the Alhurra website. The 
resulting sample frame consists of more than 1,100 hour-long newscasts. 
Matthes (2009) conducted a systematic analysis of 131 framing studies in the 
leading communication journals. The analysis revealed that most studies (79%) used 
a purposive sample, 5% used random samples, 2% a constructed week sample, 3% 
other samples, and 12% provided no information about sampling methods. Studies of 
cross cultural media content examined in the literature review ranged from simple 5-
day samples, (Ayish, 2002; Keith et al., 2009); a constructed two-week period 
(Vettehen et al., 2005); a constructed month (Groshek, 2008); and the duration of a 
crisis event (Aday, 2004). 
The goal was to create a sample that represents longitudinal “normal” or 
“routine” news coverage, and minimizes the impact of a single major news event on 
the sample. As already mentioned, there were several major international news 
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stories during the sample frame. These events generally did not demand the kind of 
live 24-hour coverage that would have interrupted the normal news cycle. However, 
some news coverage during the Arab Spring was an exception. During the most 
intense periods of political unrest in Egypt, and Libya, the international news 
networks interrupted their normal news cycles to provide 24-hour, live, breaking-
news style coverage. The bulk of this atypical coverage occurred between January 
29, and February 20, 2011. Newscasts airing between these dates were excluded 
from the sample. This research design should result in a sample that controls for 
stories that overwhelmed the news agenda.  
For the current study, a nonprobability sample of broadcasts was drawn for 
three days from the entire sample frame to construct the sample of routine news 
coverage. A random date generator was used to pull the sample. The selected dates 
were Wednesday, December 29, 2010, Thursday, January 27, 2011, and Tuesday, 
June 14, 2011. The programming from all five networks was analyzed for each 
selected day in the sample. The resulting sample comprised 438 stories and 6,595 
shots in 15 hours of news programming. 
Each story from the sample (n = 438) was also coded for Arab Spring 
coverage. Stories were coded Arab Spring if they contained coverage of the uprisings 
in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. This coding 
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Measurement 
The unit of analysis for RQ1 was the individual story. For RQ1 each story (n 
= 438) was coded into one of 16 possible categories that have been outlined in 
previous studies (Groshek, 2008; Natarajan & Xiaoming, 2003; Weaver, Porter & 
Evans, 1984). The categories used to measure the nominal agenda diversity of stories 
are as follows: (1) accidents/natural disasters, (2) agriculture, (3) 
business/economics, (4) crime/criminal justice/law and order, (5) 
ecology/environment, (6) education, (7) health care, (8) military/national defense, (9) 
politics, (10) race/religion/culture, (11) social problems/services, (12) sports, (13) 
technology, (14) war/terrorism, (15) oddities and (16) undecided. One additional 
category, (17) tease, was added to handle pre-show, re-join, commercial break, and 
closing tease elements.  
The unit of analysis for the remaining research question and hypotheses 
involving the entire sample was the individual image or shot (n = 6,595). For this 
study, the description of the individual shot followed the description set forth by 
Keith et al. (2009).  Using their guidelines, a shot was counted “each time the shot 
(subject) changed by video editing or, in the case of a pan, each time the subject 
changed” (p. 7).  
Each unit of analysis (story or shot) was analyzed for the presence of multiple 
frames (e.g. conflict, human interest, political, sensational elements). In other words, 
a single shot could simultaneously represent the conflict frame and political frame. 
This approach to frame extraction is not uncommon. While numerous studies look 
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for the presence of a single primary frame per discourse unit (e.g. Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012), Matthes (2009) found that 34% of framing studies extracted more than one 
frame per unit of analysis.   
RQ2 compares Amerocentric framing among the five networks. Using 
methodology similar to Groshek’s (2008), images were coded for the presence of 
four American signifiers. First, the visual contained an image of a person that was 
clearly identifiable as an American. Second, the visual contained a textual reference 
to the United States (i.e. the words United States or similar on the screen). Third, the 
visual contained an American symbol like a U.S. passport or the American flag. 
Fourth, the visual is located in the United States or its property (i.e. an overseas 
American embassy or military base). The shot was coded present if it was found to 
contain one of the four criteria. A shot was coded as absent of an American image if 
none of the four criteria were present. In addition shots containing American images 
were coded as positive, neutral, or negative. Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, and 
Trammell (2005) utilized a similar measure for tone of coverage to analyze support 
for the Iraq War. Amerocentric framing was operationalized as shots containing 
positive American images.  
Depictions of conflict and violence as sensational content were explored in 
all the visuals (H2 & H3) and Arab Spring visuals (RQ2 & RQ3). For these analyses, 
conflict was defined as “disagreements between or among parties…and needed to be 
obvious and clear from a casual viewing” (Groshek, 2008, p. 60). In addition to 
coding for the presence or absence of conflict, images were also coded for their level 
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of violence. Klijn (2003), using a modified definition of violence from the National 
Television Violence Study (1996, 1997, 1998), defined violence as:  
any evidence of a credible threat of physical force or the actual use of such 
a force intended to physically harm or intimidate an animate being or a 
group of animate beings.  Violence also includes certain depictions of 
physically or emotionally harmful consequences that occur as a result of the 
use of violent means against an animate being (or group of beings) (p. 132).  
Fishman and Marvin (2003) note that this is a representative description of explicit 
violence found in most systematic studies of violent content. 
The current study utilized a five category coding scheme for conflict and 
violence developed by Fishman and Marvin (2003) and refined by Groshek (2008). 
The categories are as follows: (1) No Conflict Frame, (2) Conflict Frame/Not 
Violent, (3) Conflict Frame/Dramatic Violence, (4) Conflict Frame/Latent Violence, 
and (5) Conflict Frame/Explicit Violence. The no conflict frame indicates the 
absence of conflict or violence in the image. The not violent frame contains images 
of conflict being handled in a peaceful manner, such as protest signs and marches. 
The dramatic violence frame includes images of violence that are “performed but not 
seriously intended” such as for sport or entertainment (Fishman & Marvin, p. 34). 
Images containing latent violence do not show the “immediate application of direct 
physical force” but suggest “that such force could be applied” (Fishman & Marvin, 
p. 34). Examples of latent violence include the presence of police, military 
personnel, and weapons.  Finally, Fishman & Marvin refer to images of explicit 
violence as those showing either the direct application of, or consequences resulting 
from, violence which is “seriously intended and performed” (p. 34). Explicit 
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violence includes images of firefights, damage to buildings or property, and injuries. 
The harmful aftermath of violence including the image of anguished victims or 
eyewitnesses was also included as explicit violence. Violence caused by non-
manmade agents (natural disasters, animals, weather) was excluded. 
Structural features of newscast visuals were explored for all shots (H4 & H5) 
and in Arab Spring shots (H8 & H9). Two scales of sensational structural features 
were developed to consolidate findings from a number of individual indicators. 
These indicators were divided into two groups: (1) acquisition features, and (2) 
presentation features. The indicators are dichotomous and were recorded as either 
present or absent in each shot.  
Acquisition Features. Acquisition features, or video maneuvers (Grabe, et 
al., 2001), refer to specific image characteristics that are established during the 
recording, or acquisition phase of television news. These characteristics are generally 
the result of camera operation decisions. They are considered sensational because 
they alter, what Tuchman (1978) referred to as, the “facticity” of news. Six features 
of the basic news shot were determined to comprise the acquisition features 
category: (1) zoom movements; (2) eyewitness camera; (3) extreme close-up; (4) 
dramatic sounds; (5) high-angle shots; and (6) low-angle shots.  
Zoom movements were coded present if either a zoom-in or zoom-out 
movement occurred in the shot. Previous studies (Grabe et al., 2001; Vettehen et al., 
2005) have included both movements as indicators, but have differentiated between 
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zoom-in and zoom-out movements. Grabe et al. cited research that suggests these 
two movements differ in their effect on audience involvement. However, for the 
current study, no differentiation was made between zoom-in and zoom-out camera 
movements. The rationale is that both movements have been coded in previous 
studies and these camera movements are non-traditional elements of a newscast. 
The eyewitness camera perspective, also referred to as subjective camera, or 
point-of-view camera, occurs when a photographer takes the camera off the tripod 
and moves with the camera. It provides a view from the audience’s point of view. 
Images of the camera running with contestants in reality shows like the Amazing 
Race or Survivor provide examples of eyewitness camera movements. The presence 
of eyewitness camera was coded if shaky video, or a movement of the camera with 
the action, was identified.  
Field of view refers to how close or how close or far an object appears to be 
from the viewer (Zettl, 2011). Zettl explains there are five steps to field of view: the 
extreme long shot (ELS), long shot (LS), medium shot (MS), close-up (CU) and 
extreme close up (ECU). The MS (composition of subject from the waist up) and the 
CU (composition of subject from the chest up) are two of the more commonly used 
field of view compositions on American television. On the other hand, the ECU is 
used sparingly, particularly on TV news. The ECU is a tightly framed shot of a 
subject’s face—roughly comprising the area between the chin and forehead—that 
occupies the bulk of the screen. ECU’s are generally reserved for conveying the 
intense emotion of the subject. Tightly framed shots have been used in past studies as 
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indicators of proximity (Vettehen et al., 2005) and vividness (Klijn, 2003). Presence 
of an ECU was coded if a shot of a human face occupied more than one-third of the 
screen. 
Changes in viewing angle, also related to field of view, are effective in 
distorting perceptions of power and powerlessness (Messaris, 1992; Tuchman, 
1978). Tuchman explains that “facticity is established by keeping the camera at eye 
level to the subject whenever possible. High and low angle shots were included as 
separate indicators because each of these shots imply different meanings to the 
audience. Low angle shots (worm’s eye) can make the subject look more powerful, 
while high angle shots (bird’s eye) can make the subject appear weaker. However, 
Tuchman notes that shooting acts of violence, disasters, demonstrations, and riots 
from distorted perspectives symbolically objectifies the participants. Presence of a 
high angle shot was coded if a subject was shot from above. Presence of a low angle 
shot was coded if a subject was shot from below. 
Although technically not a visual element, dramatic sounds were included as 
elements of sensational packaging by Vettehen et al. (2005). They defined dramatic 
sounds as “sounds of exploding ammunition, gunshots, as well as sounds of people 
who were crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding” (p. 288). These sounds 
represent natural sounds (nat sound or NATS), or background sounds, that the 
camera microphone picks up while recording the visuals of the event. As such, nat 
sound is an acquisition element. The present study adds the sounds of sirens, and 
military vehicles/aircraft to the list of dramatic sounds identified by Vettehen et al. 
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Dramatic sounds were coded as present if any of the sounds occurred in the shot.  
Presentation Features. These features have been referred to as “tabloid 
packaging” and “dramatic editing” (Vettehen et al., 2005, p. 289), or “decorative 
effects” (Grabe et al., 2001, p. 642). Presentation features refer to elements that are 
added to news items after acquisition, generally through editing (post-production), or 
as the visuals are presented on a newscast. Following examples from previous 
studies on sensational elements (Grabe et al., 2001; Vettehen et al., 2005), eight 
features of the news shot were determined to comprise presentation features: (1) 
decorative transitions; (2) slow-motion; (3) visual enhancements; (4) audio 
manipulations; (5) graphics; (6) animations; (7) split screen or boxes; and (8) 
monitor or video wall backgrounds.  
The standard transition between shots in television news is the cut. Use of 
other types of transitions, including the dissolve, fade-in, fade-out, wipe, and flash, 
are less common and considered more sensational. Grabe et al., (2001) identified 
these “decorative” transitions as “indicative of a sensational production style” (p. 
648).  Decorative transitions were coded present if one or more of these transitions 
were used between shots. 
Grabe et al. suggest their findings reveal the slow motion effect is a “formal 
feature” of sensational news presentations (p. 648).  Slow motion was coded present 
if the effect occurred in a shot. 
Visual enhancements refer to post-production techniques that are designed to 
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draw attention to, or away from, particular elements in an image. These include the 
freeze frame, highlight, and mosaic. The freeze frame occurs when the video image 
is frozen, or stilled, for the duration of the shot. The highlight occurs when part of 
the image is highlighted, or spotlighted, to emphasize and area of the screen. The 
mosaic occurs when part of the image is blurred, or otherwise rendered 
unrecognizable, in order to protect someone’s, or something’s identity. The presence 
of any one of these techniques in the shot was coded as a visual enhancement.  
“Audio manipulations” (Grabe et al., 2001, p. 288) refer to sound effects and 
music added to news items. Sound effects are sounds that have not been recorded 
during the acquisition phase, but are instead added during the post-production 
process. Music and sound effects are rarely utilized in shots during a standard 
newscast. Audio manipulations were coded as present if either of these was added to 
a shot. 
 Graphics and animations are created to visually illustrate the elements of a 
news story. Graphic and animation effects have been identified as elements of 
sensational or tabloid news (Cremedas & Chew, 1994). A graphic was coded present 
if a full-screen image containing, video, text, or photo-based images were shown. 
Animation was coded present if 2D or 3D images in motion were shown.  
 Finally, split-screen/boxes, and monitor/video walls were included as 
sensational presentation features. Split-screen/boxes are used to divide the 
audience’s video screen into multiple display areas, with separate subjects in each 
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area. For example, a split-screen may contain a shot of the anchor on one side of the 
screen while the other side of the screen may include footage (b-roll) of the story the 
anchor is discussing. The monitor/video wall effect refers to graphics or other visual 
elements that are presented on a video wall behind, or monitor next to, an anchor or 
interview subject. Monitor/video wall was coded present if compelling visual images 
appeared on the video wall or monitor.  Generic background images, network logos, 
and cityscapes displayed on a monitor/video wall were not considered compelling 
and were therefore coded not present.  
H6 and H7 explored the differences between human interest (H6) and 
political (H7) frames in visuals from Arab Spring coverage. For all Arab Spring 
stories the dominant actor in each shot, if identifiable, was coded into one of seven 
categories similar to those used by Dobernig et al. (2010). The categories were: (1) 
individual politician; (2) political party/government; (3) authorities/military/police; 
(4) individual civilian; (5) civilian population; (6) foreign politician/authority; and 
(7) other. In cases when the dominant actor could not be identified, the shot was 
coded as “other.” These categories describe the parties portrayed in the visuals. The 
seven-category indicator for subject of Arab Spring coverage was collapsed into a 
dichotomous indicator of human interest frames (individual civilians, or civilian 
population) and political frames (individual politicians, political party/government, 
military/police/authorities, foreign politician/authority). 
Coding and Inter-coder Reliability 
 Before coding could begin, the author, aided by a research assistant, 
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determined the parameters of each news story and also the in and out (beginning and 
end) points for each shot. The actual coding was conducted by the author and a 
second coder. A codebook (see Appendix) was developed as a reference for the 
coders to use to operationalize choices. Training consisted of two separate pre-test 
samples that were used to develop definitions and clarify agreement issues. After 
successfully completing pre-testing, with high inter-coder raw percentage agreement, 
the coding was conducted. For reliability purposes, it was determined that at least 
10% of the sample would be double coded, which is the percentage often 
recommended (Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). The reliability scores 
were calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha. Agreement on use of American images 
and the tone of American images was 0.96. Determination of Arab Spring content 
had an agreement of 0.97. Agreement for story and tease type was 0.90. The level of 
agreement for conflict and violence was 0.81. Agreement for sensational 
presentation features and acquisition features was at 0.77 for each. Scores for all 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
What God hath woven together, even multiple regression analysis cannot tear 
asunder. 
 David Brooks, The New York Times 
 A total of 6,595 shots from 438 stories were analyzed from three hour-long 
newscasts on five pan-Arab satellite TV networks. The breakdown of shots by 
network is Al Jazeera (n = 1,445); Al Jazeera English (n = 1,457); Alhurra (n = 
1,431); BBC Arabic (n = 840); and Al Arabiya (n = 1,422). The following chapter 
presents the results of the inferential statistical analysis that aimed to assess the 
research questions and hypotheses. The nature of the purposive sample precludes 
generalizing claims about the larger population of network newscasts. Therefore, the 
analysis is used for the purpose of determining the strength of associations.  
Analysis Strategy 
 A limited number of statistical tools were employed in the analysis of the 
data. Specifically, for the research questions cross-tabs were utilized to determine 
frequency and percentage of categories by each independent variable. A chi-square 
test of independence was calculated to evaluate whether the differences were 
significant. A combination of multi-level linear and multi-level logistic regression 
models was used to analyze all of the hypotheses. Multilevel regression was needed 
for analyzing the data since this sample was based on nested sources of variability. 
The unit of analysis, the shot, is nested within stories giving the data a multilevel, or 
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hierarchical, structure. To ignore the structure of this data and collapse the data 
across the shots or to analyze the data without consideration for the multilevel 
structure could lead to an increase in either alpha (false positive) or beta (false 
negative) errors (Hox, 2002). The specific type of multilevel regression used, logistic 
or linear, was determined based on the dependent variable. Linear regression was 
utilized when the dependent variable was metric (e.g., interval or ratio). Logistic 
regression, a variation of ordinary regression, was used when the dependent variable 
was binary. The binary variable usually represents the presence or absence of the 
visual feature under investigation. Logistic versus another form of analysis (e.g., 
probit) was the proper choice for this particular analysis given the underlying 
structure of the dependent variable is likely not dichotomous (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). For example, the first hypothesis examines a dichotomous dependent variable, 
Amerocentric. This variable, while coded in degrees of coverage (positive, neutral, 
or negative), was reduced to a dichotomous measure of either absent (neutral and 
negative), or present (positive). A research project/coding system that had as its 
focus Amerocentric reporting might try to analyze degrees of this variable at a finer 
level (i.e., more than just a dichotomy). Given the broader goals of this project a 
blunt measure of Amerocentrism was utilized and consequently logistic regression is 
the proper choice. Logistic regression relies on the mathematical concept of the logit, 
or the natural logarithm of an odds ratio (Peng, Lee, Ingersoll, 2002). The outcome 
of logistic regression is a prediction of the probability (reported as the natural 
logarithm of an odds ratio) of the occurrence based on the given independent 
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variables. 
 Historically, the most common methods for fitting hierarchical regression 
models are based on likelihood estimation methods. Iterative generalized least 
squares (IGLS) is one such model fitting method that has been popularized because 
of its computational speed and efficiency. For the current study the Bayesian 
method, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), was used for fitting all multilevel 
models. Brooks (1998) identified the MCMC method as an alternative sample 
method that avoids approximation by performing direct posterior sampling to “obtain 
sample estimates of the quantities of interest” (p. 3). Browne and Draper (2006) note 
the ability to perform calibration within the model makes MCMC a more attractive 
approach, particularly now that upgrades in computer technology have improved the 
speed of performing the necessary computations. Ultimately, MCMC should provide 
a more precise estimation. This increased level of precision is practically the case for 
the hypotheses that tested a binary outcome variable (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & 
Goldstein, 2009). It should be noted that the estimation procedures outlined above 
(e.g., logit) were still utilized to determine starting values for the MCMC estimation 
procedure. A careful comparison of results from the traditional form of estimation 
with the MCMC estimates reveals only minor differences. For example, if predictors 
were “non-significant” in the traditional analysis they stayed non-significant in the 
MCMC procedure. 
 MCMC estimates are the mathematical averages for a particular parameter 
(e.g., B) across a number of sampling iterations. Iterations represent a repetition of 
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the estimation procedure that result in convergence at the maximum likelihood 
estimate (Jackman, 2000). The number of iterations an analysis is run is determined 
by when the analyst deems convergence—the differences between log likelihoods 
are small—has been achieved (Browne, 2012). Browne suggests a number of 
graphical and numerical indicators of convergence, but there are no ironclad rules. 
The analyses reported below follow the Browne guidelines. Therefore, in the 
reporting of the results the number of iterations is reported along with the “burn-in” 
value/period. The burn value is the number of iterations the analysis runs until the 
estimates start to stabilize (Browne). The estimates calculated during the burn-in 
period are disregarded in the calculation of the final estimates. The MLwiN 
statistical software package was utilized to determine the MCMC multilevel 
regression estimates. 
RQ1: Story Agenda Diversity 
 The first research question examined the nominal agenda diversity of stories 
between the liberal commercial networks (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya) and western-
styled networks (Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, BBC Arabic). To test RQ1, story type 
was cross-tabulated with network taxonomy. Both the liberal commercial networks 
and western-styled networks had at least one story for each of the 17 story types. 
However, in order to conduct the chi-square analysis, story types with cells 
containing less than five stories were collapsed into a single category called “other.” 
These eight story types comprise the other category: accidents/natural disasters, 
agriculture, ecology/environment, health care, education, military/national defense, 
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race/religion/culture, and undecided. The frequency and percentages of story types 
on western and liberal commercial networks are shown in Table 1. 
 A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the 
percentage differences between story type and network taxonomy. The relationship 
between these variables was statistically significant (χ2  = 21.30, df = 9, p = .011, 
Cramer’s V = .22). There is a statistically significant difference in the nominal 
agenda diversity of stories between western-styled networks and liberal commercial 
networks. Further analysis (presented in the discussion section) reveals the 
significant differences involve the increased dependence on sports stories for western 
networks and teases for liberal networks.  
Table 1 
Frequency and Percentages of Story Types by Network Taxonomy 
Network Taxonomy Story Type 
Western Liberal 
Total 
Tease 55 (22.3%) 66 (34.6%) 121 (27.6%) 
Political Unrest/War/Terrorism 57 (23.1%) 39 (20.4%) 96 (21.9%) 
Sports 49 (19.8%) 16 (8.4%) 65 (14.8%) 
Other 22 (8.9%) 20 (10.5%) 42 (9.6%) 
Politics 26 (10.5%) 13 (6.8%) 39 (8.9%) 
Business/Economics 10 (4.0%) 14 (7.3%) 24 (5.5%) 
Technology 7 (2.8%) 6 (3.1%) 13 (3.0%) 
Crime/Law & Order 9 (3.6%) 5 (2.6%) 14 (3.2%) 
Humanitarian/Social Problems 7 (2.8%) 5 (2.6%) 12 (2.7%) 
Entertainment/Oddities 5 (2.0%) 7 (3.7%) 12 (2.7%) 
Total 247 (100%) 191 (100%) 438 (100%) 
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H1: Amerocentric Visuals 
The first hypothesis predicted Amerocentric visuals would be more likely to 
appear on Alhurra than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC Arabic, and Al Arabiya. 
A multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model was used to test 
this hypothesis. The dependent variable, originally a categorical indicator (positive, 
neutral, negative) was dichotomized into the presence of Amerocentric (positive) 
visuals or not within a given shot. The analysis controlled for story type (a 
dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not one of 
these), and shot length in seconds. Control variables were included in order to rule 
out the influence of these extraneous factors. This is a conservative assessment, 
which results in more confidence that the control variables are not interfering with 
the focus variables under investigation. The five networks were dummy coded with 
Alhurra as the reference category. Therefore, the predicted B (logged odds) for each 
of the four networks is an indicator of the difference between the particular network 
and Alhurra controlling for the other variables in the model. 
 An examination of the two control variables in the model (see Table 2) 
indicates as shot length increased the likelihood of Amerocentric framing 
significantly decreased (B = -.55, SE = .25, p = .024), but story type did not predict 
the likelihood of Amerocentric framing (B = -.15, SE = 1.33, p = .910). The results 
partially support the hypothesis. Al Jazeera (B = -7.37, SE = 2.74, p = .007), Al 
Arabiya (B = -6.47, SE = 2.37, p = .006), and Al Jazeera English (B = -3.74, SE = 
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1.93, p = .053) were significantly less likely to have pro-American images in their 
shots when compared to Alhurra. While this trend was also found in shots from BBC 
Arabic (B = -1.98, SE = 2.16, p = .360), the trend was not statistically significant. H1 
was mostly supported. 
 
Table 2 
Level of Amerocentric Framing by Network 
Variable B S.E. Z p 
Constant -11.86 2.38 4.98 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -7.37 2.74 -2.69 0.007 
Al Jazeera English -3.74 1.93 -1.94 0.053 
BBC Arabic -1.98 2.16 -0.92 0.360 
Al Arabiya -6.47 2.37 -2.74 0.006 
Shot Length -0.55 0.25 -2.26 0.024 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.15 1.33 -0.11 0.910 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). The story type variable had to be 
collapsed from the original seventeen types to a dichotomous measure. This was the 
case because the dependent variable, Amerocentric framing, did not vary (i.e., did 
not appear) for some story types. Iterations = 300,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance 




H2: Conflict Visuals 
The second hypothesis predicted visuals of conflict would more likely appear 
in the newscasts of the liberal commercial networks than on the western-styled 
networks. In the multi-level logistic regression model (see Table 3) the five-category 
dependent variable was collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence 
 
 116  
 
(conflict/not violent, conflict/dramatic violence, conflict/latent violence, 
conflict/explicit violence) or absence (no conflict) of conflict. The network 
taxonomy of western styled networks (AJE, BBC Arabic, and Alhurra) and liberal 
commercial networks (AJZ, and Al Arabiya) was dummy coded with western as the 
reference category. The model also included controls for shot length and story type. 
The seventeen story types were collapsed into four dummy coded variables10: 
politics/crime, business/technology, humanitarian, entertainment/other, with 
politics/crime as the reference category. Analysis of the control variables reveals that 
as shot length decreased the likelihood of conflict visuals increased (B = -.05, SE = 
.01, p < .001). Similar results were found with the controls for story type. The 
business/technology (B = -3.28, SE = .51, p < .001), humanitarian (B = -3.10, SE = 
.64, p < .001), and entertainment/other (B = -1.55, SE = .32, p < .001) story types 
were significant predictors of conflict visuals. In other words, explicit violence was 
less likely for these story types when compared to the reference category 
(politics/crime story type). Turning to the results of the hypothesis, visuals of 
conflict are significantly more likely to appear in the newscasts of the liberal 
                                                
10The seventeen story types were collapsed into the following four dummy coded 
variables: (1) politics/crime (politics, political unrest/war/terrorism, military/national 
defense, crime/criminal justice/law); (2) business/technology (business/economics, 
technology, education, agriculture, accidents/natural disasters); (3) humanitarian 
(humanitarian/social problems, health care, race/religion/culture, 
ecology/environment); (4) entertainment/other (oddities, sports, tease, undecided). 
This was the case because the dependent variable did not vary (i.e., did not appear) 
for some story types. 
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commercial networks (B = .57, SE = .29, p = .05) than on the western-styled 
networks. H2 is supported. 
Table 3 
Conflict Visuals by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. Z p 
Constant -1.21 0.26 -4.60 < 0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.57 0.29 1.96 0.050 
Shot Length -0.05 0.01 -3.62 < 0.001 
Story Type - Business/Tech. -3.28 0.51 -6.50 < 0.001 
Story Type – Humanitarian -3.10 0.64 -4.86 < 0.001 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other -1.55 0.32 -4.87 < 0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 300,000, Burn-in = 5,000. 
The variance of the constant across stories is 6.97 (χ2 = 58.99, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
H3: Explicit Violence 
H3 also examined conflict in visuals. H3 predicted the liberal commercial 
networks would utilize more images of explicit violence in conflict coverage than the 
western-styled networks. A multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic 
regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled 
networks as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was 
utilized (see Table 4). The five-category indicator for conflict and violence was 
collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of explicit 
violence. The control variable shot length (B = -2.80, SE = .66, p = .960) was not a 
significant predictor of explicit violence. As with H2, story type does appear to be a 
predictor of explicit violence. Each of the story type categories, business/technology 
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(B = -3.54, SE = .95, p < .001), humanitarian (B = -1.66, SE = .41, p < .001), and 
entertainment/other story types (B = -2.80, SE = .66, p < .001) were significant 
predictors of visuals of explicit violence in conflict coverage. Once again, this 
reveals explicit violence was less likely for these story types when compared to the 
reference category (politics/crime story type). Results from the hypothesis testing 
suggest that the liberal commercial networks (B = 0.74, SE = .36, p = .041) were 
significantly more likely to present images of explicit violence in conflict coverage 
than the western-styled networks. H3 is also supported. 
Table 4 
Visuals of Explicit Violence by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. Z p 
Constant -4.03 0.35 -11.65 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.74 0.36 2.04 0.041 
Shot Length -2.80 0.66 -4.24 0.960 
Story Type - Business/Technology -3.54 0.95 -3.74 <0.001 
Story Type – Humanitarian -1.66 0.41 -4.07 <0.001 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other -2.80 0.66 -4.24 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2,142.83 (χ2 = 28.96, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
H4: Sensational Features by Network Taxonomy 
 The next two hypotheses examined the prevalence of sensational framing 
between network taxonomies (H4), and each of the five networks (H5). Sixteen 
indicators were used to examine sensational framing within each shot. These sixteen 
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indicators were collapsed into two counts of event dependent variables: acquisition 
features (zoom in/out, eyewitness camera, extreme close-up, dramatic sounds, low-
angle shot, and high angle shot); and presentation features (decorative transition, 
slow-motion, visual enhancement, audio manipulation, graphic, animation, split 
screen/box, and monitor/video wall). Each of the sixteen indicators was weighted 
equally. This is consistent with previous studies (Grabe, et al., 2001; Vettehen, et al., 
2005) that have also examined sensational formal features in TV programming.  
 In addition to the above features, shot length (editing pace) was also included 
as a seventeenth indicator of sensationalism. Specifically, the shot length in seconds 
(M = 6.47 seconds, SD = 7.18) was dichotomized and added to the above mentioned 
counts. Shots with durations under six seconds11 were included as an indicator of 
sensational presentation features. In studies by Grabe, et al. (2001), and Vettehen, et 
al. (2005) shot length in seconds was analyzed as a separate ratio scale indicator of 
sensational program features. For the current study, dichotomizing shot length at the 
mean afforded the opportunity to include this indicator in the regression analysis 
(i.e., including this dichotomy with the other 16 dichotomies previously mentioned). 
                                                
11 While mean shot length was an arbitrary choice for dichotomizing the variable, 
previous research indicates that six seconds represents a reasonable division for 
sensational pacing. For example, Grabe, et al. (2001) found an average shot length of 
four seconds for the sensational program Hard Copy compared to seven seconds for 
the non-sensational 60 Minutes. Similarly, Vettehen, et al. (2005) found shot length 
was significantly shorter on the more sensational Dutch commercial network RTL 
(M= 6.59) than on the public Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation (NOS) network 
(M = 10.73).  
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Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length 
in seconds was not included as a control variable.   
 According to H4, shots on the liberal commercial networks would be more 
likely to contain sensational features than on the western-styled networks. A multi-
level linear regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-
styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—was used to 
examine both acquisition and presentation features. Statistically significant 
differences in the application of acquisition features between western and liberal (B 
= -0.001, SE = .05, p = .983) networks were not found (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
Sensational Acquisition Features by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 0.58 0.05 12.63 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial -0.001 0.05 -0.02 0.983 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.16 0.07 -2.28 0.024 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.23 0.09 -2.46 0.015 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other -0.004 0.05 -0.08 0.936 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.16 (χ2 = 119.94, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
In looking at sensational presentation features for H4 (see Table 6), 
entertainment/other (B = .64, SE = .08, p < .001) was the only story type control 
variable found to vary significantly with the dependent variable. The implication is 
sensational presentation features were more likely in shots from entertainment/other 
stories than from politics/crime stories (reference category). In analyzing the 
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hypothesis, sensational presentation features were found to differ significantly by 
network taxonomy. Use of sensational presentation features was more likely on the 
liberal networks (B = .47, SE = .07, p < .001) than on the western networks. Partial 
support for H4 is found for presentation features only. 
Table 6 
Sensational Presentation Features by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 1.40 0.07 19.11 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.47 0.07 -6.73 <0.001 
Story Type - Business/Technology 0.10 0.10 1.00 0.317 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.05 0.15 -0.30 0.764 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 0.64 0.08 8.19 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 40,000, Burn-in = 2,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.48 (χ2 = 153.42, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
 
H5: Sensational Features Between Networks 
 H5 predicted visuals on Al Arabiya would be more likely to contain 
sensational elements than visuals on Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, and 
BBC Arabic. The multi-level linear regression models controlled for the same four 
levels of story type. The five networks were dummy coded with Al Arabiya as the 
reference category. Results from the model for acquisition features (see Table 7) 
reveal no statistically significant differences in the application of sensational 
acquisition elements between Al Jazeera (B = .07, SE = .07, p = .360), Al Jazeera 
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English (B = .07, SE = .06, p = .254), Alhurra (B = .04, SE = .07, p = .538), BBC 
Arabic (B = -.14, SE = .08, p = .099), and Al Arabiya. 
 
Table 7  
 
Sensational Acquisition Features by Network 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 0.57 0.05 10.48 <0.001 
Al Jazeera 0.07 0.07 0.92 0.360 
Al Jazeera English 0.07 0.06 1.14 0.254 
Alhurra 0.04 0.07 0.62 0.538 
BBC Arabic -0.14 0.08 -1.65 0.099 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.17 0.07 -2.42 0.016 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.24 0.09 -2.65 0.008 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other -0.01 0.05 -0.18 0.860 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.16 (χ2 = 114.81, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
 
 The regression model for sensational presentation features in H5 reveals a 
significant relationship for only one of the control variables (see Table 8). Once 
again, the presence of sensational presentation features was more likely in shots from 
the entertainment/other story type (B = .67, SE = .10, p < .001) than from the 
reference category (politics/crime). In terms of the hypothesized relationships, a 
significant difference was found between networks for sensational presentation 
features. The prediction Al Arabiya (B = 1.60, SE = .08, p  < .001) would utilize 
more sensational presentation features than BBC Arabic (B = -.55, SE = .13, p  < 
.001) Al Jazeera (B = -.59, SE = .11, p  < .001), Al Jazeera English (B = -.67, SE = 
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.10, p  < .001), and Alhurra (B = -.80, SE = .10, p  < .001) was confirmed. H5 is 
partially supported for presentation features, but not acquisition features. 
Table 8 
Sensational Presentation Features by Network 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 1.60 0.08 19.75 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -0.59 0.11 -5.38 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.67 0.10 -6.91 <0.001 
Alhurra -0.80 0.10 -8.18 <0.001 
BBC Arabic -0.55 0.13 -4.35 <0.001 
Story Type - Business/Technology 0.11 0.10 1.10 0.273 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.00 0.14 0.02 0.983 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 0.67 0.08 8.74 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.44 (χ2 = 148.71, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
RQ2: Conflict in Arab Spring Visuals by Network Taxonomy 
Each story from the three-day sample (n = 438) was also coded for Arab 
Spring coverage. Stories were coded Arab Spring if they contained coverage of the 
uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. This 
coding resulted in an Arab Spring sample of 89 stories (22.6%) comprising 1,951 
shots (29.6%) from the original sample. The breakdown of shots by network is Al 
Jazeera (n = 508); Al Jazeera English (n = 213); Alhurra (n = 383); BBC Arabic (n 
= 386); and Al Arabiya (n = 461). 
 The second research question examined differences in levels of conflict and 
violence in visuals used between liberal commercial networks and western-styled 
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networks in coverage of the Arab Spring. To test RQ2, level of conflict and violence 
was cross-tabulated with network taxonomy. The frequency and percentages of 
conflict/violence types on western and liberal commercial networks are shown in 
Table 9. 
 A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the 
percentage differences between story type and network taxonomy. The 
Conflict/Dramatic Violence category was removed from the analysis since the 
normal minimum cell count is five (n = 1947). The chi-square was statistically 
significant (χ2  = 26.58, df = 4, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .12). There is a difference in 
level of conflict/violence in visuals used between western-styled networks and 
liberal commercial networks. Further analysis (presented in the discussion section) 
reveals liberal networks were more likely than western networks to use conflict 
visuals.  
Table 9 
Frequency and Percentages of Conflict by Network Taxonomy 
Network Taxonomy Level of Conflict/Violence 
Western Liberal 
Total 
No Conflict 454 (46.2%) 425 (43.9%) 879 (45.1%) 
Conflict/Not Violent 307 (31.3%) 235 (24.3%) 542 (27.8%) 
Conflict/Dramatic Violence 2 (0.2%) 2 (0.2%) 4 (0.2%) 
Conflict/Latent Violence 113(11.5%) 142 (14.7%) 255 (13.1%) 
Conflict/Explicit Violence 106 (10.8%) 165 (17.0%) 271 (13.9%) 
Total 982(100.0%) 969 (100.0%) 1,951 (100.0%) 
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RQ3: Conflict in Arab Spring Visuals Between Networks 
 The third research question examined differences in use of conflict visuals 
among each networks’ Arab Spring coverage. For RQ3, level of conflict/violence 
was cross-tabulated with all five networks. The frequency and percentages of 
conflict/violence types by network are shown in Table 10. 
 A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the 
percentage differences between story type and the networks. The Conflict/Dramatic 
Violence category was removed from the chi-square analysis since the normal 
minimum cell count is five (n = 1947). The relationship between these variables was 
statistically significant (χ2  = 98.72, df = 16, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .11). Findings 
reveal a difference in level of conflict/violence in visuals between the networks. An 
additional procedure was conducted to decompose the chi-square by cell (see 
discussion section), which revealed where significant differences lie. Some of the 
more interesting findings were that visuals on BBC Arabic were the least violent, 
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H6: Human Interest Framing in Arab Spring Coverage 
H6 predicted liberal commercial networks would emphasize the human 
interest frame more than western networks. A logistic multi-level (shots nested 
within stories) regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-
styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—was utilized 
(see Table 11). Shot length was not included as a control variable for H6, as it caused 
instability in the model (endless iterations) due to the smaller number of shots in the 
sample. The seven-category indicator for subject of Arab Spring coverage 
(politician, government/political party, police/military/authorities, individual civilian, 
civilian population, foreign authority, other) was collapsed into a dichotomous 
indicator of the presence or absence of human interest visuals (individual civilians, 
or civilian population). Results from the model for human interest reveal no 
statistically significant differences between liberal-commercial (B = .54, SE = .34, p 
= .110) and western networks. H6 is not supported. 
Table 11 
Human Interest Visuals in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. Z p 
Constant 0.55 0.22 2.50 0.013 
Liberal Commercial 0.54 0.34 1.60 0.110 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.40 0.52 0.78 0.434 
Story Type – Humanitarian 1.89 1.37 1.38 0.168 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 0.94 0.50 1.89 0.059 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 25,000, Burn-in = 1,500. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 1.47 (χ2 = 15.06, df = 1, p < .001). 
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H7: The Political Frame in Arab Spring Coverage 
 H7 predicted visuals representing the political frame in Arab Spring coverage 
would be more likely to appear on Alhurra than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC 
Arabic, and Al Arabiya. A logistic multi-level (shots nested within stories) 
regression model was used to test this hypothesis. The same seven-category indicator 
for subject of Arab Spring coverage used for H6 was collapsed into a dichotomous 
indicator of the presence or absence of political figures (individual politicians, 
political party/government, military/police/authorities, foreign politician/authority) 
as the main subject of a shot or not. The analysis controlled for story type (a 
dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, or conflict or not), and 
shot length in seconds. The five networks were dummy coded with Alhurra as the 
reference category. The predicted B (logged odds) for each of the four networks is an 
indicator of the difference between the particular network and Alhurra controlling for 
the other variables in the model. 
 An examination of the two control variables (see Table 12) in the model 
indicates as shot length increased the likelihood of political framing significantly 
decreased (B = .03, SE = .01, p = .012). For the story type control variable, the 
business/technology story type significantly predicted political framing (B = -3.34, 
SE = 1.68, p = .046). This means the political frame was less likely to be found in 
business/technology stories when compared to the reference category (politics/crime 
story type). Turning to the hypothesized predictions, only Al Jazeera (B = -2.12, SE 
= 1.05, p = .045) and BBC Arabic (B = -2.27, SE = 1.01, p = .024) were significantly 
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less likely to utilize the political frame in their shots of the Arab Spring when 
compared to Alhurra. H7 is partially supported. 
 
Table 12  
The Political Frame in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks 
Variable B S.E. Z p 
Constant -2.63 0.61 4.29 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -2.12 1.05 2.01 0.045 
Al Jazeera English -0.33 1.01 0.33 0.743 
BBC Arabic -2.27 1.01 2.26 0.024 
Al Arabiya 0.23 0.80 0.29 0.776 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.50 0.012 
Story Type - Business/Technology -3.34 1.68 1.99 0.046 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.50 2.44 0.20 0.839 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other -0.58 1.03 0.56 0.574 
Note: Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 5.18 (χ2 = 10.55, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
H8: Sensational Arab Spring Features by Network Taxonomy 
Analysis of H8 and H9 followed the same protocol established for H4 and 
H5. The seventeen indicators for sensational structural features were collapsed into 
two counts of event dependent variables: acquisition features (zoom in/out, 
eyewitness camera, extreme close-up, dramatic sounds, low-angle shot, and high 
angle shot); and presentation features (decorative transition, slow-motion, visual 
enhancement, audio manipulation, graphic, animation, split screen/box, and 
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monitor/video wall, editing pace), with each weighted equally. Since shot length (a 
dichotomous variable of less than 6 seconds or not) was included as one of the 
indicators for sensational presentation features (editing pace), it was not used as a 
control variable for these two hypotheses. 
H8 stated news visuals from coverage of the Arab Spring on liberal networks 
would more likely contain sensational features than visuals from western networks. 
Multi-level linear regression models—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring 
western-styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—were 
used to examine Arab Spring stories for both sensational acquisition features and 
presentation features (see Table 13).  
Once again only partial support for the predicted results was found (see Table 
14).  Statistically significant differences in the application of acquisition features 
between western and liberal commercial networks (B = .06, SE = .10, p = .567) were 
not found. 
Table 13 
Acquisition Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 0.72 0.07 9.97 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.06 0.10 0.57 0.567 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.28 0.18 1.56 0.119 
Story Type – Humanitarian 0.18 0.43 0.42 0.675 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 0.21 0.17 1.20 0.231 
Note: Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 99). Iterations = 20,000, Burn = 2,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.162 (χ2 = 24.20, df = 1, p < .001). 
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The examination of sensational presentation features for H8 reveals a 
significant relationship for only one control variable (see Table 14). As the presence 
of the entertainment/other story type (B =1.39, SE = .24, p < .001) increased the use 
of sensational presentation features also increased. In other words, sensational 
presentation features were more likely in entertainment/other type stories when 
compared to the control category (politics/crime stories). As for the hypothesized 
relationship, significant differences in the use of sensational presentation features 
were found, providing partial support for H9. As predicted, the use of sensational 
presentation features was determined to be significantly more likely on liberal 
networks (B = .70, SE = .16, p < .001) than on western networks.  
Table 14 
Presentation Features in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 0.85 0.11 8.13 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.70 0.16 4.45 <0.001 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.32 0.31 1.03 0.304 
Story Type – Humanitarian -0.07 0.71 0.10 0.920 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 1.39 0.24 5.87 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 99). Iterations = 95,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.51 (χ2 = 34.43, df = 1, p < .001).  
 
H9: Sensational Arab Spring Features between Networks 
According to H9, Arab Spring visuals on Al Jazeera would be more likely to 
contain sensational structural features than Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, BBC Arabic, 
or Al Arabiya. The multi-level linear regression model controlled for four levels of 
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story type. The five networks—dummy coded with Al Jazeera as the reference 
category—were analyzed for the presence of both sensational acquisition features 
and presentation features.  
Sensational acquisition features for H9 were found to differ significantly for 
one network (see Table 15). None of the story type control variables had a significant 
relationship for acquisition features. Looking at the hypothesized predictions, 
significant differences in the use of sensational acquisition features were only found 
between BBC Arabic (B = -0.42, SE = .15, p < .004) and Al Jazeera. The use of 
sensational acquisition features was determined to be significantly more likely on Al 
Jazeera than on BBC Arabic.  
Table 15  
Acquisition Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 0.89 0.11 8.06 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English 0.19 0.17 1.16 0.248 
Alhurra -0.11 0.14 0.77 0.441 
BBC Arabic -0.42 0.15 2.86 0.004 
Al Arabiya -0.13 0.13 -1.00 0.317 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.32 0.18 1.80 0.072 
Story Type – Humanitarian 0.13 0.41 0.31 0.760 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 0.09 0.16 0.56 0.574 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.13 (χ2 = 19.42, df = 1, p < .001). 
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In terms of presentation features, only limited support was found for the 
hypothesized prediction (see Table 16). First, an examination of the control variables 
reveals the entertainment/other control variable was more likely (B = 1.40, SE = .24, 
p < .001) to contain sensational presentation features when compared to the reference 
category (politics/crime). When evaluating the results of the hypothesis for 
sensational presentation features, only partial support for the predicted results was 
found. In this case, Al Jazeera was significantly more likely to air shots containing 
sensational presentation features than Alhurra (B = -0.47, SE = .23, p < .042), but 
significantly less likely to air shots containing sensational presentation features than 
Al Arabiya (B = 0.68, SE = .22, p < .002).  
Table 16  
Presentation Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks 
Variable B S.E. T p 
Constant 1.15 0.18 6.26 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.21 0.28 0.76 0.445 
Alhurra -0.47 0.23 2.03 0.042 
BBC Arabic -0.18 0.25 0.71 0.478 
Al Arabiya 0.68 0.22 3.13 0.002 
Story Type - Business/Technology -0.20 0.30 0.66 0.510 
Story Type – Humanitarian 0.10 0.71 0.14 0.886 
Story Type - Entertainment/Other 1.40 0.24 5.89 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Opposing rooters at a football game do not experience the ‘same’ game. 
 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis 
 
Using framing theory, this study set out to explore the differences in story 
selection, sensational content, and production form on five transnational Arab 
satellite TV channels in routine news coverage, and coverage of the Arab Spring. 
Distinct differences in the application of story types, shot content, and structural 
features of news visuals were found between the network taxonomies (western and 
liberal commercial), as well as, between the individual networks (Al Arabiya, 
Alhurra, Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, and BBC Arabic). The current chapter 
provides: (1) summary of the results; (2) interpretations of results; (3) limitations and 
directions for future research. 
Summary of Results 
The findings revealed differences in the nominal agenda diversity of stories 
aired between western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks (RQ1). The 
prediction that Alhurra would be more likely to air pro-American visuals than the 
other networks was supported for three (Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, and Al 
Arabiya) of the networks (H1). The liberal commercial networks were more likely to 
utilize conflict visuals than the western-styled networks, providing support for H2. In 
addition, conflict visuals on liberal commercial networks were more likely to depict 
explicit violence than on western networks (H3). The study also predicted differing 
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applications of sensational production techniques among the networks. Use of 
sensational presentation features (but not sensational acquisition features) was found 
to be more likely on the liberal networks than on western networks (H4). Likewise, 
Al Arabiya utilized more sensational presentation features than the other four 
networks (H5). 
The study also investigated differences in the use of visuals for Arab Spring 
coverage. Differential use of conflict and violence in visuals of the Arab Spring was 
found between western networks and liberal commercial networks (RQ2), and 
between the individual networks (RQ3). The predicted reliance by liberal 
commercial networks on the human interest frame in Arab Spring coverage was not 
supported (H6). Alhurra was much more likely to invoke a political frame than Al 
Jazeera and BBC Arabic providing partial support for H7. As predicted, the use of 
sensational production features in Arab Spring coverage differed by network 
taxonomy and individual networks. Use of sensational presentation features was 
determined to be significantly more likely on liberal networks than on western 
networks (H8). At the level of individual networks (H9), the use of sensational 
acquisition features was determined to be significantly more likely on Al Jazeera 
than on BBC Arabic. Also, Al Jazeera was significantly more likely to air shots 
containing sensational presentation features than Alhurra but significantly less likely 
to air shots containing sensational presentation features than Al Arabiya. 
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Interpretation of Results 
 This study expands framing theory by examining the visual interplay of story 
selection, content, and production forms from transnational Arab television news 
outlets in the context of routine news visuals and conflict-specific news visuals. A 
review of the literature reveals that both pan-Arab television news and news visuals 
are under-researched framing elements in mass communication scholarship.  
 Systematic analysis of Middle Eastern news visuals is generally performed 
through cross-cultural comparisons of Arabic-language and English-language media. 
These studies have provided important insights into differences in the framing of 
print, web-based, and less-often, television news visuals. However, they rarely 
provide insight into differences in the application of television news frames by Arab 
news outlets trying to reach the same Arab audience. The current study provides a 
rare comparison of visual frames, and sensational production techniques among 
competing pan-Arab news networks. 
 Furthermore, a significant contribution to framing theory is made by the 
incorporation of sensationalism and television form in the current study. Tuchman 
(1978) asserted that both content and form operate as media frames. Here, content 
and form were primarily explored through the lens of sensationalism. As indicated in 
the literature review, sensationalism has been explicated as a separate theoretical 
approach, and through numerous other theoretical applications. However, 
sensationalism fits within framing theory as an example of “symbols and visual 
images emphasized in a news narrative” (Haigh, Bruce, & Craig, 2008). While both 
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framing and sensationalism have been recognized as factors of cultural and political 
considerations, scholars (Tuggle & Huffman, 1999; Vettehen, 2005) also point to a 
coalescence of technology, journalistic practices, and competition. The current study 
provides additional support for this conceptual premise.  
 The organization of this section deviates from the order of research questions 
and hypotheses examined in the results sections. Instead, this section is organized to 
provide more general insights into the major components of newscast visuals: story 
selection, content, and production form.  
 Story selection. First, this study explored differences in the nominal agenda 
diversity of news stories presented on both western networks and liberal commercial 
networks. The literature review suggested a propensity among liberal commercial 
networks to focus on political news stories. What was previously unknown was 
whether this propensity also carried over to the western-styled networks that 
operated in the region. The chi-square analysis revealed significant differences in 
story selection do exist, but not where those differences lie.  
A ranking of story topics between western and liberal networks (see Table 
17) provides additional insight into where these differences reside. In general, there 
appear to be only minor differences in the preferences for story types between 
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Table 17 
Rank Comparison of News Topics on Western and Liberal Commercial Networks 





Political Unrest/War/Terrorism 1 23.1 2 20.4 
Tease 2 22.3 1 34.6 
Sports 3 19.8 4 8.4 
Politics 4 10.5 6 6.8 
Other 5 8.9 3 10.5 
Business/Economics 6 4.0 5 7.3 
Crime/Law & Order 7 3.6 9 (tie) 2.6 
Technology 8 (tie) 2.8 7 3.1 
Humanitarian/Social Problems  8 (tie) 2.8 9 (tie) 2.6 
Entertainment/Oddities 10 2.0 8 3.7 
 
In order to determine if these differences were statistically significant, an 
additional procedure was conducted to decompose the chi-square by cell. The 
resulting standardized Pearson residuals provide a more meaningful cell-by-cell 
analysis regarding the differences and where they lie. Regarding the standardized 
Pearson residuals, Agresti (2002) states that absolute values greater than two indicate 
where there is a greater likelihood of difference. The results (see Table 18) confirm 
teases are significantly more likely on liberal than western networks |2.85| and sports 
stories are significantly more likely on western than liberal networks |3.35|.  
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Table 18 
Standardized Pearson Residuals for News Topics on Western and Liberal Networks 
Network Taxonomy Story Type 
Western Liberal 
Political Unrest/War/Terrorism 0.67 -0.67 
Tease -2.85 2.85 
Sports 3.35 -3.35 
Politics 1.36 -1.36 
Other -0.55 0.55 
Business/Economics -1.50 1.50 
Crime/Criminal Justice/Law & Order 0.61 -0.61 
Technology -0.19 0.19 
Humanitarian/Social Problems  0.14 -0.14 
Entertainment/Oddities -1.04 1.04 
Note. The squares of the non-standardized Pearson residuals for all cells sum to the 
table chi-square value. With just to columns the standardized Pearson residuals have 
the same absolute value.  
 
While statistically significant differences in story selection exist between 
western and liberal networks, the differences are—with the exception of sports and 
teases—subtle. Story selection on “serious” news topics (i.e., political events in the 
region) is very similar. This could reflect evidence of what scholars (Groshek, 2008; 
Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Plasser, 2005) refer to as increasing global news 
homogenization. Hallin & Mancini note that a homogenized journalistic culture is 
increasingly prevalent as journalists from around the globe emulate western-styled 
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journalism, which has historically been viewed as the “standard” (p. 257). Further 
evidence of potential homogenization of news is reflected in similar levels of 
entertainment, technology, and humanitarian stories between western and liberal 
networks. These story types would have been rare under the previously state-
controlled newscasts, which featured protocol news.  
The starkest differences in story selection have less to do with political 
motivations and more to do with cultural and market based factors. Even though 
sports stories were featured in newscasts from all five networks, they were much 
more prevalent on the western networks. The main difference appears to be that the 
sports culture prevalent in western society manifests in increased coverage of sports 
on the western networks. Sports coverage seems to be one area of western news 
culture that is easily exported to an Arab audience.  In addition, the analysis of 
Alhurra, commissioned by the BBG and conducted by the USC Center on Public 
Diplomacy at the Annenberg School (2008), suggested that Arab audiences are 
interested in such cultural material. 
 On the other hand, the liberal networks relied much more heavily on tease 
elements. Teasers, or bumpers, serve as transitions between production elements, and 
promote upcoming stories by grabbing and holding the attention of the audience 
(Cohler, 1985; Yoakam & Cremer, 1985). As is common in most newscasts around 
the globe, all five networks utilized teases and bumpers to varying degrees. While 
not all teases are necessarily sensational, the most provocative types of teases often 
contain sophisticated audio and visual production treatments combined with 
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sensational content. Teases for high-profile stories are often sensational as they 
interrupt the flow of a newscast with music, graphics, and visual elements that serve 
as an attention-gaining device. As an example, Al Arabiya used visually alluring 
teases composed of still image montages, graphics, and music to lead into, and out 
of, several high-profile stories. Tovares (1997) notes that provocative teases—once 
the exclusive domain of American daytime talk shows—utilize alluring elements to 
“titillate” the audience into continued viewing (p. 1). The combination of market 
pressures, and commitment to technical sophistication led to significant increases in 
the number of teases on the liberal networks. Reliance on tease elements also 
increased the level of sensationalism on the liberal networks, particularly on Al 
Arabiya.   
Content frames. Not only were significant differences found in the nominal 
agenda diversity of western and liberal networks, there were significant differences 
in the framing of visual content. When it comes to conflict coverage, portrayals of 
conflict actors can provide insight into differences of human interest versus political 
framing. Past studies of culturally bound media have often found differences in the 
portrayals of conflict actors (Aday, et al., 2005; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahren, 2007; 
Dimitrova, et al., 2005; Dobernig, et al., 2010; Fahmy, 2005a, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 
2008; Griffen & Lee, 1995; King & Lester, 2005; Konstantindou, 2008; Silcock, et 
al., 2008). Table 19 illustrates the primary conflict actors broken down by network 
for all shots. Of these shots, 320 (16.4%) portray politicians, government, authorities, 
or foreign authorities as the primary conflict actor (political frame), while 1,006 
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(51.6%) portray individuals, or groups of civilians (human interest frame) as the 
primary conflict actor. It was assumed that network taxonomy would influence the 
application of the human interest frame in Arab Spring conflict coverage. 
Surprisingly, the differences were not statistically significant. Visual references to 
civilian actors were relatively constant across the networks. The coverage universally 
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 However, significant differences in the portrayal of political frames were 
revealed for Alhurra when compared to the other networks. Officials—government, 
politicians, police and military authorities—appeared in 19.8% of the Arab Spring 
shots used on Alhurra, which was significantly more often than on Al Jazeera 
(13.2%) or BBC Arabic (12.3%). While visuals on Alhurra still emphasized the 
human interest frame (57.7%) more often than the political frame, visuals 
representing the political frame were more prevalent on Alhurra than on the other 
networks. Increased coverage of U.S. government officials (e.g., Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton), images of government leaders in the affected areas (e.g., Hosni 
Mubarak), and opposition leaders (e.g., Mohamed ElBaradei) contributed to the 
findings. Alhurra’s use of the political frame seems to reflect its organizational 
mandate, the U.S. government’s interest in the region, and America’s close ties to 
several of the governments targeted by the uprisings.  
There were several unexpected findings as well. First, visuals of foreign 
authorities were noticeably absent from coverage on Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera 
English. The findings seem to be consistent with other research (e.g., Dobernig, et 
al., 2010), which found a visual emphasis on civilians could be intended to evoke 
sympathy from the audience. Next, the political frame was found more often in Al 
Arabiya (20.9%) coverage than any of the other networks, including Alhurra. Images 
of foreign authorities were portrayed more evenly on Alhurra, BBC Arabic and Al 
Arabiya. Along with images of Arab Spring protestors, the western networks 
presented images of NATO military forces, U.S. and British government officials, 
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and the leaders of neighboring Arab states. These findings suggest that Alhurra and 
Al Arabiya presented more balanced coverage of the crises by visually presenting a 
wider view of stakeholders. As an example, Alhurra in particular, aired numerous 
man-on-the-street interviews with Egyptian protestors. These networks’ more 
balanced coverage could be the result of more objective journalistic philosophies, 
and a reflection of the political sensitivities of the networks’ benefactors. 
These two principles, objective journalism and sensitivity to the 
organizational mission, are also likely at play in Alhurra’s use of Amerocentric 
visuals. Since Alhurra is charged with presenting the American perspective to its 
Arab audience, it was expected that the network would present significantly more 
positive toned visuals of America and Americans. This turned out to be the case as 
the use of Amerocentric visuals on Alhurra differed significantly from all the other 
networks, except for BBC Arabic. Of all the visuals coded from Alhurra (n = 1,431), 
322 (22.5%) contained a reference to America or Americans. Of those, 185 images 
(12.9%) had a positive tone. The fact that nearly a quarter of all visuals on Alhurra 
contained images of America or Americans reveals that the network takes its 
mandate to present the American story to its Arab audience seriously. However, this 
promotes the double-edged image problem that has plagued the network since its 
inception. While surveys reveal members of the Arab audience want to know more 
about America, the positively toned coverage likely contributes to accusations from 
the same audience that Alhurra airs propaganda.  
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This discussion of visual content is incomplete without focusing on images of 
conflict and violence. Al Jazeera has been heavily criticized for presentation of 
graphic news visuals. However, there have been few systematic comparisons of 
conflict visuals between pan-Arab satellite channels. Therefore, the differential use 
of conflict and violence in visuals was an important element of the current research 
design. Figure 1 illustrates differences in the use of conflict and violence in the 
visuals of the daily newscasts. In general, the overwhelming majority of images on 
both western and liberal networks did not contain cues to conflict related visuals. 
This finding runs contrary to the popular belief that the majority of visuals aired on a 
daily basis by Arab networks, like Al Jazeera, are violent. However, significant 
differences in the use of conflict and violence do exist between the liberal and 
western networks. The liberal networks were significantly more likely than western 
networks to use conflict visuals. In addition, when they used conflict visuals, the 
liberal networks were also more likely than western networks to use images of 
explicit violence.  
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Figure 1. Frequency of conflict and violent imagery by network taxonomy as 
represented in H2. 
 
 Findings from the analysis of conflict visuals from the Arab Spring were 
even more specific. Differences were found between the use of conflict visuals on 
western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks. Looking at the 
standardized Pearson residuals (Table 20), the “no conflict” category is the only 
difference not likely to be significant. Differences in the use of conflict/not violent 
visuals between western and liberal networks were likely statistically significant 
|3.46|. Statistically significant differences for latent violent images were more likely 
for liberal networks |2.06| than for western networks. Differences for use of violent 
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images on western and liberal |3.98| networks were also likely significant. Just as 
with the daily topics, the results reveal that Arab Spring visuals on all the networks 
were predominantly conflict free. However, when Arab Spring conflict was shown, 
the western networks were more likely to use non-violent visuals while the liberal 
networks were more likely to present a view of the uprisings that was more explicitly 
violent.  
Table 20 
Standardized Pearson Residuals for Arab Spring Conflict Visuals on Western and 
Liberal Commercial Networks 
Network Taxonomy Level of Conflict/Violence 
Western Liberal 
No Conflict 1.05 -1.05 
Conflict/Not Violent 3.46 -3.46 
Conflict/Latent Violence -2.06 2.06 
Conflict/Explicit Violence -3.98 3.98 
 
 Table 21 further breaks down the standardized Pearson residuals for 
significant differential use of conflict and violence in Arab Spring coverage at the 
network level. The table reveals BBC Arabic is more likely to air conflict free 
visuals |2.93| and less likely to air visuals of latent violence |-2.47| and explicit 
violence |-2.69| than the other four networks. Alhurra was less likely to use latent 
violence visuals |-3.11| and more likely to air not violent visuals |2.88|. Aljazeera 
English was less likely to present no conflict visuals |-2.53| but more likely to show 
visuals with latent violence |4.60|. Al Arabiya was less likely to air no conflict 
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visuals |-2.02|. Al Jazeera was less likely to use not violent |-3.27| shots, but the only 
network significantly more likely to use shots of conflict/explicit violence |2.09|. 
These results reveal a clear progression from the network airing the least violent 
visuals (BBC Arabic) to the network airing the most graphic visuals (Al Jazeera) in 
Arab Spring coverage. Figure 2 illustrates this progression of violent visuals between 
all five networks.  
 Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya depicted a more violent image of the Arab Spring 
than Alhurra and BBC Arabic. Stories airing on the same day on Alhurra and Al 
Jazeera illustrate these differences. Each story, which focused on the Libyan rebels, 
used the same footage from the same source. However, due to editing decisions at 
each network, the stories differed visually. Both networks included at least a few 
explicitly violent visuals (e.g., rebel forces firing artillery). However, Al Jazeera 
aired more footage (number and length of shots) and more shots containing explicit 
images, including shots of material destruction and injured civilians.    
This study produced results that corroborate the findings of a great deal of the 
previous work from cross-cultural comparisons of conflict visuals. The liberal 
networks depicted more violent images of conflict while images on the western 
networks presented a more sanitized view of conflict. Despite obvious preferences 
for violent images, the overwhelming majority of visuals aired on pan-Arab 
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Television form. In addition to content differences, this study examined 
differences in the application of sensational production features between the two 
dimensions of network taxonomy, and between the individual networks. The 
research design adds to framing theory by providing a more simplified 
methodological approach for examining the production features of news visuals. 
Two scales of production features (acquisition and presentation) were utilized for the 
analysis rather than relying on a multiplicity of elaborate scales, or the separate 
analysis of each individual variable. This two-scale design provides a comprehensive 
measure of the variables associated with the acquisition of visuals, or the 
presentation of visuals to the audience. It is important to note that none of the 
individual variables making up these scales should necessarily be considered 
sensational production elements on their own. Instead, these independent elements 
likely have a cumulative effect on sensationalism, which has been referred to as 
“tabloid packaging” (Grabe, et al., 2000, p. 595), and a “superfluity of attention-
getting devices” (Klijn, 2003, p. 127). Klijn suggests having multiple production 
features applied to a shot is more indicative of a sensational production style, which 
boosts attention but reduces comprehension.  
 Acquisition features. The prediction that there would be significant 
differences in the use of sensational production features between liberal and western 
networks, and individual networks was partially supported. Acquisition features are a 
result of techniques applied during the acquisition of news images and fall into six 
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categories: (1) zoom movements; (2) eyewitness camera; (3) extreme close-up; (4) 
dramatic sounds; (5) high-angle shots; and (6) low-angle shots.  
 Significant differences were not found in the sensational acquisition features 
used between western and liberal networks in routine, or Arab Spring coverage, or 
between the individual networks in routine news. In order to gain a richer 
understanding of whether any individual indicators might contribute to differences in 
the scale of acquisition features, additional regression analysis was conducted on 
many of the individual variables that comprise the scale of acquisition features. The 
results of these additional analyses on sensational acquisition and presentations 
features in routine and Arab Spring newscasts can be found in the appendices12 (see 
Appendices B through E).  
 Breaking down the analysis to the level of individual variables does reveal 
some minor differences between networks. As one example, shots on Al Jazeera 
English were more likely to contain zooms than on Al Arabiya (see Table C1). While 
dramatic sounds were significantly more likely in shots from Al Jazeera and Al 
Jazeera English than in shots from Al Arabiya (see Table C3).  
 In Arab Spring coverage at the network level, significant differences were 
only found between Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic. BBC Arabic was less likely to use 
sensational acquisition features than Al Jazeera. When looking at differences in the 
                                                
12 These results must be interpreted with caution as the large number of multiple 
significance tests dramatically increases the likelihood of type 1 error.  
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individual variables of sensational acquisition features, even fewer significant 
differences were found. The findings revealed the liberal networks were more likely 
to use zooms in shots during Arab Spring coverage (see Table D1) than the western 
networks. 
 The lack of statistically significant differences in the use of sensational 
acquisition features was somewhat surprising. The author expected to see greater 
differences across the board in the application of these features because western—
specifically American—TV news visuals generally conform to a standard set of 
codes (Tuchman, 1978). The eyewitness camera technique provides a good 
illustration of these codes. The frequent use of eyewitness camera has traditionally 
been discouraged in American TV newscasts because it violates what Tuchman 
(1978) referred to as visual neutrality. Therefore, it was expected that shots from the 
western networks would reflect this proclivity. However, eyewitness camera was 
heavily utilized in shots from all the networks in the sample. In summary, the 
approach for acquiring news footage is not that different among these five 
transnational networks. 
 There are several possible explanations for the overall lack of difference in 
the use of acquisition features, particularly when it comes to conflict or breaking 
news coverage. First, the rather shaky, eyewitness camera appearance of some of the 
conflict footage may be the result of journalists getting so close to the action that it is 
impractical to achieve more stable and objective shots. Second, in some cases, this 
footage may have originated form laypersons using cell phones or amateur recording 
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devices to capture the events rather than from professionally trained journalists. 
Third, the availability of news footage from breaking news events is often limited to 
a small number of sources. A network may not always have a news crew in an area 
where breaking news occurs. In such instances, a network may air footage acquired 
from another network, or a news agency. For example, scholars (Fahmy, 2005a; 
Paterson, 2001; Pavlik, 2001; Wanta, 2002; Wanta & Roarke, 1993) have found that 
competing print media outlets often use visuals acquired from the same news wire 
services, and that the news source can impact the media frame. Finally, the cultural 
sensitivities and professional standards of media professionals at the various 
networks may not be as diverse as expected. Scholars have documented the 
significant numbers of both western-trained (BBC), and professional Lebanese 
journalists (Kraidy, 2012) spread throughout Arab media outlets. These factors have 
likely contributed to similar journalistic routines and codes at each of the 
transnational Arab networks for the acquisition of visuals.  
 Presentation features. Conversely, significant differences in the use of 
sensational presentation features were universally found. Presentation features are 
the “bells and whistles” of news production that are applied after shots are acquired 
and before they are delivered to the audience for viewing (Grabe, et al., 2001, p. 
652). The results from the analysis of H4, H5, H8 & H9 show liberal networks were 
more likely than western networks to apply sensational presentation techniques in 
both normal coverage and Arab Spring coverage. Additional analysis of the 
individual variables that make up the scale of presentation features revealed the 
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liberal networks were more likely to use decorative transitions (see Table B5), audio 
manipulations (see Table B6), graphics (see Table B7), animations (see Table B8), 
and a quicker editing pace (see Table B11) than western networks. Additional 
analysis of the H5 variables revealed Al Arabiya was more likely to use decorative 
transitions (see Table C5), animations (see Table C7), and monitor/video wall 
backgrounds (see Table C10) than the other networks. Al Arabiya also utilized more 
audio manipulations than Alhurra and Al Jazeera English (see Table C6), was more 
likely than Al Jazeera and Alhurra to use graphics (see Table C7), and more likely 
than Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic to have a quicker shot pace (see Table 
C11). 
 When it comes to application of presentation features in Arab Spring 
coverage, the liberal networks were more likely to use graphics (see Table D7), 
animations (see Table D8), and a quicker shot pace (see Table D11). At the network 
level, Al Arabiya was more likely to use decorative transitions (see Table E5), and 
graphics (see Table E7) in Arab Spring coverage. Al Jazeera was more likely to use a 
quick shot pace than BBC Arabic (see Table E10). 
 The analysis of presentation features reveals a distinct separation between 
western and liberal networks. Visuals on the liberal networks emphasized a more 
provocative production style reflected in attention grabbing visual treatments, sound 
enhancements, and a quicker shot pace. These production treatments increase the 
prominence of visuals. Among the individual networks, shots on Al Arabiya were 
more likely to emphasize sensational presentation features. These distinctions were 
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also found to a lesser extent in Al Arabiya’s Arab Spring coverage. The author had 
predicted that the competitive forces inherent in the coverage of conflict and 
breaking news by competition driven media outlets would lead to increased reliance 
on sensational presentation features by Al Jazeera. Contrary to expectations, this 
prediction was only partially supported. Al Arabiya’s coverage still utilized more 
sensational presentation features in Arab Spring coverage.  
 In retrospect, these findings should not be surprising in light of statements by 
Al Arabiya’s management that their news product would emphasize technological 
innovation and “flashy graphics.” A segment of story detailing an insurgent attack on 
a government compound in Baquba, Iraq, illustrates the network’s commitment to 
technologically sophisticated news visuals. The story starts with full-screen video 
footage from the aftermath of the attack and then transitions to shots of the anchor 
standing in front of a large video wall in the studio. The anchor describes the attack 
while a montage of still images scroll across the screen behind him. This transitions 
to a minute and one-half long visual reenactment of the attack. The animated 
reenactment illustrates the location of the attack and how the attack was carried out. 
The animation is complete with burning vehicles, exploding suicide bombers, and 
muzzle flashes from the weapons of insurgents and Iraqi military engaged in a 
firefight. These visual techniques are beyond the level of just “flashy graphics.” 
Instead, they increase the prominence of news visuals on Al Arabiya. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
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 While this study generated some important and interesting findings, a number 
of limitations need to be considered. The limitations presented here focus on the (1) 
sampling frame; (2) the deductive content analysis method; (3) theoretical 
considerations; and (4) networks. An understanding of these limitations should be 
useful in the development of future research. 
In terms of the sampling frame, there are limitations to both the size of the 
sample and content of the sample. From the beginning, the approach of this project 
was to analyze every single news image from each newscast in the sample. Most 
visual studies use a more restrictive unit of analysis like individual stories, or shots 
from specific selections within a newscast. This approach limits the cumulative 
impact of images that are repeated multiple times in a single newscast, or over a 
series of newscasts. While this holistic visual approach provides opportunity to see 
continuing symbols in news coverage, it introduces other limitations. One limitation 
is that all visuals, regardless of type (e.g., graphics, animations, studio shots, field 
shots), were treated the same. Future research could make distinctions based on the 
type of visual using a visual prominence score similar to those utilized by Doyle 
(1982), and Nimmo and Combs (1985). Another limitation of this approach involves 
the sample size. In order to keep the size of the project manageable, the purposive 
sample consisted of only three days of programming selected from the ten-month 
sampling frame. The resulting fifteen hours of programming provided thousands of 
images for the analysis. However, these three days do not necessarily provide a 
representative sample of visuals on pan-Arab satellite TV channels. This is even 
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more problematic for Arab Spring coverage as the sample excluded the non-routine 
breaking news coverage from the most contentious days of the Egyptian and Libyan 
uprisings. 
 Future research should focus on a more detailed visual analysis of Arab 
Spring coverage that includes the non-routine (breaking news) newscasts from the 
height of the Egyptian and Libyan uprisings. Such an analysis could also be 
expanded to include Arab Spring coverage on other networks including state TV 
outlets (e.g. Egyptian TV) and international commercial broadcasters (e. g. CNN). 
For example, Pintak (2011a) noted that at times Egyptian TV broadcast panoramic 
views of the city to avoid showing the conflict taking place in the streets. Ali 
Hashem, a former Al Jazeera correspondent, accused Arab channels of adopting 
some Arab Spring revolutions while avoiding others (2012). He suggests that Arabs 
are increasingly relying on western media outlets for news. His statements suggest 
that an analysis of how the networks framed different uprisings in the region should 
be considered.  
Matthes (2009) noted a lack of reliability reporting in many framing studies. 
While the reliability reported in this study was quite high, it is influenced by the 
deductive content analysis approach. As already noted in the method section, this 
approach is used to search for the occurrence of certain pre-defined frames among 
the variables under analysis. The downside to this approach is the potential to 
overlook frames that were not identified prior to the analysis stage (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000). Dependence on this deductive approach resulted in reliable 
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measures, but may have done so at the expense of additional overlooked visual 
frames. For example, post-study analysis reveals usefulness for an additional 
acquisition feature category labeled “movement” (e.g. camera tilts, pans, elevation 
changes). 
There are also a few theory-based limitations associated with the current 
study. First, a limitation of framing to the current study is the suggestion by media 
scholars that Western communication theory does not adequately account for the 
societal and cultural structures of the Middle East (Hafez, 2001). This echoes 
criticisms by Hallin (1994) that the political economy approach does not account for 
the impact of culture in non-western media. Second, the study does not explore how 
the differing application of frames affects public opinion in the Middle East. While 
the rationale presented in chapter one for this study is based primarily on the 
perceived influence of pan-Arab newscasts on Arab public opinion, the results 
presented here cannot be used to draw those kinds of causal links. As an example, 
the influence of Allhura’s Amerocentric framing on Arab public opinion toward the 
U.S. and the network remains unexplored.  
 Finally, issues related to three of the networks require further elaboration. 
While all the newscasts were approximately an hour long, BBC Arabic’s newscast 
provided more in-depth news and analysis on a smaller number of stories. This 
production style led to significantly fewer stories and shots from BBC Arabic for 
making comparisons. Another issue related to production style involves Alhurra. The 
network revamped its daily news show “The Global” with a new look during the 
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sample period. Alhurra newscasts in the sample include the old (two shows) and new 
(one show) visual styles. The new style featured new graphics, decorative 
enhancements, and other production features. An analysis based only on newscasts 
featuring the new look could lead to different results.  Also, Al Jazeera English was 
included in the current analysis because of its ties to Arabic Al Jazeera and its 
growing popularity as an international broadcaster. Placement of Al Jazeera English 
in the western dimension of the taxonomy may not have been ideal. AJE aired the 
lowest percentage of non-conflict visuals, but the highest percentage of latent violent 
images out of all the networks. In addition, AJE had the highest percentage of violent 
images when latent and explicit violent images were combined. In terms of violent 
content, AJE may have a lot in common with its sister-network. Another 
commonality between the sibling networks was found in use of dramatic sounds in 
Arab Spring coverage. There may be other similarities that were not fully explored in 
this study. The current implication of these similarities is that Al Jazeera English 
may be closer to the liberal commercial pattern than the western pattern. These 
similarities suggest a couple of avenues for future research. A more detailed visual 
analysis could be conducted to explore similarities and differences between Al 
Jazeera English and Al Jazeera. In addition, more systematic analysis of network 
structure should guide future categorization of the individual pan-Arab networks. 
These findings reveal the need for additional systematic analysis of visuals, and the 
factors shaping transnational Arab media. 
 Ayish (2002, 2008) has made repeated calls for systematic analysis of Arab 
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media in order to develop solid theoretical frameworks of pan-Arab television. A 
decade later, systematic analysis of pan-Arab newscasts linked to media system 
characteristics is still under-developed. Matthes (2009) has noted that many scholars 
claim significant numbers of framing studies are too descriptive and atheoretical. 
Development of sophisticated models like those advanced by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) require a rich understanding of the factors that affect television news 
production. The present study does not approach the level of analytical framework 
championed by these scholars. Rather than focusing on the nation state as a unit of 
analysis, the intention was to examine the content of newscasts by utilizing stories 
and shots as the units of analysis. This approach generally appeals to a theoretical 
base through the use of hypotheses grounded in organizational factors, which have 
been called for by other visual scholars (e.g., Fahmy, 2010). The findings, while 
somewhat descriptive, provide important benefits over the anecdotal evidence often 
presented concerning pan-Arab media. Insights gained here can serve as building 
blocks for the future development of more sophisticated models of Arab 
broadcasting, which should be the ultimate goal. Thus, future attempts at building 
macro-theoretical frameworks of pan-Arab television must more fully account for 




 For more than a decade, events have rippled through the Arab world like a 
“political tsunami” powered by information and communication technology (Cottle, 
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2011, p. 249). The Pan-Arab satellite channels have been simultaneously hailed and 
derided for expanding the range of news and views available to the Arab public 
(Khouri, 2001). The current study sought to provide in-depth analysis of the visual 
content of five pan-Arab satellite news networks.  
 The current study adds to the catalog of visual framing research by exploring 
an under-researched aspect of television news through predictions informed by press 
theory and political economy models. As the literature revealed, visual framing 
differs from verbal or textual framing, and has been explored through a number of 
differing approaches. Like many visual framing studies, the current research utilizes 
frequency and prominence to establish frames. In addition, the current study is one of 
the few to emphasize sensational, or tabloid, TV production features. Furthermore, 
the current study introduced a simplified methodology for extracting sensational 
production features in TV news.  
 The main conclusion is that differences exist in how the networks visually 
frame their newscasts. As expected, notable differences were found in terms of story 
selection, content, and production form, particularly in regards to sensational 
attributes. Analysis of the data from the three days of newscasts also revealed unique 
characteristics of each network’s newscasts, suggesting that homogenization of 
transnational Arab news media is not yet a reality. 
 Alhurra presented visuals utilizing a more objective journalistic approach 
laced with U.S. perspectives on the important issues. BBC Arabic appeared to be the 
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most visually conservative of all the networks in terms of presentation of both 
conflict and violence, and sensational production techniques. However, the 
differences between Alhurra and BBC Arabic may not be as overt as BBC Arabic 
management intended, since it is assumed that BBC Arabic was conceived as an 
alternative to Alhurra (Jarrah, 2008). 
 Al Jazeera English clearly shares elements with both the liberal and western 
networks. AJE presented a slick, high-tech newscast that emphasized more conflict 
than any of the other networks. Furthermore, AJE seems to be looking for a place in 
the increasingly crowded international news environment. Although its mission is to 
“reverse the flow of information to the south” (al-Najjar, 2009), AJE also covered 
significant U.S. news stories, including a lengthy story on an early Republican 
presidential debate.  
 The liberal networks were found to emphasize both sensational content and 
production techniques. Al Jazeera was the network found mostly likely to utilize 
images of explicit violence. Al Arabiya has embraced the glitz of sensational 
production techniques. While the liberal networks were generally more violent, the 
visual differences did not appear to be as stark and pervasive as western government 
officials and media critics have let on over the past decade. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of visuals on all the networks were conflict free. The findings from this 
study suggest much of the recent criticism of pan-Arab satellite newscasts could be 
attributed to nothing more than hyper-, over-reaction.   
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Appendix A: Visual Framing Codebook 
 
1. Coder name:  (1) M. Bruce   (2) T. Bruce  (3) Hartwig   2. Air Date: 
___/___/___  
The newscast # will be provided for you on the video file. 
3. Newscast #_________________  
4. Day:  
 (1) Sunday (2) Monday (3) Tuesday (4) Wednesday (5) Thursday (6) Friday 
(7) Saturday  
5. Network:  
 (1) Al Jazeera   (2) Al Jazeera English  (3) Alhurra   (4) BBC Arabic  (5) Al 
Arabiya 
Story # will consist of the newscast # plus the two-digit number of the story, 
numbered consecutively as they appear on the newscast. For example: if the 
newscast # is 15 and you are coding the first story, the story number would be 1501. 
To differentiate the stories, begin watching the newscast. You can generally tell 
when a story changes by listening for pauses and or changes in the anchor’s 
delivery, and watching for changes in the video that accompanies the stories 
(changes in graphics, video subject matter, etc…).  
6. Story # ________ 
To determine the story type, watch each story all the way through. There are often 
several visual cues that can help you determine the correct type. Tease generally 
refers to a video montage that appears at the beginning of the newscast, before or 
after a commercial break, or before a new high-profile story. If you are unclear 
about the story type, circle undecided.  
7. Story:  
(1) accidents/natural disasters (2) agriculture (3) business/economics/tourism     
(4) crime/criminal justice/law and order (5) ecology/environment (6) 
education (7) health care (8) military/national defense (9) politics (10) 
race/religion/culture (11) humanitarian/social problems/services (12) sports 
(13) technology (14) war/terrorism/political unrest (15) 
entertainment/oddities (16) undecided (17) tease. 
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Tease types: opening appears at the beginning of the newscast, break will occur as 
the newscast goes to a commercial break, rejoin occurs after a commercial break, 
high-profile story occurs as a lead-in to a story. 
8. Tease Type. If the answer to question 7 was 17, provide the type of tease 
below.  If not, skip to question 9. 
 (1) opening (2) break (3) rejoin, (4) high-profile story (5) close 
9. Length of Story: _____________ 
Select yes if the story covers the uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, 
Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. 
10. Is the subject of the story about the Arab Spring?  
 (1) Yes (2) No 
The following criteria apply to the coding of all shots. Only visuals appearing in the 
newscast will be coded. Commercial breaks and sponsored messages within the 
newscast will not be coded. Using the guidelines set forth by Keith et al. (2009), a 
shot was counted “each time the shot (subject) changed by video editing or, in the 
case of a pan, each time the subject changed” (p. 7).  When there are multiple 
images on the screen, for example if there is a 2-box shot with one box containing an 
interview shot and another box containing b-roll footage, only code the larger, more 
predominant shot.  
Shot number will consist of the story number plus a 2-digit number for the shot. For 
example, if you are logging the first shot in story #1501, the shot number will be 
150101. 
11. Shot Number:_____________ 
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If clearly identifiable, code the dominant actor in the visual shot.  
13.  If the answer to question 12 was “yes”, answer the following questions. If 
not, skip to question  
 
(1) individual politician (2) political party/government (3) 
authorities/military/police (4) individual civilian (5) civilian population (6) 
foreign politician/authority (7) other  
Select yes if the visual contained an image of: a person that was clearly identifiable 
as an American, a textual reference to the United States (i.e. the words United States 
or similar on the screen), an American symbol like a U.S. passport or the American 
flag, or the visual is clearly located in the United States or its property (i.e. an 
overseas American embassy or military base). 
14.  Images of US citizens, symbols, property used in the shot?  
 (1) Yes (2) No  
15. If yes, what was the tone of the US image. If no, skip to #16. 
 (1) Positive (2) Neutral (3) Negative 
  
Select the correct level of Conflict/Violence for each visual based on the following 
criteria established by Fishman and Marvin (2003) and Groshek (2008):  
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Conflict/Not Violent if the frame contains images of conflict being handled in a 
peaceful manner, such as protest signs and marches.  
 
 
Conflict/Dramatic Violence if the shot contains images of violence that are 
performed but not seriously intended such as for sport or entertainment. 
. 
 
Conflict/Latent Violence shows the immediate application of direct physical force 
but also suggests, that such force could be applied. Examples include the presence of 
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Conflict/Explicit Violence images show either the direct application of, or 
consequences resulting from, violence which is seriously intended and performed. 
Explicit violence includes images of firefights, damage to buildings or property, and 
injuries. The harmful aftermath of violence including the image of anguished victims 
or eyewitnesses was also included as explicit violence.  
 
 
Violence caused by non-manmade agents (natural disasters, animals, weather) will 
not be coded. 
16. Conflict/Violence Frame: 
(1) No Conflict   (2) Conflict/Not Violent  (3) Conflict/Dramatic  (4) Conflict/Latent   
(5) Conflict/Explicit 
For the following structural features code each feature as either present (1) or 
absent (2) by writing the correct number in the blank. Zoom in/out if the camera 
zooms.   
Eyewitness camera is present if the image is shaky or the camera moves with the 
action from the perspective of the participants.   
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Dramatic sounds should be coded as present if the background sounds (natural 
sound) includes sounds of people crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding, 
Dramatic sounds should be coded as present if the background sounds (natural 
sound) includes sounds of people crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding, sounds 
of exploding ammunition, gunshots, sirens and military vehicles/aircraft. Low-angle 
shot is a shot taken from below looking up at the main subject. High-Angle is a shot 
from above looking down at the main subject. 
Acquisition Features used in shot: 
      16._____ Zoom In/Out     17._____ Eyewitness camera   
 18.______XCU      19._____ Dramatic Sounds 
 20.______Low-angle shot     21._____ High-angle shot 
 
Decorative transitions will be coded present if one or more of these transitions: 
dissolve, fade-in, fade-out, wipe, or flash was used between shots. Because the 
transitions are used between two or more shots, rather than as part of a single shot, 
the transition effect will be coded with the shot that precedes it.  Slow motion will be 
coded present if the effect occurred in a shot. Visual enhancements refer to post-
production techniques that are designed to draw attention to, or away from, 
particular elements in an image. The freeze frame occurs when the video image is 
frozen, or stilled, for the duration of the shot. The highlight occurs when part of the 
image is highlighted, or spotlighted, to emphasize and area of the screen. The 
mosaic occurs when part of the image is blurred, or otherwise rendered 
unrecognizable, in order to protect someone’s, or something’s identity. Code the 
visual enhancements present if a freeze frame, highlight, or mosaic is applied to the 
shot. Audio manipulations are coded as present if sound effects or music is added to 
news items.  
A graphic is a full-screen image that may contain, video and text, but is primarily 
photo based. Animation refers to 2D or 3D images in motion created to illustrate the 
elements of the story. 
 
Split-screen or box  When a split-screen or box appears, code the images in the 
largest frame. 
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Monitor or video wall background 
Do not code as present if the image contains just a generic background, network 
logo, or cityscape. 
 
 
Presentation Features used in shot: 
      22._____ Decorative Transitions      23._____ Slow-motion      
 24.______Visual Enhancements   25._____ Audio Manipulations 
 26.______Graphic        27._____ Animation 
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Appendix B: Logistic Regression Tables for H4 Individual 
Indicators 
To analyze the individual features in routine news at the level of network 
taxonomy, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with 
a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled networks as the reference 
category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis 
controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, 
crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and 
presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample 
(XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and visual enhancement) were generally excluded 
from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would 
produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent 
variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks. 
 
 




Zoom Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.66 0.15 -18.23 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.32 0.19 1.73 0.084 
Shot Length 0.02 0.01 3.43 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.38 0.19 -2.00 0.046 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 








Eyewitness Camera Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.60 0.20 -12.83 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial -0.27 0.24 -1.14 0.253 
Shot Length -0.05 0.01 -6.71 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 1.14 0.24 4.75 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.07 (χ2 = 59.97, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
 





Dramatic Sound by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.45 0.33 -13.56 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial -0.46 0.36 -1.30 0.195 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -2.10 0.036 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.28 0.33 0.86 0.390 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 7.02 (χ2 = 34.99, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
 




High Angle Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.66 0.17 -15.49 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial -0.36 0.23 -1.55 0.121 
Shot Length -0.04 0.01 -4.67 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.37 0.22 -1.67 0.095 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2.88 (χ2 = 51.25, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Decorative Transitions by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.53 0.26 -13.57 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 1.27 0.31 4.13 <0.001 
Shot Length 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.585 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -2.04 0.32 -6.33 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 80,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 5.51 (χ2 = 43.30, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Audio Manipulations by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.39 0.71 -6.15 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 2.39 0.79 3.04 0.002 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.17 0.030 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -3.64 0.69 -5.31 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 150,000, Burn-in = 5,000. 
The variance of the constant across stories is 39.69 (χ2 = 25.81, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Graphics by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.28 0.29 -14.84 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.78 0.32 2.42 0.016 
Shot Length 0.04 0.01 5.86 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.38 0.33 1.18 0.240 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. 
The variance of the constant across stories is 6.52 (χ2 = 45.56, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Animation by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.20 0.31 -13.58 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 1.05 0.36 2.92 0.003 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.73 0.006 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -2.07 0.41 -5.06 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 150,000, Burn-in = 5,000. 
The variance of the constant across stories is 7.15 (χ2 = 37.55, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Split Screen / Box by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -8.68 0.83 -10.40 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.994 
Shot Length -0.03 0.01 -3.71 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 2.69 0.68 3.95 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n= 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 23.42 (χ2 = 28.55, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Monitor by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.73 0.26 -14.33 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.03 0.33 0.09 0.926 
Shot Length 0.02 0.01 2.88 0.004 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.37 0.33 -1.13 0.260 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 5.92 (χ2 = 42.21, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Shot Pace by Network Taxonomy in H4 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant 0.78 0.08 9.56 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.33 0.11 3.09 0.002 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.40 0.11 -3.76 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is .62 (χ2 = 52.26, df = 1, p 0.003). Since 
editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in 
seconds was not included as a control variable.   
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Appendix C: Logistic Regression Tables for H5 Individual 
Indicators 
To analyze the individual features in routine news at the network level, a 
multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a dummy 
coded taxonomy featuring Al Arabiya as the reference category, and controls for shot 
length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type (a 
dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and shot 
length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that represented 
less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and 
visual enhancement) were generally excluded from this additional analysis. Five 
percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce stable logistic regression 
models. This was the case because the dependent variable, did not vary (i.e., did not 
appear) for some networks. 
 




Zoom Shots by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.15 0.21 -10.29 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -0.43 0.29 -1.51 0.131 
Al Jazeera English -0.61 0.27 -2.29 0.022 
Alhurra -0.33 0.27 -1.24 0.214 
BBC Arabic -0.64 0.35 -1.86 0.064 
Shot Length 0.02 0.01 3.43 0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.40 0.19 -2.05 0.041 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 1.91 (χ2 = 48.44, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Eyewitness Camera by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.10 0.28 -10.94 <0.001 
Al Jazeera 0.48 0.40 1.21 0.225 
Al Jazeera English 0.68 0.35 1.93 0.053 
Alhurra 0.56 0.35 1.60 0.110 
BBC Arabic -0.32 0.46 -0.69 0.493 
Shot Length -0.05 0.01 -6.86 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 1.21 0.24 4.99 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000 Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.09 (χ2 = 62.06, df = 1, p <.001). 
 
 




Dramatic Sound by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -5.77 0.56 -10.23 <0.001 
Al Jazeera 1.81 0.62 2.94 0.003 
Al Jazeera English 1.77 0.58 3.08 0.002 
Alhurra 0.92 0.60 1.53 0.126 
BBC Arabic 0.59 0.71 0.84 0.403 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -2.10 0.036 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.39 0.39 1.00 0.316 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 60,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 6.95 (χ2 = 33.76, df = 1, p <.001). 
 
 




High Angle Shots by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.93 0.25 -11.70 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -0.20 0.34 -0.60 0.547 
Al Jazeera English 0.37 0.31 1.18 0.237 
Alhurra 0.45 0.33 1.36 0.174 
BBC Arabic -0.62 0.46 -1.35 0.176 
Shot Length -0.04 0.01 -4.30 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.32 0.23 -1.40 0.162 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2.79 (χ2 = 49.92, df = 1, p <.001). 
 





Decorative Transitions by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -1.62 0.28 -5.82 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -1.61 0.43 -3.76 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -2.15 0.43 -5.00 <0.001 
Alhurra -1.19 0.39 -3.04 0.002 
BBC Arabic -3.07 0.64 -4.81 <0.001 
Shot Length 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.585 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -2.05 0.31 -6.54 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.97 (χ2 = 105.20, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Audio Manipulations by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -1.669 0.76 -2.196 0.028 
Al Jazeera -3.385 0.98 -3.454 0.001 
Al Jazeera English -3.385 0.98 -3.454 0.001 
Alhurra -3.384 1.118 -3.027 0.002 
BBC Arabic -0.611 1.509 -0.405 0.686 
Shot Length -0.049 0.096 -0.510 0.610 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -3.714 0.673 -5.519 0.000 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 40.45 (χ2 = 29.79, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Graphics by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.59 0.29 -8.98 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -2.26 0.48 -4.73 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.35 0.38 -0.93 0.353 
Alhurra -4.62 0.64 -7.21 0.002 
BBC Arabic -0.81 0.52 -1.55 0.122 
Shot Length 0.04 0.01 5.88 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.32 0.31 1.03 0.305 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 50,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 5.05 (χ2 = 39.66, df = 1, p <.001). 
 
 




Animation by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.69 0.34 -8.01 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -1.21 0.51 -2.38 0.017 
Al Jazeera English -1.22 0.48 -2.53 0.011 
Alhurra -1.52 0.49 -3.07 0.002 
BBC Arabic -1.91 0.69 -2.77 0.006 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.73 0.006 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -2.12 0.41 -5.22 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 90,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 6.99 (χ2 = 36.05, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Split Screen / Box by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -8.46 0.81 -10.46 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -0.92 1.26 -0.73 0.468 
Al Jazeera English -0.28 0.99 -0.28 0.776 
Alhurra -0.90 0.99 -0.91 0.362 
BBC Arabic 1.73 0.99 1.75 0.080 
Shot Length -0.03 0.01 -3.25 0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 2.42 0.80 3.01 0.003 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 24.43 (χ2 = 20.69, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Monitor by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.26 0.26 -8.65 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -5.07 0.74 -6.89 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.01 0.34 -0.02 0.986 
Alhurra -3.17 0.47 -6.78 <0.001 
BBC Arabic -1.54 0.50 -3.12 0.002 
Shot Length 0.02 0.01 2.88 0.004 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.56 0.30 -1.88 0.060 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 95,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.08 (χ2 = 40.05, df = 1, p <.001). 
 
 




Shot Pace by Network in H5 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant 1.16 0.11 10.41 <0.001 
Al Jazeera -0.11 0.16 -0.71 0.479 
Al Jazeera English -0.39 0.15 -2.64 0.008 
Alhurra -0.21 0.15 -1.43 0.153 
BBC Arabic -0.68 0.19 -3.50 <0.001 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.39 0.11 -3.61 <0.001 
Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 45,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is .61 (χ2 = 52.74, df = 1, p <.001). Since 
editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in 
seconds was not included as a control variable.   
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Appendix D: Logistic Regression Tables for H8 Individual 
Indicators 
To analyze the individual features in Arab Spring coverage at the level of 
network taxonomy, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression 
model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western networks as the reference 
category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis 
controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, 
crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and 
presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample 
(XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and visual enhancement) were generally excluded 
from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would 
produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent 
variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks. 
 




Zoom Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.72 0.61 -4.46 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 1.34 0.46 2.93 0.003 
Shot Length 0.01 0.01 1.22 0.222 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.70 0.58 -1.21 0.228 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2.78 (χ2 = 12.08, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
 




Eyewitness Camera in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -0.41 0.63 -0.65 0.513 
Liberal Commercial -0.68 0.50 -1.36 0.176 
Shot Length -0.01 0.01 -1.29 0.199 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.34 0.62 -0.55 0.586 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 3.79 (χ2 = 15.10, df = 1, p < .001). 
 




Dramatic Sounds in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.23 0.83 -3.90 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial -0.76 0.54 -1.40 0.163 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -1.55 0.122 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.27 0.79 0.35 0.729 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.52 (χ2 = 10.01, df = 1, p = 0.002). 
 
 




High Angle Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.74 0.54 -6.97 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.24 0.42 0.56 0.577 
Shot Length -0.01 0.01 -0.70 0.484 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.98 0.50 1.96 0.050 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2.16 (χ2 = 10.00, df = 1, p = 0.002). 
 




Decorative Transitions in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.099 2.134 -1.921 0.055 
Liberal Commercial 3.144 1.495 2.103 0.035 
Shot Length -0.026 0.028 -0.929 0.353 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -4.979 2.194 -2.269 0.023 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 27.24 (χ2 = 4.18, df = 1, p = 0.040). 
 




Audio Manipulations in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.82 2.67 -1.06 0.291 
Liberal Commercial 2.18 2.39 0.91 0.361 
Shot Length 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.863 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -10.28 3.33 -3.09 0.002 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 62.65 (χ2 = 3.92, df = 1, p = 0.048). 
 




Graphics in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -6.05 1.79 -3.38 0.001 
Liberal Commercial 2.76 1.21 2.28 0.023 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.08 0.038 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.32 1.56 0.20 0.840 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 21.31 (χ2 = 8.36, df = 1, p = 0.004). 
 




Animations in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -7.03 1.22 -5.78 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 2.46 0.95 2.59 0.010 
Shot Length -0.001 0.03 -0.41 0.679 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.25 1.04 -0.24 0.811 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations =125,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 250.46 (χ2 = 4.28, df = 1, p = 0.039). 
 




Split Screens / Boxes in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -11.32 3.55 -3.19 0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.68 1.79 0.38 0.703 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -2.11 0.035 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 5.11 2.36 2.16 0.031 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 40.13 (χ2 = 3.81, df = 1, p = 0.050). 
 




Monitors in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -7.47 1.62 -4.60 <0.001 
Liberal Commercial 0.60 1.17 0.51 0.609 
Shot Length -0.001 0.02 -0.06 0.956 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 1.77 1.47 1.20 0.229 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 404.50 (χ2 = 11.97, df = 1, p = 0.005). 
 




Shot Pace in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant 1.02 0.34 3.03 0.002 
Liberal Commercial 0.63 0.26 2.45 0.014 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.92 0.33 -2.79 1.995 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 145,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 0.89 (χ2 = 14.52, df = 1, p <.001). Since 
editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in 
seconds was not included as a control variable.   
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Appendix E: Logistic Regression Tables for H9 Individual 
Indicators 
To analyze the individual features in Arab Spring coverage at the network 
level, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a 
dummy coded taxonomy featuring Al Jazeera as the reference category, and controls 
for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type 
(a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and 
shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that 
represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow 
motion, visual enhancement, and monitors) were generally excluded from this 
additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce 
stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent variable, 
did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks. 
 




Zoom Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -1.71 0.63 -2.71 0.007 
Al Jazeera English -0.40 0.77 -0.51 0.609 
Alhurra -0.89 0.73 -1.23 0.221 
BBC Arabic -1.19 0.76 -1.57 0.116 
Al Arabiya 0.86 0.64 1.35 0.178 
Shot Length 0.01 0.01 1.10 0.271 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.90 0.54 -1.67 0.095 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 









Eyewitness Camera in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -0.90 0.61 -1.47 0.141 
Al Jazeera English 0.58 0.83 0.70 0.484 
Alhurra 0.61 0.64 0.96 0.340 
BBC Arabic -1.33 0.75 -1.77 0.077 
Al Arabiya -1.12 0.67 -1.66 0.096 
Shot Length -0.01 0.01 -1.29 0.199 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.27 0.59 0.45 0.651 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 3.29 (χ2 = 13.85, df = 1, p <.001). 
 




Dramatic Sound in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -3.32 0.74 -4.50 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English 1.57 0.95 1.66 0.097 
Alhurra -0.86 0.83 -1.04 0.297 
BBC Arabic -0.69 0.90 -0.76 0.445 
Al Arabiya -1.48 0.83 -1.79 0.074 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -1.64 0.102 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 0.48 0.77 0.63 0.529 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 4.14 (χ2 = 8.01, df = 1, p <.005). 
 




High Angle Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.62 0.51 -5.10 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English 0.42 0.71 0.60 0.550 
Alhurra -0.23 0.62 -0.37 0.714 
BBC Arabic -0.63 0.71 -0.88 0.378 
Al Arabiya 0.10 0.59 0.17 0.867 
Shot Length -0.01 0.01 -1.18 0.237 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.54 0.35 -1.54 0.124 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 2.22 (χ2 = 7.98, df = 1, p <.005). 
 




Decorative Transitions in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -4.338 1.919 -2.261 0.024 
Al Jazeera English 3.764 2.623 1.435 0.151 
Alhurra 0.626 2.389 0.262 0.793 
BBC Arabic -0.112 2.905 -0.039 0.969 
Al Arabiya 6.167 2.344 2.631 0.009 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.08 0.038 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -5.732 1.934 -2.964 0.003 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 150,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 23.30 (χ2 = 3.79, df = 1, p = 0.052). 
 




Audio Manipulation in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -2.997 2.939 -1.020 0.308 
Al Jazeera English -0.282 5.992 -0.047 0.962 
Alhurra -7.555 6.841 -1.104 0.269 
BBC Arabic 2.698 5.25 0.514 0.607 
Al Arabiya 4.268 3.91 1.092 0.275 
Shot Length 0.004 0.029 0.138 0.890 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -11.557 3.203 -3.608 0.000 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 84.67 (χ2 = 2.04, df = 1, p = 0.153). 
 




Graphics in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -5.43 1.83 -2.97 0.003 
Al Jazeera English 1.66 1.99 0.83 0.405 
Alhurra -5.52 2.88 -1.92 0.055 
BBC Arabic 2.27 1.93 1.18 0.239 
Al Arabiya 4.42 1.81 2.45 0.014 
Shot Length 0.03 0.01 2.08 0.038 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.48 1.66 -0.29 0.773 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 19.91 (χ2 = 6.75, df = 1, p = 0.009). 
 




Animation in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -5.38 1.36 -3.95 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.6 1.72 -0.35 0.726 
Alhurra -3.99 2.14 -1.87 0.062 
BBC Arabic -2.45 1.88 -1.30 0.193 
Al Arabiya 0.94 1.28 0.73 0.466 
Shot Length -0.01 0.03 -0.41 0.679 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.21 1.19 -0.18 0.858 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 8.92 (χ2 = 3.69, df = 1, p = 0.05). 
 




Split Screen / Box in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant -7.27 1.52 -4.78 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English 0.64 2.79 0.23 0.818 
Alhurra -3.28 2.80 -1.17 0.242 
BBC Arabic 1.70 2.93 0.58 0.562 
Al Arabiya 0.53 1.90 0.28 0.779 
Shot Length -0.02 0.01 -2.11 0.035 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict 1.37 1.76 0.78 0.436 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is 33.57 (χ2 = 8.07, df = 1, p = 0.005). 
 
 258  
 
 
Table E10  
Shot Pace in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9 
Variable B S.E. Z P 
Constant 1.67 0.37 4.53 <0.001 
Al Jazeera English -0.74 0.46 -1.60 1.890 
Alhurra -0.55 0.39 -1.41 0.158 
BBC Arabic -0.86 0.42 -2.08 0.038 
Al Arabiya -0.11 0.39 -0.29 0.774 
Story Type – Politics/Conflict -0.85 0.34 -2.51 0.012 
Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The 
variance of the constant across stories is .92 (χ2 = 13.91, df = 1, p <.001). Since 
editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in 
seconds was not included as a control variable.   
 
 
